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Introduction 1 
1 Introduction 
Although companies are linked to each other through a supply chain, they often only 
focus on their own business in order to achieve their goals. Such individual optimization 
is known to be a major source of inefficiencies within supply chains, because the goals 
of the individual supply chain members are typically contradictory. This leads to 
individually optimal decisions that harm the overall supply chain performance (Lee et 
al. (1997), Cachon (2003), Arshinder et al. (2011)). A common example for a 
suboptimal supply chain performance caused by individual optimization within supply 
chains is the double marginalization effect that was first identified by Spengler (1950). 
Consider a supply chain, in which a supplier sells goods to a buyer, who, in turn, sells 
these goods to end-customers. In order to maximize his profit, the supplier will charge a 
prize that is above his respective marginal cost. The buyer, in turn, will again charge a 
surplus on his marginal costs (i.e. on the selling price of the supplier) leading to a 
suboptimally high end customer price. Hereby, the caused loss of welfare is more 
pronounced the higher the degree of the supply chain member’s market power is. 
In the research area of supply chain management companies within a supply chain are 
no longer viewed at in isolation. Instead, the focus gets extended to the interactions (e.g. 
delivery of goods, sharing of information) between those companies. This way, the 
previously wasted potential of the supply chain can get revealed and advanced supply 
chain mechanisms can be developed that enable the supply chain to utilize this hidden 
potential. Such advanced supply chain mechanisms consist of vertical contracts between 
the supply chain parties (e.g. a quantity discount, a buyback contract, a revenue sharing 
contract (Cachon (2003)) or a screening contract (Corbett and de Groote (2000), Ha 
(2000), Corbett (2001)), information technology and sharing (e.g. sharing demand, 
orders, inventory and/ or point of sale data) or other forms of collaboration between the 
supply chain parties (e.g. vendor managed inventory (Cheung and Lee, 2002), 
collaborative forecasting and planning (Skjoett-Larsen et al. (2003), quick response 
(Choi and Sethi (2010)). In an ideal case, all supply chain members benefit from 
implementing advanced mechanisms as the additional profit is shared amongst them. In 
this case, all supply chain members would be willing to accept the implementation of 
those mechanisms. 
As discussed, the inefficiency is caused by uncoordinated optimization within supply 
chains. Hence, the advanced mechanisms from the area of supply chain management 
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aim to coordinate the decisions within the supply chain by aligning the objectives of the 
supply chain members with the objectives of the supply chain. This way an individually 
optimal decision will be identical to the decision that is optimal from the perspective of 
the entire supply chain. One typical mechanism to achieve this alignment are contracts 
that are concluded between the supply chain members and define the conditions for 
interaction within the supply chain (e.g. pricing schemes or the commitment to share 
specific information). A contract that perfectly aligns the incentives of the supply chain 
members and, therefore, unlocks the full potential of the supply chain gets referred to as 
a coordinating contract. 
Another source of inefficiencies within supply chains is caused by uncoordinated 
inventory decisions. Despite causing holding costs, companies utilize inventory for a 
number of well documented reasons. For example, classical reasons to hold inventory 
refer to the decoupling of production/ procurement and demand. This way companies 
can smooth their production/ procurement (e.g. in the case of high seasonal demand) or 
utilize economies of scale in production/ procurement by producing/ procuring more 
items than needed to satisfy the actual demand. Moreover, companies might build up 
inventory to hedge against uncertainties. A common example for this is the build-up of 
safety stocks in case of stochastic demand. This way the company ensures that it will be 
able to serve its customers even if the demand exceeds the expectations. Further, 
companies might hedge themselves against increasing prices by building up a 
speculative stock. Last, during the transportation of items pipeline inventory emerges. 
Focusing on these classical reasons to hold inventory, a major fraction of research in the 
area of supply chain management has analyzed the deficits1 that occur under 
uncoordinated inventory management within supply chains.2 
However, a recently emerging branch of research on the effects of non-cooperative 
behavior in supply chains is concerned with the effects of multi-period interaction in 
supply chains with vertical competition between a supplier and a buyer, who both 
possess a high degree of monopoly power (e.g. Anand et al. (2008), Desai et al. (2010), 
Arya and Mittendorf (2013)). One of the surprising findings in this literature is that 
buyers possess an incentive to build up an inventory caused by purely strategically 
                                                 
1 For example, a buyer might prefer to order small quantities from his supplier in order to reduce holding 
costs. But, the supplier, in turn, might prefer a larger delivery size aiming to reduce the frequency of 
orders, which reduces the costs of delivery. 
2 Tsay et al. (1998) give a good review on the literature including deterministic and stochastic demand 
models, while Cachon’s (2003) more recent review focuses on models with stochastic demand. 
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considerations, even if other motivations do not exist. Hence, this so called strategic 
inventory that was first discovered by Anand et al. (2008) clearly differs from the 
classical reasons to hold inventory, because it is built up by buyers solely to offset the 
strategic advantage that a monopolistic supplier otherwise has. Regarding the supply 
chain performance, this might be good news as strategic inventory can partly offset the 
disadvantages of the double marginalization effect3 that is caused by individual 
optimization. As a result, strategic inventory can be advantageous to the overall supply 
chain performance although creating additional holding cost. However, at the same time 
the buyer’s possibility to utilize inventory in a strategic manner hinders the 
implementation of contracts that were developed without taking multi-period interaction 
into account from continuing to coordinate the supply chain. More precisely, Anand et 
al. (2008) have shown that the supplier is no longer able to propose a dynamic vertical 
contract that simultaneously coordinates the supply chain and allows a free distribution 
of the supply chain profit between supplier and buyer. 
Based on the findings of Anand et al. (2008) various studies focusing on strategic 
inventory have been conducted. For example, Keskinocak et al. (2008) introduce a 
capacity constraint for the supplier’s first-period production/ procurement quantity. 
Desai et al. (2010) integrate a discount factor into the model of Anand et al. (2008) and 
investigate duopoly settings both for suppliers as well as for retailers. However, the 
existing literature on strategic inventories focuses on expansions of the theoretical 
findings. Hence, strategic inventories lack a validation regarding the practical relevance. 
This is especially important as previous studies on supply chain interaction have shown 
that real decision makers do not simply maximize their profit but also have a tendency 
to consider fairness consequences (Cui et al., 2007; Loch and Wu, 2008; Pavlov and 
Katok, 2011). In order to get an empirical foundation of the utilization of strategic 
inventory in vertical competition, an experiment with real decision makers who have the 
option to apply strategic inventory gets presented in this thesis. 
Moreover, the current literature (Desai et al. (2010), Viswanathan and Jang (2009)) only 
examines horizontal competition in duopoly settings. However, in practice, a higher 
number (than two) of horizontal competitors often exists in the market. An examination 
                                                 
3 Intuitively, strategic inventory in a multi-period supply chain game reduces the monopoly power of a 
supplier, because the inventory acts as a “virtual competitor” and leads to a reduced equilibrium 
wholesale price, which in turn allows the buyer to reduce the market price and serve a larger number of 
customers.  
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of the effects of horizontal competition between an arbitrary number of buyers is 
conducted in this thesis. 
In the study of Anand et al. (2008), a constant per unit holding cost rate is used. This 
assumption is critical, as in practice holding costs partially depend on the purchasing 
cost. As long as the purchasing costs maintain constant within the model this is no 
thread for the general validity of the model. However, a major effect of strategic 
inventories is a shift in the supplier’s wholesale price determination. To fully cover the 
price effects of strategic inventory, purchasing cost depending holding costs have to be 
used. Desai et al. (2010) already studied strategic inventory within a discount rate model 
(i.e. later cash flows get discounted). In this thesis, an inventory interest rate model is 
additionally considered and compared to both the standard model by Anand et al. 
(2008) as well as to the discounted cash flow model by Desai et al. (2010). 
While strategic inventory may increase supply chain performance, it also causes holding 
cost and, therefore, impairs supply chain performance. As physically holding inventory 
does not seem to be mandatory for its positive effect, it is unclear if an obligation of the 
supplier to deliver goods at a predefined price to the buyer does not lead to better supply 
chain performance. 
 
This thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2, companies’ reasons to build up 
inventory will be explained. Thereby, the companies’ incentive to build up inventory 
will be divided into two sections. In the first section, classical reasons like decoupling 
of procurement, production and demand (anticipation stock, cycle inventory), hedging 
against uncertainty (safety stock) or price speculation will be introduced in more 
detailed form. In the second chapter, an overview on the latest research regarding 
strategic reasons to build up inventory is given. 
In the first section of chapter 3, the double marginalization effect will be demonstrated 
by analyzing a single-period model with one supplier and one buyer. Using the solution 
of an integrated channel as a benchmark, it will be shown that the double 
marginalization effect is caused by individual and uncoordinated optimization in a 
vertical supply chain. Moreover, using a two-part tariff as an example, the coordinating 
effect of more sophisticated contracts is demonstrated. In the second section of 
chapter 3, the two-period model of Anand et al. (2008) that serves as the baseline model 
of the forthcoming theoretical expansions will be reviewed. Hereby, the dynamics that 
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are caused by the buyer’s possibility to utilize inventory as a strategic tool will be 
explained. 
In chapter 4, a laboratory study will be presented. Although, the utilization of strategic 
inventory is predicted in theory it is not self-evident that it also gets utilized by human 
decision makers. In order to utilize inventory as a strategic tool as described in theory, 
decision makers are required to demonstrate a high degree of strategic sophistication in 
their behavior. Given the extensive literature on behavioral biases in single-period 
supply chain interactions, however, it is not self-evident that theoretically predicted 
efficiency gains are behaviorally sustained in this type of multi-period interplay. 
The results of the laboratory investigation give strong empirical support for the 
utilization of strategic inventory and, moreover, identifies behavioral effects that top off 
the purely strategic effect of inventory. Seeking a more equitable payoff distribution in 
the supply chain, the buyers get empowered through strategic inventory and may harm 
the supply chain performance by choosing suboptimal small inventories. But, this 
negative effect of buyer empowerment on supply chain performance is generally offset 
by a positive effect of lower first-period prices. 
Since the behavioral study in chapter 4 gives strong empirical support for the theory of 
strategic inventory, the theoretical analysis will be extended to scope a broader range of 
scenarios that are closer to real world scenarios. 
In chapter 5, the validity of the findings regarding strategic inventory will be tested 
considering the case of a diverging supply chain structure with multiple buyers. Hence, 
the vertical competition that caused the utilization of strategic inventory in multi-period 
interaction will be supplemented by horizontal competition between the buyers. This 
allows to test whether strategic inventory continues to play a pivotal role, even if the 
market power on the side of the buyers decreases. The analysis proves that strategic 
inventory remains relevant in a diverging supply chain structure. However, as the 
monopoly power of the buyers decreases under increasing horizontal competition, the 
supply chain profit converges to the first-best solution. Consequently, the relevance of 
strategic inventory decreases as less space for an improvement of the supply chain profit 
exists. 
In chapter 6, holding costs that depend on the buyer’s purchasing costs are introduced. 
This is an advisable modification, since the original constant per unit holding cost rate 
like it is postulated in Anand et al. (2008) does not take into account that the purchasing 
costs of the buyer are affected by strategic inventory. Hence, the buyer would likely also 
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face changing holding costs that cannot be represented by constant per unit holding 
costs. In the first section of chapter 6, the holding costs get replaced by an inventory 
interest rate. This way, fluctuations of the purchasing costs are directly reflected in the 
holding costs. The results show that the function of strategic inventory persists under 
this assumption. 
In the second section of chapter 6, a discounted cash flow approach gets applied. 
Hereby, all cash flows that are generated in the second period will be discounted. 
Hence, also the supplier has an incentive to generate a higher profit in the first-period. 
In contrast to the model with an inventory interest rate, the discounted cash flow 
approach causes strong structural changes in stocking decisions. 
In chapter 7, the theoretical analysis aims to eliminate the holding costs that occur 
through the physical build-up of strategic inventory. Thereby, the supplier is enabled to 
offer the buyer the option to preorder items at a specific price. Hence, the buyer can 
acquire items for the second period without having to pay costs for holding an 
inventory. The analysis will show that the solution strongly depends on the size of the 
holding cost parameter and that preorders indeed are able to replace physical strategic 
inventory. Surprisingly, the supply chain profit is larger if holding costs are high as this 
enables the supplier to implement a solution, in which he does no longer cause an 
increase of the double marginalization effect in the first-period like in the model of 
Anand et al. (2008). 
Finally, chapter 8 summarizes the results of the theoretical and behavioral findings of 
this thesis and outlines directions for future research in the area of strategic inventory. 
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2 Companies’ Reasons to hold Inventory 
Holding inventory causes costs for companies that can be separated into different 
components. First, capital costs arise because holding inventory locks up capital for the 
companies. As this capital cannot be used for other purposes, it causes opportunity costs 
(in the simplest case, these could be foregone interest on the locked capital). Second, the 
value of stored goods might decrease as they become obsolete or be forfeited 
completely as the goods deteriorate. Third, the company has expenses to provide the 
storage place (i.e. cost for the building and the necessary equipment). Last, running a 
warehouse causes operating costs like personal expenses, electricity costs or the 
insurance of the stored goods. 
In terms of cost cutting, it could be assumed that companies should avoid using 
inventory at all. In fact, a common denominator of definitions of the just-in-time 
approach contains the philosophy of pursuing zero inventories4 or a bare minimum of 
work-in-process inventory5. In practice, however, it can be observed that a major 
fraction of companies’ locked up capital is caused by their inventory. In Germany 
(2012), for instance, the locked up capital through inventory on the total assets averages 
at 10.1% for affiliated groups and at 16.6% for the subsidiaries (i.e. without the 
holding).6 Hence, companies likely gain benefits from holding inventory that outweigh 
their holding costs. Reasons to build up inventory may either be motivated by the 
procurement, production and/ or selling processes of a company itself (referred to as 
classical reasons to build up inventory) or by strategic considerations regarding the 
other parties within a company’s supply chain. Following Moellgaard et al. (2000), the 
latter case, in which the explicit purpose of holding inventory is to influence the 
decisions of horizontal or vertical supply chain members, gets referred to as strategic 
inventory. 
The various classical reasons to carry inventory will be described in section 2.1, while 
inventory that is build up due to strategic considerations within supply chains will be 
presented in section 2.2. 
                                                 
4 Vollmann et al. (2005) p.301 
5 Nahmias (2009) p. 369 
6 “Monthly Report July 2014” of the Deutsche Bundesbank, p. 58 
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2.1 Classical Reasons for Holding Inventory 
The functions7 that inventory fulfils within the procurement, production and/ or selling 
processes of a company are summarized in Figure 1 and will be separately described in 
detail in the following subsections. 
 
  Function  Denotation 
    Anticipation Stock 
 
 Decoupling of Procurement, 
Production and Demand 
 
 
    Cycle Inventory 
     
  
Hedging against 
Uncertainties 
 Safety Stock 
Inventory     
  Price Speculation  Speculation Stock 
     
  Transportation  Pipeline Inventory 
Figure 1: Classical Reasons to Hold Inventory 
2.1.1 Anticipation Stock 
Under ideal conditions, companies would start the production of items in a way that the 
production is finished at exactly the time at which demand occurs. Moreover, the 
necessary input factors for the production would be delivered exactly at the start of the 
production. This way, both an inventory for input factors as well as for finished goods 
could be avoided. However, such a just-in-time approach often is not the optimal 
approach in a real world scenario, where it might be beneficial to use inventory to 
implement the possibility for a temporal separation of purchasing, production and 
shipment processes. 
A common reason to separate production and demand is seasonality of the demand. 
Products like air conditioners, winter jackets or Christmas gifts have a known seasonal 
peak (i.e. a predictable variation). Producing such items just-in-time would cause a high 
variation of production quantities. As a result the capacity (workers and machines) of 
the facility must be sufficiently high to produce enough items even in high peak periods. 
At the same time, in the low demand periods (i.e. out of the season) the capacity 
remains largely unused. To alleviate the described disruptions caused by variable 
                                                 
7 Vollman et al. (2005) pp. 135-136, Nahmias (2009) p. 198, pp. 202-203 
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production rates, anticipation stock can be used. This enables the company to smooth 
the production by building up inventory in the low demand periods that then gets 
depleted during the peak demand periods. Therefore, companies have to solve a trade-
off between holding and capacity costs to determine the optimal level of anticipation 
stock.8 
2.1.2 Cycle Inventory 
Economies of Scale exist, if the average procurement or production costs per unit are 
decreasing with an increase of the procurement or production quantity. Reasons for 
economies of scale in procurement are, for example, fixed cost per order or a quantity 
discount of the supplier. In the production process, economies of scale may, for 
example, arise because companies may have to clean the equipment or to reconfigure 
the machines before starting the production of a certain product. By increasing the 
quantity of a production batch, the setup costs that arise from setting up a production lot 
are shared between a larger number of units. Therefore, an increase of the production lot 
leads to lower average unit costs. 
In order to benefit from economies of scale, it could be economical for companies to 
order or produce larger quantities than needed to satisfy the immediate requirement. 
Hence, companies have to solve a trade-off between holding and order costs. The so-
called economic order quantity9 that aims to solve this trade-off may be one of the most 
prominent inventory models. Stock that is built up to use benefits from economies of 
scale is referred to as cycle inventory. 
2.1.3 Safety Stock 
Next to predictable variations in demand, companies are also confronted with 
uncertainties regarding their supply, their production process or their demand 
(stochastic variations). 
Although creating forecasts, the exact amount of customer’s demand is usually 
unknown. If production exactly covers the forecasted demand and the customers 
demand exceeds the forecast, the company could no longer satisfy the entire demand of 
its customers. This would result in lost sales and/ or forfeit of customers’ goodwill. By 
holding an additional safety stock, companies can reduce the risk of being out of stock. 
                                                 
8 A good overview, how to solve this trade-off , is given in Chapter 3 (pp. 124-162) of Nahmias (2009). 
9 See Chapter 4.5 (pp. 210-217) of Nahmias (2009) for a detailed description of the economic order 
quantity model. 
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The newsvendor problem, as one of the most popular inventory models, considers this 
trade-off between cost of having too few items (i.e. lost sales/ loss of goodwill) and 
having too much items (holding or salvage costs).10 
While demand uncertainty is perhaps the most important reason to hold safety stock, a 
multitude of additional reasons exist. One of them is the uncertainty of production/ 
delivery lead times. Regarding the supply, the lead time describes the span between 
placing an order and its arrival. If the lead time is higher than expected, companies face 
the risk of having too few input items, which would disrupt the production process. 
Regarding the production, lead time describes the span that is required to produce an 
item. However, if the production process takes longer than expected, the company 
might fail to fulfill the customer’s demand. By building up safety stock a smooth flow 
of the production and sales processes can be ensured. Other uncertainties include the 
risk of disruption, yield risk of a production/ procurement process11 or poor availability 
of input factors (e.g. oil in the 1970s12). 
2.1.4 Speculation Stock 
If a company expects that the price of one of their input factors increases in future, it 
might buy a larger amount of items at the current price and build up a stock at the 
current (low) price. This stock then gets depleted, when the prices are higher. Examples 
why a price increase might be expected include an expected shortage of an input factor, 
the ending of a low price contract with a supplier. Companies that use speculative 
inventory to hedge against a price increase of their input factors, therefore, face a trade-
off between the holding costs and the risk of having to buy items at higher prices. 
2.1.5 Pipeline Inventory 
Another reason for the occurrence of inventory is the transportation times that are 
needed to transport items from one location to another. The average level of the pipeline 
inventory that sometimes is also called in-transit inventory directly depends on the 
distance between the transportation points. An illustrating example is oil pipelines: The 
longer the transportation distance is, the more oil will be stored within the pipeline. 
Hence, pipeline inventory can be reduced in the long term by reducing the distance 
between starting and end location (e.g. building a factory closer to the source of the 
                                                 
10 See Chapter 5 (pp. 248-291) of Nahmias (2009) for a detailed description of the newsvendor problem. 
11 Yano, Lee (1995) give a review on the literature on determining lot sizes under random yields. 
12 Nahmias (2009), p. 202 
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input factors) or in the short term by choosing a faster transportation method (e.g. 
switching from rail to air freight). Hence, regarding pipeline inventory there exist two 
trade-offs. In the short term, it is holding versus transportation costs (i.e. method of 
transporting materials). In the long term, it is holding cost against the costs of choosing 
another supplier or relocation of the factory. 
 
2.2 Strategic Reasons to Build up Inventory 
While the classical reasons to build up inventory are tied to considerations regarding the 
operations of a single company, strategic inventory intends to influence the decisions of 
other supply members. Hence, strategic inventory has an effect on the competitive 
conditions between the supply chain members. Herby, it has to be distinguished 
between horizontal and vertical competition. 
2.2.1 Horizontal Competition within Supply Chains 
Horizontal competition exists between supply chain members (referred to as retailers in 
this section) that are on the same level within the supply chain (see grey shaded area of 
Figure 2). Regarding the upstream level (left side of Figure 2), the retailers may 
compete against each other in order to achieve a better (i.e. cheaper) supply condition. 
This may either be a lower purchasing price or a more reliable supply. A lower price 
could be achieved by purchasing a larger quantity due to economies of scale. Reliability 
of supply is especially pronounced if the supplier can only deliver a limited amount of 
goods and has to decide how to split his capacity among the retailers. 
Regarding the downstream level (right side of Figure 2), competition between multiple 
retailers arises if they are active in the same (external) market. Hereby, products do not 
necessarily need to be identical as it is sufficient if the sold products are substitutes (e.g. 
cars and motorcycles, juice and soft drinks). If horizontal competition exists because 
retailers are active in the same market, their individual actions do not only have an 
impact on themselves but also on their competitors. If, for example, retailer 1 decides to 
lower the selling price in order to sell more goods, other retailers might lose customers 
as they prefer to buy goods from retailer 1 now. In order to control the loss of 
customers, the other retailers might lower their selling prices as well. Hence, the 
decision of retailer 1 also affects the decisions and profits of the other companies. 
Companies’ Reasons to hold Inventory 12 
 
Figure 2: Supply Chain with horizontal Competition 
 
A large number of literature exists that incorporates either upstream, downstream or a 
combination of both factors of horizontal competition between retailers. However, the 
major fraction of literature regarding horizontal competition is limited to a single-period 
examination (a brief review of recent studies on single-period horizontal competition is 
given in chapter 5). Typically, no incentive exists to carry inventory at the end of the 
last period, as it cannot be used in subsequent periods. Consequently, the utilization of 
(strategic) inventory is out of consideration in most single-period studies. 
However, a minor faction of the literature on horizontal competition considers multi-
period supply chain interaction and, therefore, the possibility to utilize strategic 
inventory. Ware (1985) shows that a monopolistic retailer can hold a strategic inventory 
in the post-entry game. Hereby, strategic inventory can be used as a credible threat to 
temporary sell goods below marginal production cost as inventory has zero supply costs 
at the moment of the selling quantity decision. Therefore, inventory can be used 
strategically by the monopolistic retailer in order to hinder other retailers to join the 
market. 
Saloner (1986) analyzes a supply chain setting with a retailer with a first-mover 
advantage and a second retailer that moves afterwards (Stackelberg competition). The 
first-movers production quantity can be observed by the second-moving retailer. 
However, as the first-mover may partly carry over goods from the first to the second 
period as inventory, the commitment regarding his selling quantity is reduced. If 
holding costs are low (i.e. the likelihood of inventory usage is high), the Stackelberg 
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leader loses his first mover advantage. Hence, in this specific setting, allowing the first-
mover to build up inventory is a threat to his first-moving advantage. 
Rotenberg and Saloner (1989) incorporate limited production capacities for the retailers. 
In their study retailers can improve their profit if they agree on selling fewer units to the 
customers. If a retailer’s competitor deviates from cooperation (i.e. sells more units than 
under cooperation), the other retailer can punish this retailer by producing and selling 
more units in future periods. However, the ability to punish the competitor is limited by 
the retailer’s production capacity. However, by using their excess capacity the retailers 
are able to build up a strategic inventory which improves their ability to punish their 
competitor. Hence, strategic inventory serves as a tool to punish competitors that 
deviate from cooperation and strengthens the power of a commitment to cooperate. 
Pal (1991) extends the model of Rotenberg and Saloner (1989) by allowing production 
cost functions to vary across periods. Under rising marginal production costs one out of 
two competing retailers acts as a Stackelberg leader and builds up a strategic inventory 
in the first-period to establish a price-advantage in the second period in comparison to 
the second moving retailer. Moellgaard et al. (2000) support this finding by showing 
that strategic inventory may also get used by simultaneously moving retailers with 
diverse production cost functions in order to achieve a future price-advantage to their 
competitor. 
Even though the number of studies that consider the impact of inventory under 
horizontal competition is small, the existing literature clearly shows that strategic 
inventory can strongly affect the interaction between supply chain members. However, 
the existing literature mainly focuses on downstream competition, while competition 
regarding the upstream needs closer examination in future research. 
2.2.2 Vertical Competition within Supply Chains 
The competition that exists between supply chain members that are on different levels 
within the supply chain is referred to as vertical competition. In its simplest version, an 
upstream supply chain member (denounced as supplier) sells goods to a downstream 
supply chain member (denounced as buyer) which, in turn, sells these goods to the 
consumers (Figure 3). Because the supplier and the buyer are the only source for their 
respective customer, both supply chain members (supplier and buyer) possess a high 
degree of market power: As there are no horizontal competitors (i.e. alternative 
suppliers or buyers), both supplier and buyer can freely decide about the price they are 
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offering their respective customer. Both supply chain members independently try to 
maximize their individual profits by setting their prices. As a result, this leads to a 
suboptimal high consumer price and the supply chain profit is below the first-best 
solution (i.e. highest possible supply chain profit under centralized decision making). 
This effect that reduces supply chain efficiency is called double marginalization. 
 
Figure 3: Supply Chain Structure with vertical Competition 
 
As under horizontal competition, the majority of literature regarding the interaction 
within supply chains with vertical competition does not consider a strategic utilization 
of inventory. A good review on the literature including deterministic and stochastic 
demand models is given by Tsay et al. (1998), while a more recent review by Cachon 
(2003) focuses on models with stochastic demand. 
Recently, Anand et al. (2008) proved that strategic inventory plays a pivotal role under 
vertical competition. A buyer who faces a supplier with a high degree of monopoly 
power can build up inventory for future periods. This inventory then serves as an 
alternative supply source and, therefore, can dampen the monopoly power of the 
supplier. This leads to a lower price setting of the supplier in future periods. The 
supplier, in turn, anticipates the strategic behavior of the buyer and increases the price, 
if he expects the buyer to build up a strategic inventory. Overall, if holding costs are not 
extremely high, both supplier and buyer can achieve an improvement of profits 
compared to a situation in which holding inventory is not feasible. 
However, the profit enhancing effects of strategic inventory only hold for the linear 
wholesale price as payment scheme between supplier and buyer. The study examines 
the effect of a two-part tariff that consists of a fixed fee plus a per unit wholesale price 
in each period. In the single-period case, a two-part tariff solves the double 
marginalization problem. However, if the length of the horizon is extended, the contract 
is no longer able to achieve a coordination of the supply chain caused by the buyer’s 
possibility to build up a strategic inventory. By building up strategic inventory in the 
first-period the buyer forces the supplier to lower the fixed fee in the second period. As 
a result, the supplier will set a first-period wholesale price that is above his marginal 
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costs in order to prevent the buyer from building up extensive amounts of inventory. 
Nevertheless, the buyer will continue to build up a considerable amount of strategic 
inventory. Because of the inventory holding costs and the first-period wholesale price 
that is above the supplier marginal costs, the supply chain outcome can no longer 
achieve the first-best outcome in multi-period interaction. 
Anand et al. (2008) also consider commitment contracts in which the supplier credibly 
commits himself to set a specified prices in the future. In the case of the simple 
wholesale price contract, this effectively eliminates an inventory use of the buyer as she 
can no longer influence the committed second period wholesale price of the supplier. 
However, as the supplier strictly prefers the solution without commitment, he has no 
incentive to implement such a contract. Moreover, in most cases even the buyer prefers 
the solution without a commitment contract. 
In the case of the two-part tariff, however, a commitment of the supplier is no longer 
able to generally prevent an inventory build-up of the buyer as the buyer may try to 
reduce the payment of the fixed fee. Depending on the holding cost two scenarios for 
the commitment version of the two-part tariff exist. If holding costs are low, the 
supplier will not hinder the buyer from building up strategic inventory. Instead, he will 
not allow the buyer to purchase items in the second period. As a result, the buyer will 
pre-purchase her entire second period selling quantity and will not buy additional units 
in the second period. However, the supplier will extract the entire profit from the buyer 
with the first-period fixed fee. For higher holding costs, the supplier will control the 
strategic inventory build-up of the buyer by setting a first-period wholesale price that is 
above his marginal costs which effectively eliminates strategic inventory. Still, the 
contract fails to coordinate the supply chain because of the increased first-period 
wholesale price that leads to below-optimal first-period selling quantities. 
Additionally, Anand et al (2008) implemented various extensions to their standard 
model to further test the relevance of strategic inventory under multi-period interaction. 
First, they replaced the linear demand function of their standard model by a convex, 
piecewise-linear, and decreasing demand function. They show that buyers maintain to 
build up strategic inventory and, therefore, prove the relevance of strategic inventory for 
that class of demand functions. For the class of concave demand functions, however, 
inventory is not carried under certain conditions (i.e. on the intercept and slopes of the 
linear segments). Nevertheless, the threat that the buyer might use a strategic inventory 
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can influence the supplier’s wholesale price decision and, therefore, impacts the 
equilibrium solution. 
Second, they extended the horizon of the model to three periods to test the robustness of 
their result regarding an end of (last) period effect. The results show that strategic 
inventories are not just an artifact caused by an end of period effect, but instead are also 
pivotal under general horizon length. Moreover, they consider the case with an infinite 
horizon whereby future periods get discounted and show that the existence of strategic 
inventories maintains. 
Third, they generalize their finding regarding more sophisticated contracts. As a result 
of the buyers extended action space of strategic inventory, the supplier is no longer able 
to implement a dynamic vertical contract that simultaneously implements the first-best 
solution and extracts away all of the buyer’s residual profits.13 However, by using a 
more sophisticated commitment contract the supplier can eliminate the buyer’s inter-
temporal link between periods as strategic inventory no longer impacts the previously 
committed prices of the supplier. As a result, a sophisticated commitment contract 
enables the supplier to implement the first-best solution and to obtain the entire supply 
chain channel profit. 
Following the findings of Anand et al. (2008), several studies that examine the 
utilization of strategic inventory under vertical competition have been conducted. 
Keskinocak et al. (2008) introduce a capacity constraint for the supplier’s first-period 
production/ procurement quantity that was unlimited in the standard model. They show 
that strategic inventory only gets utilized, if the supplier’s capacity level is above a 
critical threshold. However, if the supplier’s capacity is above the critical threshold but 
lower than the equilibrium purchasing quantity of the standard model, the buyer has to 
balance his selling quantity and inventory size against each other reducing her strategic 
power. Moreover, they show that, if the supplier faces positive capacity cost, he might 
prefer lower capacity levels than the buyer. As a result, certain capacity costs will cause 
the supplier to choose capacity levels that harm the performance of the supply chain. In 
these cases both buyer and supply chain profit would be higher under a commitment 
contract. 
The working paper of Viswanathan and Jang (2009) extends the standard model of 
Anand et al. (2008) to a duopoly with one supplier selling through two retailers under a 
                                                 
13 See: Anand et al. (2008) p.1802: Theorem 4 
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simple wholesale price contract. The working paper of Viswanathan and Jang (2011) 
additionally studies the impact of a commitment contract for the one supplier, two 
buyer’s oligopoly. However, both working papers report different solutions for the 
wholesale price contract and both solutions seem to be erroneous as a comparison to a 
more generalized horizontal competition model with a single supplier who sells through 
an arbitrary number of buyers will show. 
The study of Desai et al. (2010) addresses the utilization of strategic inventory under a 
variety of settings. First, they integrate a discount factor into the model. This way, the 
value of cash flows is determined in dependence of the period in which it was realized. 
The general function of strategic inventory maintains in the discounted cash flow 
approach. However, as the supplier favors to realize a higher degree of his profit if the 
discount rate increases, some structural differences to the solution of model of Anand et 
al. (2008) occur. A detailed recap on the discounted cash-flow approach is given in 
section 6 of this thesis, where the discounted cash flow approach of Desai et al. (2010) 
gets compared to a new developed model with an inventory interest rate. 
Moreover, Desai et al. (2010) analyze three different supply chain structures: A base 
model and two duopoly cases (i.e. with horizontal competition within the supply chain). 
In the base model, a single supplier sells his goods to a single buyer (as in Anand et al. 
2008). In the first duopoly setting, two competing suppliers face a single buyer while in 
the second duopoly setting, a single supplier faces two competing buyers. Moreover, 
they present an extended model in which the buyer can invest in merchandising that 
increases the demand of the end customers and in which the supplier is allowed to give 
a trade promotion. The trade promotion grants the buyer a special, lower first-period 
wholesale price which is only available, if the buyer has accomplished a certain level of 
merchandising effort. Last, they also analyze whether strategic inventories are also used 
under demand uncertainty. 
With their one supplier, two buyers setup, Desai et al. (2010) show that the utilization of 
strategic inventory is not always beneficial from the buyers’ perspective. However, as 
they are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma, they are enforced to continue to build up 
strategic inventory. In their two suppliers, one buyer setup, however, the retailer is 
better off through forward buying in comparison to the situation with only one supplier. 
Regarding trade promotions, the authors show that the supplier can influence the 
buyer’s level of merchandising effort by implementing trade promotions that are only 
accessible for the buyer if she commits to fulfilling a specified level of merchandising 
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effort. By allowing the buyer to utilize strategic inventory, the necessary price discount 
of the first-period trade promotion that is needed to encourage the buyer to choose the 
higher level of merchandising effort gets reduced. Hence, both supplier and buyer are 
able to benefit from the possibility to utilize strategic inventory. 
As previously mentioned, Desai et al. (2010) also take an approach on stochastic 
demand in their study on trade promotions. Thereby, they mix strategic and operational 
(i.e. safety stocks) reasons to build up inventory. In their setup, the demand is either low 
or high (i.e. they use two different demand functions) and gets revealed to all supply 
chain members after the buyer has placed her first-period purchasing order. Hence, the 
actual realization of demand is common knowledge across the supply chain members. 
Whether the buyer will utilize strategic inventory depends on the level of the holding 
costs. If they are sufficiently low, the buyer will keep an inventory regardless of the 
realization of the demand function. For medium holding cost, the buyer will only keep 
inventory, if the demand is low (i.e. if prices are low), else he will sell all of her items. 
Finally, for high holding costs values the buyer will never utilize a strategic inventory. 
In Zhang et al. (2010) the end customer demand is stochastic in each period. The 
buyer’s unsold units are carried over to the next period as inventory. However, the 
supplier cannot observe the sales quantity and the buyer does not share this information. 
Hence, the buyer’s amount of strategic inventory is private information. In contrast to 
the standard model of Anand et al. (2008), the supplier is allowed to use dynamic short-
term contracts (i.e. the supplier offers a purchasing contract to the retailer that is only 
available in the specific period). While the supplier is unable to observe the buyer’s size 
of strategic inventory, he can estimate it by using his information about the distribution 
of the end customers demand function (common knowledge) and recent buyer’s 
purchasing quantity. The study shows that the non-observable inventory size may cause 
information distortions within the supply chain and, therefore, negatively impacts 
supply chain efficiency. They show that a batch order contract can solve the distortions 
in their infinite-horizon model. 
Li et al. (2015) implement production costs for the supplier. Hereby, the second period 
production costs are declining linearly with the first-period production quantity because 
of the experienced gained by first-period production. The learning curve parameter, 
however, is determined by a random factor. The study shows that the double 
marginalization problem is more pronounced in the presence of learning than without. 
Using a revenue sharing contract, the supplier can reestablish a first-best supply chain 
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outcome. However, the supplier’s share of profit decreases the lower the holding costs 
are, while the buyer’s share of profit increases. 
Arya and Mittendorf (2013) analyze how end customers rebates that are offered directly 
by the supplier affect the interaction in multiple period, vertical competition and the 
utilization of strategic inventory. They show that the supplier can increase the buyer’s 
(opportunity) costs of holding inventory by offering customers rebates in the first-period 
that increase the customer’s willingness to pay. Hence, the buyer can set higher prices 
that get compensated by the supplier’s rebates and, thus, do not decrease the customers 
demand and the level of strategic inventory gets slightly reduced. Because of the 
reduction of double marginalization due to the rebates the overall supply chain 
performance also gets enhanced. Surprisingly, both supply chain members benefit from 
the introduction of supplier-to-customer rebates. Moreover, Arya and Mittendorf (2013) 
also investigate a nonlinear pricing scheme (i.e. a quantity-contingent pricing scheme) 
that is supplemented by supplier-to-customer rebates. By implementing such a contract, 
the supplier can eliminate strategic inventory and achieve channel coordination. 
Arya et al. (2014) investigate the impact of strategic inventories under centralized and 
decentralized procurement structures of a retailer that consists of multiple divisions. 
Each division sells an identical product on its individual market. The identical product 
gets purchased from a single supplier. In the case of a centralized structure, purchasing 
decisions are made by a central planner. Consequently, the centralized model and the 
solution are identical to the standard model of Anand et al. (2008). In the decentralized 
structure, however, the individual divisions of the retailer make the procurement 
choices. As the incentive to build up inventory is smaller for the individual division than 
for the entire company, a decentralized procurement structure generates a free-rider 
problem leading to lower inventory levels and higher second period prices. At the same 
time, the lower willingness to build up inventory forces the supplier to set a lower first-
period price than under centralization. The study shows that the benefit from getting a 
lower first-period wholesale price outweighs the disadvantage of a higher second period 
wholesale price, if holding costs are sufficiently low. Hence, if holding costs are 
sufficiently low, the retailer prefers a decentralized procurement structure over a 
centralized one. Moreover, the study analyzes the impact of a delegation factor that the 
retailer uses to virtually increase the divisions holding costs. This way, the retailer can 
influence the individual divisions to build up fewer inventories. As a higher delegation 
factor commits the retailer to build up fewer inventories, the supplier is forced to set a 
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lower first-period wholesale price, but will set a higher second period wholesale price. 
Overall, the delegation factor proves being beneficial for a certain range of low holding 
costs. More precisely, under very low holding costs the retailer prefers a solution with 
strategic delegation. If holding costs are sufficiently high, the retailer prefers a 
decentralized structure. 
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3 Strategic Inventory and its Impact on Supply Chain Coordination 
under Vertical Competition 
Anand et al. (2008) were the first showing analytically that in supply chains with 
vertical competition a strategic benefit can be obtained by using inventory. In such a 
supply chain as shown in Figure 4, one supplier (he) produces and sells goods to one 
buyer (she) that, in turn, sells these goods to customers with price dependent demand. 
As there are no horizontal competitors (i.e. alternative suppliers or buyers), both 
supplier and buyer possess a high degree of monopoly power and are independently 
trying to optimize their individual profits by competing with their prices. This 
individual optimization may lead to a suboptimally high end customer price and to a 
supply chain profit that is below the first-best solution (i.e. the highest possible supply 
chain profit). This so-called called double marginalization effect that reduces supply 
chain efficiency was first shown by Spengler (1950). 
 
Figure 4: Supply Chain with vertical Competition 
 
In the first subsection, the well-known single-period model (Spengler 1950) will be 
reviewed first in order to demonstrate the disadvantage that is caused by the 
coordination failure (i.e. the double marginalization effect) under individual 
optimization. In this model, the supply chain consists of a single supplier selling to a 
single buyer. By analyzing an integrated supply chain, the first-best solution can be 
obtained. Comparing the result of the integrated supply chain with the solution under 
individual optimization demonstrates the coordination failure. In a last step, the two-
part-tariff will be shown as an example for a more sophisticated contract that can restore 
the first-best solution even under individual optimization by realigning the incentives of 
the supply chain members with those of an integrated supply chain. 
In the second subsection, the results of the study of Anand et al. (2008), in which the 
single-period model was extended to a two-period model, will be recapped. Thereby, 
the effects of strategic inventory will be demonstrated: After perceiving benchmarks 
from the single-period model, the impact of strategic inventory under individual 
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optimization will be shown. Moreover, it will be shown that the possibility to use 
strategic inventory hinders the two-part tariff from providing a solution with first-best 
supply chain profits. 
Technically, the solution of the various scenarios ( e ) can be obtained by backwards 
induction. This means that the optimization starts with the last decision point in the 
model. Optimizing the corresponding target function for this decision delivers a reaction 
function for the next decision variable. This decision function then gets inserted into the 
objective functions. Next, the model gets optimized for the second last decision variable 
and the obtained reaction function also gets inserted into the target functions and, 
additionally, into the already calculated reaction function(s) of the previous step(s). 
These steps get repeated until the first decision within the model gets optimized. This no 
longer results in a reaction function. Instead, the final result for this variable is obtained. 
Inserting the result into the reaction functions and the target functions yields the final 
results for the decision functions as well as the profits of the supply chain members. 
3.1 Supply Chain Performance in the Single-Period Horizon Model 
In this section, the first-best solution ( 1e FB ) of the single-period model is obtained 
by analyzing the supply chain under vertical integration (Figure 6). Then, the solution of 
the single-period model under individual optimization ( e IO ) will be derived (Figure 
5). A comparison to the first-best outcome will show the profit reducing effect caused 
by double marginalization. Last, the two-part tariff ( 1e TP ) will be analyzed as an 
example of a more sophisticated contract. This will demonstrate  that such a contract 
can align the incentives of supply chain members and, thus, allows a first-best supply 
chain outcome. 
 
Figure 5: Single-Period Model 
In the classical single-periodic setting, the supplier first determines the wholesale price  
( ew ). Then, the buyer chooses his purchasing ( eQ ) and selling quantity ( eq ). It is 
Selling Price ( e ep a b q   ) Wholesale Price (
e
w ) 
Selling Quantity ( eq ) 
 
Purchasing Quantity ( eQ ) 
 
External Market Supplier Buyer 
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assumed that unsold units possess a salvage value of zero.14 Hence, the buyer will never 
order more units than he will sell (i.e. e eQ q ). Both supplier and buyer possess perfect 
information15. In this model setup the customer demand of the external market is 
assumed to be described by a linear, quantity-dependent price function: 
     e e ep q a b q  (3.1) 
Moreover, it is assumed that the supplier does not have any production/ purchasing cost 
and neither supplier nor buyer face any handling costs.16 Therefore, the supplier’s profit 
function ( eS ) is given by: 
      e e e eS ew w q w  (3.2) 
And, the buyer’s profit function (eB ) is given by: 
 
   
 
    
      ,
e e e e e e e
B
e e e e
q p q q w q
a b q q w q
 (3.3) 
Combining the supply chain members profit functions ((3.2), (3.3)) results in an overall 
supply chain profit function (eSC ) of: 
 
 
 
      
    .
e e e e e e
SC B S
e e
p q q
a b q q
 (3.4) 
3.1.1 Solution of the Integrated Supply Chain (First-Best) 
In an integrated supply chain, all decisions are made by a single player in order to 
maximize the supply chain profit. Therefore, the solution of the integrated channel 
delivers the first-best ( e FB ) solution. Note that the wholesale prices only define the 
transfer payments between the supplier and the buyer and are, therefore, not relevant for 
optimizing the overall supply chain profit. The supply chain model, therefore, can be 
simplified as shown in Figure 6: 
                                                 
14 As long as the salvage value is below or equal to the sum of the suppliers production cost and the 
handling costs of both supplier and buyer, this assumption is without loss of loss of generality. Else, a 
situation with the possibility to create infinite profits would exist. 
15 The term perfect information describes that both supply chain members know the previously made 
decisions of their supply chain member as well as knowing that their supply chain knows about that. 
16 The results stay structurally the same if production costs are constant. However, under increasing/ 
decreasing marginal cost, the supplier might have an incentive to discourage or encourage an inventory 
build-up of the buyer in order to achieve lower average production costs. 
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Figure 6: Simplified Model with an Integrated Supply Chain 
Determining the solution of the integrated supply chain the supply chain profit (3.4) 
must be optimized:17 
      1 1 1max FB FB FBSC a b q q  (3.5) 
Hence, the first-best solution can be obtained by solving: 
 

   

1
1
1
2 0
FB
FBSC
FB
a b q
q
 (3.6) 
The optimal selling (and buying) quantity is, therefore, given by: 
  1 1
2
FB FB aq Q
b
 (3.7) 
Inserting the first-best order quantity (3.7) in the demand function (3.1) and the supply 
chain profit function (3.4) leads to an external market price of 
 1
2
FB ap  (3.8) 
and a first-best supply chain profit of: 
  
2
1
4
FB
SC
a
b
 (3.9) 
A summary of the first-best solution is given in Table 1. 
3.1.2 Solution under Individual Optimization 
Under individual optimization, the solution of the model can be found by backwards 
induction. The corresponding optimization problems of supplier and buyer are: 
    max IO IO IO IOS w w q   (3.10) 
                                                 
17 The effects of individual optimization in comparison to the solution of an integrated supply chain were 
first derived by Spengler (1950). 
Selling Price (   1 1FB FBp a b q ) 
External Market Supply Chain (= Supplier + Buyer) 
Selling Quantity ( 1FBq ) 
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          IO IO IO I IOB IO Oq a b q q w q   (3.11) 
As the buyer’s selling quantity ( IOq ) is the last decision within the model, the buyer’s 
reaction function (  IO IOq w ) has to be determined first: 
 
 
2 0
IO IO
B IO IO
IO
q
a b q w
q

    

 (3.12) 
Solving the buyer’s first-order condition (3.12) yields the buyer’s reaction function in 
dependence of the supplier’s wholesale price decision: 
  
2
IO
IO IO a wq w
b

 . (3.13) 
As the supplier anticipates the decision of the buyer, the reaction function (3.13) must 
be inserted into the supplier’s profit function (3.2): 
  
2
IO IO IO
S
IOa
b
w w
w


  . (3.14) 
Solving the supplier’s first-order condition 
 
2
0
2
IO
S
O
IO
Ia
w
w
b






 (3.15) 
delivers an optimal wholesale price of: 
 
2
IOw
a
 . (3.16) 
Inserting the supplier’s wholesale price (3.16) into the buyer’s reaction function (3.13) 
gives the buyer’s selling (and buying) quantity under individual optimization: 
 
4
IO aq
b
 . (3.17) 
This leads to the following profits: 
 
2
8
IO
S
a
b
   (3.18) 
 
2
16
IO
B
a
b
   (3.19) 
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23
16
IO
SC
a
b
  . (3.20) 
The results of the single-period model under individual optimization are summarized in 
Table 1 alongside with the corresponding values of the first-best solution. Comparing 
these solutions shows that under individual optimization only 75% of the first-best 
supply chain profit can be achieved ( IOSC  versus 
1FB
SC ). 
Table 1: Comparison of Solutions of the One Period Model 
 First-Best 
Individual 
Optimization 
 First-Best 
Individual 
Optimization 
  1e FB  e IO    1e FB  e IO  
Wholesale 
Price 
ew  
- 
2
a
 
Profit Supplier 
eS  
- 
2
8
a
b
 
Purchasing 
Quantity 
eQ  
2
a
b
 
4
a
b
 
Profit Buyer 
eB  
- 
2
16
a
b
 
Selling 
Quantity 
eq  2
a
b
 
4
a
b
 
Profit Supply 
Chain 
eSC  
2
4
a
b
 
23
16
a
b
 
External 
Market Price 
ep  2
a
 
3
4
a
    
This profit reduction is caused by the individual surcharge on the marginal cost which is 
done by both supplier and buyer. In order to maximize his profits, the supplier chooses a 
wholesale price that already matches the supply chain profit maximizing market price of 
the first-best solution ( 1IO FBw p ). Hence, in order to maintain the supply chain profit 
of the first-best solution, the buyer would have to pass through this wholesale price to 
the end-customers. In this situation, the supplier would receive the whole supply chain 
profit leaving nothing for the buyer. However, to gain a part of the overall supply chain 
profit, the buyer also charges a surplus on her marginal costs (i.e. the wholesale price). 
In comparison to the first-best solution, this leads to a higher market price ( 1IO FBp p ) 
and a lower selling quantity ( 1IO FBq q ). Overall, under a linear demand function this 
effect causes a drop in supply chain profit of   
21
16
FB IO
SC SC
a
b
, which is a quarter of the 
first-best solution (i.e. a deadweight loss 25% of the first-best supply chain profit). 
Hereby, the supplier manages to get two thirds of the overall supply chain profit 
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(equivalent to 50% of the first-best profit), while the buyer’s share is only one third 
(equivalent to 25% of the first-best profit). 
3.1.3 Achieving First-Best Supply Chain Profit through a Coordinating Contract 
To avoid the profit loss that is caused by double marginalization, more sophisticated 
pricing schemes, that cause the downstream party (buyer) to charge the supply chain 
optimal external market price18, can be used.19 A straightforward approach to 
accomplish this task is the so called “resale-price maintenance”, in which the upstream 
supply chain member (i.e. supplier) controls the price that the downstream part (i.e. 
buyer) can charge. Equivalently, the supplier could also explicitly set a minimum for the 
buyer’s selling quantity that matches the supply chain optimal amount ( min 1FBq q q  ). 
However, both mechanisms require a direct control of the downstream member’s 
decision, which is not always a realistic scenario. 
Alternatively, the supplier could use a non-linear pricing scheme in order to eliminate 
the deadweight loss caused by double marginalization. A common example for a non-
linear pricing scheme is the two-part tariff ( 1e TP ), which consists of the payment of a 
fixed fee ( 1TPF ) and a uniform price ( 1TPw ) per sold unit (Figure 7). Hence, the buyer has 
to pay the fixed fee, if she wants to purchase goods from the supplier. This fixed fee is 
independent from the actual amount of items that the buyer purchases from her supplier, 
while the uniform price is paid per purchased unit (i.e. a wholesale price). 
 
Figure 7: Two-Part Tariff in the Single-Period Model 
Anand et al. (2008) have shown that under a two-part tariff, the supplier’s optimal 
strategy is to set the wholesale price to zero (i.e. to the marginal costs). This way the 
double marginalization effect gets prevented and the supply chain profit equals the first-
best outcome. Moreover, the supplier is able to use the fixed fee to extract the entire 
supply chain profit from the buyer. 
                                                 
18 This condition is necessary to achieve first-best supply chain profits. 
19 A good overview of such pricing is given in Tirole (1988). 
Selling Price ( 1 1TP TPp a b q  
) 
Fixed Fee (
1TP
F  ) 
Uniform Price ( 1TPw ) 
 
Selling Quantity ( 1TPq ) 
 
Purchasing Quantity ( 1TPQ ) 
 
External Market Supplier Buyer 
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3.2 The Impact of Strategic Inventory on Supply Chain Performance in Multi-
Period Horizon Models 
Anand et al. (2008) were the first that extended the single-period model, which was 
reviewed in chapter 3.1 to multiple periods. With their extended two-period model 
(Figure 8) they were able to demonstrate that the buyer exhibits an incentive to carry 
inventory between both periods due to purely strategic considerations (i.e. to influence 
the price setting of the supplier). The supplier, in turn, reacts to this strategic inventory 
by adjusting his price setting. 
 
Figure 8: Two-Period Model 
The underlying two-period model of Anand et al. (2008) simply duplicates the decisions 
of the standard single-period model. Hence, in each period ( 1, 2t  ) the supplier 
determines the contract parameters (wholesale price contract: WPtw , two-part tariff: 
FP
tF  
and TPtw ) at which the buyer can purchase goods. The buyer, in turn, chooses both her 
purchase quantity ( etQ ) and the quantity of units that she sells to an external market (
e
tq ) 
for each period. The sales price of each period ( etp ) at the external market is again 
determined by a linear inverse demand function:     e e et t tp q a b q . 
Strategic Inventory (  1 1
e e eI Q q ) 
 
Selling Price (
1 1
e e
p a b q   ) Contract Payment (
1
e
w  or 11 ;
P TPFF w ) 
Selling Quantity ( 1
eq ) 
 
Purchasing Quantity ( 1
eQ ) 
 
External Market Supplier Buyer 
Selling Price (
2 2
e e
p a b q   ) Contract Payment (
2
e
w  or 22 ;
P TPFF w ) 
Selling Quantity ( 2
eq ) 
 
Purchasing Quantity ( 2
eQ ) 
 
External Market Supplier Buyer 
Period 2: 
Period 1: 
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In contrast to the one-period model, the buyer can carry over inventory from period one 
to period two by choosing a first-period purchase quantity that is larger than the first-
period selling quantity (i.e. 1 1
e eQ q ). The buyer can then use this inventory (  1 1
e e eI Q q ) 
to reduce the second period purchase quantity that is required to optimize her profit        
(  2 2
e e eQ q I ). For each stored unit the buyer faces holding cost ( eh ). At the end of period 
two, unsold units have a salvage value of zero. Hence, the buyer will sell all of her 
goods at the end of the second period. Also, the production cost of the supplier and any 
handling costs are normalized to zero. Both supplier and buyer possess perfect 
information. Note, although the model is extended to two-periods, still none of the 
classical reasons to build up inventory as described in chapter 2 exist. 
Anand et al (2008) analyzed several supply chain scenarios including the solutions of an 
integrated channel, under individual optimization with a simple wholesale price 
contract, and under individual optimization with a two-part tariff. For the latter contract 
types, solutions under commitment were analyzed as well (i.e. the supplier commits to 
set identical wholesale prices in both periods: 
1 2
C C
w w ). This way, the buyer would 
have no incentive to build up any inventory as he cannot influence the committed 
second period wholesale price of the supplier.20 
Both the solution of an integrated channel as well as the solution of the simple 
wholesale price with commitment ( e C ) can be easily obtained from the single-period 
model. 
3.2.1 Benchmarks from the One-Period Model 
In an integrated supply chain, the wholesale prices only define the transfer payments 
between the supplier and the buyer and are, therefore, not relevant for optimizing the 
overall supply chain profit. Furthermore, inventories incur holding costs without 
providing any benefit to the supply chain as a whole. Thus, building up inventory is not 
reasonable, if no conflict of interest between the two parties exists. Therefore, in an 
integrated supply chain, only the optimal sales quantities that maximizes the joint 
profits need to be determined: 
 
     
   
   
     

 
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 .
,FB FB FB FB FB FB FB FB FBSC
FB FB FB FB
q q p q q p q
a b q q a b q q
q
 (3.21) 
                                                 
20 Analogously, the buyer could also commit to not build up any inventory. 
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As no inventory is built up, the periods are no longer connected and the problem can be 
separated into two single-period models. Hence, the selling quantity of each period is 
unaffected by the horizon extension and identical to the selling quantity of the single-
period model: 
  1 2FB FBtq q a b .  (3.22) 
Consequently, the first-best supply chain profit of the two-period model is simply twice 
as large as the first-best profit of the single-period model: 
    1 22 2FB FBSC SC a b .  (3.23) 
The results of the first-best solution that is needed as a benchmark to the following 
conducted solutions are summarized in Table 2 at the end of section 3.2.2. 
 
Similar to the way the first-best solution was determined, the results of the solution 
under a commitment contract can be obtained from respective solution of the single-
period model. As the commitment contract disables the strategic utilization of 
inventory, the periods get decoupled and can be optimized separately. Consequently, as 
both supply chain members optimize individually, the results of each period mimic the 
solution of the single-period model under individual optimization: 
 1 2
2
C C IO a
w w w     (3.24) 
 1 2 1 2
4
C C C C IO a
Q Q q q q
b
       (3.25) 
Again, the profits can be simply obtained by doubling the respective profits of the 
single-period model under individual optimization: 
    
2
2
4
C IO
S S
a
b
  (3.26) 
    
2
8
2C IOB B
a
b
  (3.27) 
   
23
2
8
C IO
SC SC
a
b
  (3.28) 
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However, Anand et al. (2008) have shown that the supplier will never offer a 
commitment contract, as he would not obtain any profit enhancement by doing so. 
Hence, the values of the commitment solution only apply, if the holding costs are high 
enough to prohibit a build-up of strategic inventory. This so called static solution will be 
mathematically examined in the following chapter. The results of the static solution that 
are identical to the commitment solution are summarized in Table 2. 
3.2.2 Individual Optimization in the Two-Period Model and the Role of Strategic 
Inventory 
By analyzing their two-period model under individual optimization and simple 
wholesale price contracting Anand et al (2008) show that buyers have an incentive to 
utilize inventory as a strategic tool. This setup will serve as the baseline model for the 
following theoretical and behavioral studies within this thesis and is, therefore, referred 
to as the standard model (SM). 
In the standard model ( e SM ), the supply chain is not integrated. Therefore, supplier 
and buyer independently choose their decision variables ( SM
t
w and SM
t
q ,
SM
I ) to 
optimize their individual profits. Analyzing the standard model will show that in 
equilibrium strategic inventory is built up, if the holding costs are not prohibitively high 
(i.e. 0SMI   if 
4
SM ah  ). These cases will be denounced as the dynamic solutions, 
because the supplier has an incentive to choose dynamic prices (i.e. 
1 2
SM SM
w w  ). 
However, if the holding costs are too high (i.e. if 
4
SM ah  ), the buyer no longer has an 
incentive to build up a strategic inventory. This leads to constant wholesale prices over 
both periods (i.e. 
1 2
SM SM
w w ) and to equilibria that resemble the solution of the 
commitment contract (i.e. decisions within each period are identical to those of the one 
period model under individual optimization). These cases will be called the static 
solutions. The closed-form static and dynamic solutions can be derived using backward 
induction as shown by Anand et al. (2008) and are described below. 
Using a simple wholesale price contract, the supplier only has to determine the prices of 
period one and two (
1
SM
w , 
2
SM
w ) within his profit function: 
 
 
   
    
   
1 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
,
.
SM SM SM SM SM SM SM
S
SM SM SM SM SM SM
w w w Q w Q
w q I w q I
 (3.29) 
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The profit function of the buyer, who has to determine 1
SMq , SMI  and 2
SMq  is given by: 
 
   
 
   
   
      
   
        
      
1 2 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2
2
2 2
, ,
.
SM SM SM SM SM SM SM SM SM SM SM
SM SM SM SM SM
SM SM SM SM SM SM SM
SM SM SM S S
B
M M
q I q p q q w Q h
p q q w Q
a b q q w q h
a b q q w q
I
I I
I
 (3.30) 
And the overall supply chain profit is described by: 
 
     
   
 
       
  



1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 .
,SM SM SM SM SM SM SM SM SM SM SMSC
SM SM SM SM SM SM
h
a b q q h a b q
q
q
q p q q I p q q
I
  (3.31) 
At the beginning of the second period the buyer chooses her selling quantity 2
SMq  given 
the decisions of period 1 and the supplier’s pricing in period 2: 
 
 
 

  

1 2
2 2
2
, ,
2 0
SM S
B
M SM SM
SM SM
SM
q I q
a b q w
q
  (3.32) 
However, if the buyer possesses inventory, she will always sell it as it has purchasing 
cost of zero (previous purchasing and holding costs are sunk costs). Therefore, the 
optimal response function to the supplier’s wholesale price of the second period is 
  
  
  
  
2
2 2 max ,
2
SM
SM SM SM a wq w I
b
. (3.33) 
Hence, the buyer will only purchase additional goods in the second period if 
2
2
SM SM
w a b I   . Anand et al. (2008) have shown mathematically that this condition is 
always fulfilled (i.e. the supplier always chooses a wholesale price in period two that is 
sufficiently low to incentivize the buyer to purchase additional goods).21 To keep the 
results concise, the description is limited to the case that 0
SM
Q   (i.e. 
2
2
SM SM
w a b I   ).22 
The supplier integrates the buyer’s response function (3.33) into his profit function: 
                                                 
21 See e-companion to Anand et al. (2008) pp. 2–4. 
22 This is without loss of generality as the supplier’s second period wholesale price response function 
(3.35) shows. 
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 
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
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S
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w w w Q w Q
w q I w I
 (3.34) 
The respective first order condition and response function for the period 2 wholesale 
price are: 
 
 
 
 
 

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
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a
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I
I b
w
w
w
. (3.35) 
The supplier’s response function shows that by building up an inventory, the buyer can 
influence the period two equilibrium wholesale price. Hence, the buyer has a strategic 
incentive to build up inventory that distinguishes from the classical reasons to hold 
inventory. The buyer anticipates this strategic effect of her inventory on the second 
period wholesale price into her profit function (3.30): 
     
 
         
   
        
          
  


   
1 1 1 1 1
2
,
2 2 2 .
2 2 2
SM SM SM SM SM SM SM SM SM SM
B
SM SM SM
SM SMa
q I a b q q w q h
a a a
b I b I b I
a b
I I
b I I
b b b
 (3.36) 
The first order conditions and optimal response functions for the first-period selling 
quantity and inventory size are: 
selling quantity: 
 
 
    

1
1 1
1
,
2 0
SM SM SM
B SM SM
SM
q I
a b q w
q
  (3.37) 
  
  
  
  
1
1 1 max 0,
2
SM
SM SM a wq w
b
 (3.38) 
inventory size: 
 
 
      

1
1 , 3 3
0
4 2
SM SM SM
B SM SM SM
SM
q I
w h a b I
I
  (3.39) 
         
 
1 1
2 2
max 0,
2 3 3
SM SM SM SMaI w h w
b b b
. (3.40) 
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Hence, the buyer only builds up inventory, if  
 
1
3
4
SM SM
w h a    (3.41) 
Since a  and SMh  are constant, the supplier’s choice of the wholesale price determines 
whether or not the buyer builds up strategic inventory. 
 
Case 1 – Static Solution: Supplier chooses a period one wholesale price that prevents 
the buyer from building up inventory (i.e. 
1
3 0
4
SM SM SM
w a h I     ): 
In this case, no inventory is built up and, therefore, the two periods are independent 
from each other. Hence, each decision is identical to the corresponding decision of the 
one-period model. Table 3 summarizes the results for this case (static solution). Note, in 
comparison to the one-period model the profits of the two-period model have to be 
doubled because of the doubled horizon length. 
 
Case 2 – Dynamic Solution: Supplier chooses a period one wholesale price that leads to 
an inventory build-up by the buyer (i.e. 1
3 0
4
SM SM SM
w a h I     ): 
In this case, the supplier anticipates the behavior of the buyer ((3.38), (3.40)) and the 
optimal period 2 decisions concerning 
2
SM
w  and 
2
SM
q  from (3.33) and (3.35). Inserting 
in (3.34) results in the following profit function: 
  
     

 

2
1
2
1 1
1
18 17 4 4
18
.
SM SM SM SM SM
SM SM
S
w w w
w
a h h
b
 (3.42) 
Then, the supplier chooses his optimal period one wholesale price: 
 
   
 



1 1
1
1
18 34 4
0
18
9 2
17
SM SM SM SM
S
SM
SM
SM
w
a
w
w
h
w
a h
b  (3.43) 
Inserting the period one wholesale price (3.43) into the condition for case 2 
( 1
3SM SMw a h
a
   ) directly shows that 
4
SM ah   must hold. Else, no inventory is built 
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up and the solution of case 1 is relevant. Hence for 
4
SM ah   the optimal first-period 
wholesale price is: 
 
  
  
  
1 ,
9 2
max
2 17
SM
SM a a hw . (3.44) 
The analysis shows that for 
4
SM ah   the buyer will build up a strategic inventory with 
a size of 
  

5 4
34
SM
SM
a h
I
b
 that influences the wholesale price setting of the supplier. 
Following Anand et al. (2008), this solution will be referred to as dynamic solution, 
because of the different wholesale prices of period one and two. In contrast, the solution 
without strategic inventory and constant wholesale prices (
4
SM ah  ) will be called 
static solution (Note, that the static solution also mirrors the solution of the one period 
model). The complete solution of the model can be obtained by inserting 1
SMw  into the 
respective first-period selling quantity and inventory response function. Then the 
obtained results are inserted into the second period wholesale price response function. 
Next, these results are inserted into the second period selling quantity response function. 
This way all decision variables are known and can be inserted into the profit functions. 
The results of the dynamic alongside with the static and first-best solution are 
summarized in Table 2: 
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Table 2: Solutions of the Two-Period Model under Wholesale Price Contracting23 
 First-Best Standard Model 
  
e FB   
Static 
e SM  
4
SM ah   
Dynamic 
e SM  
4
SM ah    
Wholesale Price Period 
1 (
1
e
w ) 
- 
2
a
 
9 2
17
SM
a h
  
Purchase Quantities 
Period 1 (
1
e
Q ) 2
a
b
 
4
a
b
 
13 18
34
SM
a h
b

 
Sales Quantities Period 
1 (
1
e
q ) 2
a
b
 
4
a
b
 
4
17
SM
a h
b

 
Inventory (
e
I ) 0  0  
 5 4
34
SM
a h
b
 
 
Retail Prices  
Period 1 (
1
e
p ) 2
a
 
3
4
a
 
13
17
SM
a h
 
Wholesale Price Period 
2 (
2
e
w ) 
- 
2
a
 
6 10
17
SM
a h
 
Purchase Quantities 
Period 2 (
2
e
Q ) 2
a
b
 
4
a
b
 
3 5
17
SM
a h
b

 
Sales Quantities Period 
2 (
2
e
q ) 2
a
b
 
4
a
b
 
11 10
34
SM
a h
b

 
Retail Prices 
 Period 2 (
2
e
p ) 2
a
 
3
4
a
 
23 10
34
SM
a h
  
Profit Supplier 
(
e
S
 ) 
- 
2
4
a
b
 
 
2
2
9 4 8
34
SM SM
a ah h
b
 
 
Profit Buyer 
(
e
B
 ) 
- 
2
8
a
b
 
 
2
2
155 118 304
1156
SM SM
a ah h
b
 
 
Profit Supply Chain 
(
e
SC
 ) 
2
2
a
b
 
2
3
8
a
b
 
 
2
2
461 254 576
1156
SM SM
a ah h
b
 
 
  
                                                 
23 These results were first derived by Anand et al (2008) and a recap of Table 1 of their study. 
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3.2.3 The Impact of Strategic Inventory on Supply Chain Performance 
Table 2 provides a summary of the first-best solution as well as the solution under 
individual optimization (standard model) that splits into the static and the dynamic 
solution. The supply chain profit of the standard model is displayed in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Supply Chain Profit in the Standard Model 
In the static solution ( 0.25
SM
h
a
 ), the total supply chain profit corresponds to only 
75% of the total supply chain profit of the first-best solution: 
 
2 2
3
0.75
8 2
SM
SC
FB
SC
a a
b b


    (3.45) 
In the dynamic solution ( 0.25
SM
h
a
 ), the total supply chain profit depends on the 
holding costs: 
 
 
2
2
2
2
2 2
461 254 576
461 254 576
1156
578
2
SM SM
SM SMSM
SC
FB
SC
a ah h
a ah h
b
a a
b


 
 
    (3.46) 
Determining the first- and second-order derivatives of (3.46) shows that a minimum 
exists at 0.22SMh a : 
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 254 1156 0
SM
SC
FB
SMSC
SM
a h
h



   

  (3.47) 
 
127
0.22
578
SM
h a a    (3.48) 
 
 
2
2
1156
SM
SC
FB
SC
SM
h





  (3.49) 
Inserting (3.48) into (3.46) determines the worst case supply chain profit of the dynamic 
solution (weighted with the first-best outcome): 
 
127
578
0.7491
SM SM
SC
FB
SC
h a

 
 
     (3.50) 
As the maximum supply chain profit of the dynamic solution must be either at the lower 
( 0SMh  ) or upper bound ( 0.25SMh  ), the bounds must be inserted into (3.46): 
 
 0 461
0.7976
578
SM SM
SC
FB
SC
h


    (3.51) 
 
  2 2 2
2
127
461 36
4 2 0.75
578
SM SM
SC
FB
SC
a a a ah
a


 
    (3.52) 
Hence, the minimum profit of the dynamic solution corresponds to 74.91% of the first-
best outcome and will not exceed about 79.76%, even if the holding cost are zero. This 
also holds for the entire standard model as the minimum and maximum profit levels of 
the dynamic solution are below/ above the profit level of the static solution. 
Moreover, the utilization of strategic inventory enables higher supply chain profits if 
holding cost are sufficiently low ( 55 0.19
288
SM
h
a
  ): 
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 
 
?
, ,
2
2 2?
?2
2
461 254 576 3
1156 8
55 127 144
0
2312 578 289
 
 

  
SM dynamic SM static
SC SC
SM SM
SM SM
a ah h a
b b
a ah h
  (3.53) 
55
288 4
   SM SM
a
h a h   
 
The lower supply chain profit of the standard model in comparison to the first-best 
solution is obviously due to the double marginalization effect that arises, because both 
supply chain members individually maximize their profits, by placing monopoly 
surcharges on their marginal costs. However, although additional holding cost occur in 
the dynamic solution due to the utilization of strategic inventory, the overall supply 
chain profit is larger for reasonably low holding costs. Hence, strategic inventory seems 
to dampen the double marginalization effect. 
If the holding costs are sufficiently low for strategic inventories to be applied (i.e. in the 
dynamic solution), then the first-period’s wholesale price is greater and the second 
period’s wholesale price is smaller than in the static solution: 
First-period wholesale price: 
?
, ,
1 1
?
?
9 2
17 2
4 0
SM dynamic SM static
SM
SM
w w
a h a
a h



 
 
 
4
SM a
h    (3.54) 
Condition (3.54) is always fulfilled in the dynamic solution. 
Second period wholesale price: 
?
, ,
2 1
?
?
6 10
17 2
5 20 0
SM dynamic SM static
SM
SM
w w
a h a
a h



  
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4
SM a
h    (3.55) 
Condition (3.55) is always fulfilled in the dynamic solution. 
 
The intuition is that the supplier sets a higher price in the first-period to reduce the 
buyer’s incentives to build up an inventory. In the second period, the wholesale price is 
lower than in the static solution, because the buyer only needs to satisfy her residual 
demand, given the inventory. Thus, the strategic inventory reduces the monopoly power 
of the supplier. Nevertheless, the comparison also shows that the supplier is always 
better off in the dynamic solution (Figure 10), because he is able to implement an 
indirect form of price differentiation for the buyers selling quantity in period two (i.e. 
the second period selling quantity consists of the strategic inventory that was purchased 
at a high price (
1
SM
w ) and the second period purchasing quantity which was purchased 
at a lower price (
2
SM
w )). 
 
Figure 10: Supplier Profit in the Standard Model 
These differentiated prices yield a lower average wholesale price across both periods 
and, therefore, reduce the degree of double marginalization. The buyer (Figure 11) is 
also better off with a strategic inventory (i.e. in the dynamic solution), as long as the 
holding cost are not too high (i.e. as long as  21 0.138152
SMh a a ): 
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 
 
?
, ,
2
2 2?
?2
2
155 118 304
1156 8
21 236 608 0
SM dynamic SM static
B B
SM SM
SM SM
a ah h a
b b
a ah h
 
 

  
 
 
21
152 4
SM SM a
h a h      (3.56) 
Hence, her profits in the dynamic solution are only less than those in the static solution 
if    
21
0.138 0.25
152
SMa a h a . 
 
Figure 11: Buyer Profit in the Standard Model 
In summary, the overall performance of a non-integrated supply chain in the dynamic 
solution is superior to the performance of the static solution for sufficiently low holding 
costs (  21 0.138152
SM ah a ). For holding cost above this threshold, the benefits of the 
lower wholesale prices (i.e. the benefits from the reduction of the double 
marginalization) are offset by the increase of the total costs due the inventory holding 
costs. The largest improvement in supply chain performance (about 6.34% more than in 
the static solution) can be achieved with a strategic inventory, when the holding cost is 
zero. Nevertheless, even at zero holding cost, the first-best solution cannot be achieved, 
because the double marginalization effect is only diminished, but not fully eliminated. 
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3.2.4 Strategic Inventory in Case of a Two-Part Tariff 
In the one period model, the supplier could implement the first-best supply chain 
outcome by using a two-part tariff consisting of a fixed fee (
1TP
F ) and a marginal 
wholesale price ( 1FPw ). With this contract design, the supplier was able to achieve the 
coordination of the channel by setting the marginal wholesale price to his marginal cost 
(i.e. eliminate double marginalization) and to freely distribute the supply chain profit 
via the fixed fee (i.e. he could extract the whole supply chain profit from the buyer). 
However, the channel coordinating effect of the two-part tariff in the one period model 
does not carry over to the two-period model as shown by Anand et al. (2008). 
In the two-period model, the supplier has to decide both about the fixed fee ( TP
t
F ) and 
wholesale price ( TP
t
w ) in each period, while the buyer still has to decide about the 
purchasing ( TP
t
Q ) and selling quantity ( TP
t
q ) of each period (with
1 1
TP TP TP
Q q I   and 
2 2
TP TP TP
Q q I  ). Note, that the decision to purchase goods in a specific period involves 
the decision whether to pay the fixed fee of that period, as the buyer does not have to 
pay the fixed fee if he forgoes ordering items in the respective period. 
In the two-period model, the two-part tariff needs to fulfill two criteria in order to 
enable a first-best supply chain outcome: First, just as in the one period model, the 
supplier needs to set the wholesale price at the level of his marginal cost to prevent 
double marginalization. Second, for  0TPh  the buyer must not carry any strategic 
inventory because inventory would cause holding costs and, therefore, a deadweight 
loss for the supply chain. Anand et al. (2008) have shown that for 0
4
TP a
h   a profit 
maximizing supplier will not be able to satisfy both criteria at the same time.24 As under 
wholesale price contracting, strategic inventories force the supplier to price for the 
residual demand of the buyer in period two. Additionally, the buyer might try to save 
the fixed fee of period two by building up a sufficiently large strategic inventory. As a 
reaction, the supplier will adjust both his fixed fees as well as his wholesale prices to 
control for strategic inventory (i.e. he will cause double marginalization because he will 
no longer set his wholesale prices to his marginal costs. 
                                                 
24 Anand et al. (2008) limit their analysis of the two-part tariff to 
4
TP ah  . At this upper bound 
strategic inventory is not used anymore under wholesale price contracting. The mathematical analysis 
can be found in the online Appendix of Anand et al. (2008). 
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The supplier can choose between two pricing schemes: Either, he can commit himself to 
prices at the beginning of the first-period (i.e. the buyer cannot influence the second 
period price by building up inventory) or he can set dynamic prices (i.e. react on the 
buyers inventory build-up in the second period). 
In the commitment two-part tariff, the supplier will announce all prices ( TP
t
F , TP
t
w ) at 
the beginning of period one. By credibly committing himself to these prices, the buyer 
is no longer able to use strategic inventory to influence the supplier’s prices. However, 
the supplier still must consider the buyer’s possibility to use inventory to save the fixed 
fee, when determining the commitment prices. Depending on the holding cost, the two-
part commitment contract splits into two different solutions: 
If holding costs are low 
  
    
  
21 0.184
6
TPh a a , the supplier will not try to control 
the inventory build-up of the buyer. Hence, he will set the wholesale price of period one 
to his marginal cost, allowing the buyer to build up a large strategic inventory in 
combination with a high fixed fee that extracts the entire supply chain profit from the 
buyer. For the second period, he will commit himself to prohibitively high prices, 
forcing the buyer to accept the fixed fee of period one and to purchase the entire second 
period selling quantity in period one which will cause holding costs and prohibits the 
supply chain from achieving the first-best solution. 
If holding costs are intermediate or high 
  
    
  
21 0.184
6
TPh a a , the supplier will 
avoid an inventory build-up of the buyer and set the first-period wholesale price above 
his marginal costs, while charging marginal costs in the second period. However, 
although the supplier charges a fixed fee in both periods, he is unable to extract the 
entire profit from the buyer (i.e. also the buyer will achieve a small profit). 
In the dynamic two-part tariff (i.e. no commitment), the supplier controls the inventory 
build-up of the buyer by charging a wholesale price above marginal costs in the first-
period. The buyer will build up inventory and force the buyer to set a low fixed fee in 
the second period. The supplier is still able to extract the entire profit from the buyer, 
but the supply chain profit is lower in comparison to the first-best solution because of 
the suppliers pricing scheme (i.e. 
1
TP
w  is above the supplier’s marginal costs). More 
details can be found in Anand et al. (2008). 
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4 Experimental Analysis and Behavioral Insights on Strategic 
Inventory in Supply Chains 
The theoretical analysis of Anand et al. (2008) summarized in chapter 3 has shown that 
strategic inventory can have a major impact on the decisions of supply chain members 
in multi-period interactions. Strategic inventory enables the buyer to dampen the 
monopoly power of her supplier. In the case of a simple wholesale price contract, the 
utilization of strategic inventory can lead to a reduction of double marginalization and, 
therefore, enhance the supply chain efficiency. In most cases (i.e. as long as holding 
costs are not relatively high) both supplier and buyer benefit from this enhancement. 
Since most supply chain interactions in reality take place in multi-period settings and 
the wholesale price contract is commonly used in industry25, the efficiency enhancing 
effects of strategic inventories may be good news for the economy. For the phenomenon 
to be effective, however, the players are required to demonstrate a high degree of 
strategic sophistication in their behavior. Given the extensive literature on behavioral 
biases in single-period supply chain interactions, however, it is not self-evident that 
theoretically predicted efficiency gains are behaviorally sustained in this type of multi-
period interplay. Especially the frequently observed failure to identify profit 
maximizing order quantities or wholesale prices (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Katok 
and Wu, 2009) and the tendency to consider fairness consequences of supply chain 
decisions (Cui et al., 2007; Loch and Wu, 2008; Pavlov and Katok, 2011) may 
behaviorally interfere with the theoretical predictions of Anand et al. (2008). 
In this chapter, a laboratory experiment that allows testing for the empirical relevance of 
the concept of strategic inventories is presented. The laboratory investigation delivers 
overwhelmingly clear evidence for the behavioral relevance of strategic inventories and 
the efficiency enhancing effect that they have on the overall supply chain performance. 
Using a control treatment, in which strategic inventories are out of equilibrium, 
demonstrates that the subjects (management and economics undergraduates) of the 
laboratory investigation use the inventories in a strategically, sophisticated manner and 
not just because they are given the opportunity to do so. 
The strong evidence that is found for the behavioral relevance of strategic inventories is 
surprising, given the interplay between strategic behavior and strategic uncertainty, 
which is inherent in this multi-period interaction. In equilibrium, both the supplier’s 
                                                 
25 Cachon (2003), p. 12 
Experimental Analysis and Behavioral Insights on Strategic Inventory in Supply Chains 45 
wholesale price and the buyer’s order quantity in the first-period are greater than in the 
case without strategic inventories (Anand et al., 2008). Increasing both the price and the 
quantity, not only requires a clear understanding of the strategic situation on the side of 
both parties, but also a mutual trust in each other’s strategic sophistication. Hence, for 
the equilibrium to be behaviorally relevant, both supplier and buyer must trust that the 
other party deliberates with a high degree of strategic sophistication and plays the 
equilibrium strategy. A substantial part of the literature on behavior in supply chains, 
however, shows that players may fail to optimize or fail to believe that their 
counterparts optimize (e.g. Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), Katok and Wu (2009), Özer 
et al. (2011), Croson et al. (2012)). In contrast to the persistent out of equilibrium 
behavior found in that literature, a high degree of behavioral stability that is very close 
to the equilibrium is observed. Hence, the results indicate that strategic inventories are a 
robust phenomenon of supply chain interaction, as long as holding costs are not 
prohibitively high. 
While it is observed that strategic inventories are adopted whenever predicted by theory, 
they are significantly smaller than in equilibrium. By choosing smaller inventories the 
buyer can establish a more equitable distribution of the profits. As one explanation of 
this phenomenon, buyer empowerment is defined to be the possibility of reducing the 
inequity of the payoff distribution via inventory choices. It is shown that suppliers 
facing empowered buyers are willing to reduce average wholesale prices as long as they 
can keep their profits above a certain threshold. This behavioral effect leads to a supply 
chain performance that is even more enhanced than in the game theoretic prediction of 
Anand et al. (2008). 
4.1 Literature Review 
The underlying laboratory investigation contributes to the literature on the effects of 
strategic decision making in inter-temporal supply chains, by examining the behavioral 
validity and reliability of the game theoretic predictions. Recently, a rather large body 
of literature on the behavioral aspects of the newsvendor’s problem (e.g. Keser and 
Paleologo (2004), Bolton et al. (2012)) and the bull-whip effect (e.g. Croson and 
Donuhue (2006), Croson et al. (2012)) has emerged, demonstrating the contribution of 
experimental research to a better understanding of strategic interaction in supply chains. 
The main findings of this literature can be summarized in several behavioral 
phenomena, each interfering in a different manner with the game theoretic predictions. 
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In the following, the observed behavioral phenomena are summarized and related to this 
study.  
Frequently observed behavioral phenomena are concerns for fairness and reciprocity. 
The notion that fairness generally plays an important role in human interaction has been 
common knowledge in social sciences for centuries. But, an elaborate research of the 
concept and its consequences for economic performance only started after a series of 
early economic experiments had documented that concerns for fairness persistently 
affect economic behavior (e.g. Güth et al. (1982), Forsythe et al. (1994), Berg and 
Dickhaut (1995), Bolton (1991), Fehr et al. (1998)). The research has culminated in a 
number of theoretical papers modeling different facets of fairness, including a 
preference for equity in income distribution (Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000)), a preference for reciprocal responses to acts of intentional kindness 
and spite (Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)), a preference for 
increasing mutual benefits, or any combination of the preferences listed above 
(Charness and Rabin (2002), Falk and Fischbacher (2006)). Fairness concerns in 
ultimatum type games (as in the underlying laboratory study) have the following 
effects: First, the proposer’s fairness concerns might lead to offers that are more 
equitable than offers in the absence of fairness concerns. Second, the receiver may 
reject offers that are perceived as unfair. The proposer may try to reduce this rejection 
risk by offering a larger share of profits. 
While it is rather difficult to clearly separate the different facets of fairness preferences 
in supply chain settings,26 it is important to note that in most cases all facets of the 
concern for fairness will have the same type of impact on behavior. Such concerns 
generally drive the wholesale prices down leading to a decrease in the payoff 
differences in the supply chain (Cui et al. (2007), Pavlov and Katok (2011)). Loch and 
Wu (2008) conduct an experimental study of supply chains with wholesale price 
contracts under deterministic, price sensitive demand. They show that the profits in all 
treatments are more evenly distributed than predicted by standard theory, because the 
suppliers set lower wholesale prices than predicted. Additionally, if an inter-personal tie 
has been created between the supplier and the buyer, the buyer tends to increase sales 
                                                 
26 A supply chain game in terms of an ultimatum game can be interpreted as follows. The supplier is the 
proposer who offers a contract (e.g., a wholesale price contract). The supplier affects the buyer’s share 
of profits by the contract terms, e.g, setting a lower wholesale price results in a higher share of profits 
for the buyer. The buyer is the receiver who determines the sales quantity in a double marginalization 
context. The buyer may lower the supplier’s profits by choosing suboptimal low sales quantities. 
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boosting the overall efficiency gains. In another experimental study, Keser and 
Paleologo (2004) examine the behavior of supply chain members in a newsvendor 
setting under a wholesale price contract. They observe a tendency towards an equitable 
distribution of profits. As the buyers tend to terminate games with high wholesale 
prices, suppliers seem to voluntarily choose lower wholesale prices that split the profits 
approximately equal. 
While the above mentioned studies cannot distinguish between the two underlying 
behavioral effects that drive suppliers’ behavior (i.e. suppliers’ fairness concerns and/or 
perception of contract failure risk), Katok and Pavlov (2013) as well as Katok et al. 
(2014) perform experiments highlighting that suppliers’ behavior is mainly driven by 
incomplete information about the risk of contract rejection (i.e. suppliers fear contract 
rejection, if the wholesale prices are set too high). In addition, they show that the 
buyers’ behavior is mostly driven by their fairness concerns (i.e. if the suppliers do not 
suffer from a rejection because they have an outside option, then the buyers’ tendency 
to reject offers is significantly lower). 
The underlying study of this chapter contributes to this literature by examining the 
influence of other regarding preferences such as fairness concerns in the context of a 
two-period supply chain interaction with strategic inventories. 
4.2 Experimental Design and Procedure 
The underlying laboratory study is based on the standard model by Anand et al. (2008) 
that was described in chapter 3 and consists of two treatments: A low cost treatment 
(LC) with holding cost of 4SMh   and a high cost treatment (HC) with holding costs of 
42
SM
h  . Both treatments have an identical, inverse demand function: 
    152 2SM SM SMt t tp q q . In contrast to the standard model, two modifications were 
conducted. First, the buyer does no longer have to decide about her selling quantities. 
Instead, the profit maximizing selling quantity is automatically chosen in each period. 
This modification was made in order to facilitate the decision problem of the buyer and 
to allow him to fully concentrate on her inventory decision.27 Second, to resupply the 
buyer with an outside option, he is able to abort the game. In this case, both supplier and 
buyer would get zero profits. Technically, this solution is identical to the case in which 
                                                 
27 Previous studies of the one-period model have shown mixed results regarding the selling quantity. Lim 
and Ho (2007) report slightly below profit maximizing end customer prices (i.e. above profit 
maximizing selling quantities). Loch and Wu (2008) report slightly above profit maximizing end 
customer prices (i.e. below profit maximizing selling quantities). 
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the buyer purchases zero items from the supplier.28 The resulting theoretical predictions 
for the described parameters of the two experimental treatments are shown in Table 3. 
In the low cost treatment, due to the relatively low inventory holding cost, the game 
theoretic model predicts a dynamic solution, with falling wholesale prices, a strategic 
inventory, and higher payoffs both for the supplier and the buyer, when compared to the 
static solution without strategic inventory. The distribution of supply chain payoffs is 
asymmetric in equilibrium, with about two-thirds going to the supplier and one-third to 
the buyer. In the high cost treatment, the relatively high holding cost prohibits the 
profitable adoption of a strategic inventory, so that the game theoretic model predicts a 
static solution with constant wholesale prices and order quantities. As in the other 
treatment, the distribution of supply chain payoffs is asymmetric in equilibrium, with 
about two-thirds going to the supplier and one-third to the buyer. Hence, while the 
treatments are very different concerning the strategic situation, they are very similar in 
the distribution of equilibrium payoffs. This similarity is important, because it 
guarantees that differences in the frequency of equilibrium play are not due to the ex-
ante differences in the equilibrium payoff distributions. 
Table 3: Theoretical Predictions 
 
Low Cost Treatment (LC) 
4
SM
h  
High Cost Treatment (HC) 
42
SM
h  
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 
*SM
tw  80 56 76 76 
SM
tp  116 104 114 114 
SM
tq  18 24 19 19 
*SM
I  10 0 
SMS  3,024 (66.55%) 2,888 (66.67%) 
SMB  1,520 (33.45%) 1,444 (33.33%) 
SMSC  4,544 4,332 
 * decision variables in the experimental analysis 
                                                 
28 An experimental examination of the two-period model with the full decision space (and no explicit 
outside option for the buyer) was recently conducted by Hartwig et al (2014). Enabling the buyers to 
choose their selling quantities seems to have only a minor effect on the general behavioral findings. 
Therefore, the presented findings of the experiment with automated selling decisions get supported by 
the results of the unlimited experiment. 
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The experiment was conducted at a German University using the software z-tree 
(Fischbacher (2007)). A total of 96 subjects, 24 suppliers and 24 buyers in each of the 
two treatments, participated in the experiment. At the outset of the experiment, each 
subject was randomly assigned either the role of a supplier or of a buyer. Subjects 
maintained their roles throughout the 15 decision rounds. Hence, a total of 360 games 
were played per treatment. The subjects were divided into matching groups of three 
suppliers and three buyers and randomly re-matched within their matching groups in 
every decision round to avoid reputation (i.e. repeated game) effects. As each matching 
group forms an independent observation, a total of 8 observations per treatment were 
used for the statistical analysis. 
The instructions were handed out to the subjects upon arrival and were read aloud. 
Then, after a short individual re-reading time, the subjects had the possibility to ask 
questions that were answered privately. Communication between the subjects was 
prohibited. The subjects were then given a computerized comprehension quiz to ensure 
that they had fully understood the rules of the game. Subjects were paid the sum of their 
profits in all rounds in cash, immediately after the experiment. 
The course of events in each decision round is displayed in Figure 12. First, the supplier 
determines the first-period wholesale price (
1
w ). Next, the buyer decides whether to 
terminate the game (corresponds to 
1 2
0q q I   ) or to continue. If the buyer 
terminates the game, the payoffs of both the buyer and the supplier are set to zero and 
the round ends immediately. If the buyer continues, she chooses the size of her strategic 
inventory ( I ) and the system automatically supplements the optimal sales quantity of 
the first-period (
1
q ). Providing the optimal quantity choices allows buyers to focus on 
their choice of the strategic inventories ( I ) that constitute the essential strategic element 
of the game. In period 2, the supplier sets his wholesale price (
2
w ) and the round ends 
with the automatic choice of the buyer's optimal second period sales quantity (
2
q ). 
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Figure 12: Sequence of Decisions 
The suppliers may choose any wholesale price in the interval between 0 and 152. At the 
lower price bound the supplier earns nothing from selling his units and at the upper 
price bound buyers have no incentive to purchase any goods from the supplier. 
The buyers decide to build up an inventory in the range between 0 and 38 units. The 
optimal response function of the buyer in (3.40) shows that even if both the wholesale 
price of the first-period and the inventory holding cost would be zero, quantities greater 
than 38 cannot be optimal. Hence, choosing values outside of the permitted intervals 
cannot be reasonable. 
To further facilitate decision making, the subjects were provided with a profit calculator 
and a payoff table as decision support. The profit calculator displays the profits of both 
players for any combination of decision variables. The subjects could also use the 
payoff tables that displayed the profits for some integer value combinations of the 
decision variables. The subjects were informed that the tables do not contain payoff 
information for all possible values of the decision parameters and only serve as a guide, 
giving an overview of the payoff space. The instructions also point out that the onscreen 
profit calculator can be used to look up profits for any feasible combination of decision 
parameters. An English translation of the instructions for the treatment with low 
inventory holding costs and the payoff tables for both the low and the high cost 
treatment are contained in Appendix A. 
Supplier determines  
the wholesale price of period 1 ( 1w ) 
Buyer continues the game 
Supplier determines 
the wholesale price of period 2 (
2
w ) 
Buyer terminates the game 
P
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r 
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Buyer determines her inventory size ( I ) 
End of decision round 
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e
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4.3 Behavioral Hypotheses 
The game implements a variant of ultimatum bargaining (Güth et al. (1982)), because 
the buyers can terminate the relation after receiving the supplier’s offer in the first-
period. This results in a risk of contract failure for the supplier as observed in many 
other behavioral supply chain studies (Keser and Paleologo (2004), Katok and Pavlov 
(2013), Katok et al. (2014)). The experimental literature of supply chains generally 
finds that the risk of contract failure can be alleviated by shifting payoffs from the 
proposer to the receiver. Hence, it can be conjectured that suppliers in HC and LC may 
reduce their first-period wholesale prices in order to reduce the risk of contract failure. 
In fact, the parameterization seems to make contract rejects more likely in HC than in 
LC, because in HC rejecting the contract is the only option buyers have to punish 
suppliers. Note that in the second period suppliers no longer have a risk of contract 
failure, because the experimental design only allows the payoff maximizing response of 
the buyers in the second period (i.e. buyers are given no rejection option in the second 
period; see: Figure 12). Hence, in line with Katok and Pavlov (2013) it is conjectured 
that due to the absence of contract failure risk suppliers will choose payoff maximizing 
second period wholesale prices. Finally, it is conjectured that the buyers in both HC and 
LC choose payoff maximizing inventory levels, because as second movers in the game 
they face no risk of contract failure. The conjectures regarding contract failure are 
summarized in the following behavioral hypothesis 1: 
 
Behavioral Hypothesis 1 (“Contract failure risk”): 
(1a) In HC and LC, the period 1 wholesale price is smaller than the equilibrium 
wholesale price. 
(1b) In HC, the difference between observed and equilibrium period 1 wholesale prices 
is greater than in LC.  
(1c) In HC and LC, the period 2 wholesale price is equal to the best response. 
(1d) In HC and LC, the strategic inventories are equal to the best response levels. 
 
The behavioral literature provides quite a bit of evidence on the effects of fairness in 
bilateral interactions. In both the LC and HC treatment, a supplier’s concern for fairness 
leads to the choice of lower average wholesale prices. Such a decrease would dampen 
the effect of double marginalization and shift profits from the supplier to the buyer. 
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Note, that shifting payoffs to the buyer generally leads to a more equal distribution of 
profits, since the buyer earns considerably less in both treatments. 
Since it is conjectured that lower first-period wholesale prices may either be caused by 
the risk of contract failure (as in hypothesis 1) or by fairness concerns (as described in 
hypothesis 2 below), the question is if differences in observations can be identified that 
support the one or the other hypothesis. A differentiation between the two hypotheses 
can be achieved by examining the difference between the wholesale prices in HC and 
LC. As stated in hypothesis 1b, if behavior is influenced by the risk of contract failure, a 
lower first-period wholesale prices in HC compared to LC should be observed. Such a 
difference is not expected, if behavior is guided by fairness concerns. In this case, first 
and second period wholesale prices that decrease the payoff differences between 
suppliers and buyers to the same extent in both treatments should be observed in the 
experiment. 
The buyers’ possibility of showing a concern for fairness is different in HC than in LC. 
In LC, a concern for fairness translates to lower levels of strategic inventory as long as 
the buyer’s marginal loss is smaller than the supplier’s marginal loss (see Appendix B). 
Going beyond this point would harm the buyer more than the supplier and, thus, 
increase payoff inequality. In contrast to the buyer in LC, it is expected that the buyers 
in HC are unable to reduce payoff inequality by reducing the strategic inventory, since 
they holds no inventory in equilibrium. The expected effects of fairness concerns on the 
interplay in the supply chains are summarized in hypotheses 2: 
Hypothesis 2 (“Fairness Concerns”): 
(2a) In HC and LC, the average wholesale price of both periods is smaller than the 
equilibrium wholesale price. 
(2b) In HC and LC, the observed strategic inventory levels minimize the payoff 
difference between buyers and suppliers. 
4.4 Results of the Laboratory Experiment 
Table 4 displays the theoretical predictions of the strategic inventory model next to the 
observed mean and median values of the experiment for both treatments. The values for 
the individual and supply chain profits are shown excluding and including the cases, in 
which the game was terminated and both players earned zero (these values are displayed 
in brackets). Since decisions on the inventory size and the second period wholesale 
price are only made when the game is not terminated, only data from non-terminated 
Experimental Analysis and Behavioral Insights on Strategic Inventory in Supply Chains 53 
games are contained in these aggregate values. In the low cost treatment (LC), 34 games 
of 360 were aborted, i.e. about 9%. The rate of termination in the high cost treatment 
(HC) was only about 4% (14 of 360 games were terminated), i.e. less than half the 
termination rate in LC. 
Table 4: Theoretical Analysis vs. Experimental Results 
 Low Cost Treatment (LC) High Cost Treatment (HC) 
 Equilibrium Median Mean Equilibrium Median Mean 
Wholesale 
Price Period 1 
80 70 70.11 76 76 73.91 
Inventory 10 10 8.98 0 0 1.37 
Wholesale 
Price Period 2 
56 56 58.58 76 76 71.34 
Profit 
Supplier 
3,024 
2,888 
(2,884) 
2,870.40 
(2,599.30) 
2,888 
2,887.75 
(2,885.38) 
2,848.13 
(2,729.46) 
Profit 
Buyer 
1,520 
1,759.25 
(1,744.63) 
1,803.60 
(1,633.33) 
1,444 
1,444 
(1,444) 
1,533 
(1,470.08) 
Profit Supply 
Chain 
4,544 
4,731.50 
(4,686) 
4,674 
(4,232) 
4,332 
4,332 
(4,332) 
4,381 
(4,199.54) 
 
The observed mean and median values of the laboratory experiment are extremely close 
to the equilibrium predictions for both treatments. In fact, the empirical medians and the 
theoretical predictions are identical except for the first-period wholesale price and the 
corresponding profits in the LC treatment, in which the adoption of strategic inventories 
was observed to be almost perfectly in the range of values theoretically predicted. In the 
HC treatment, in which the holding costs are too high to allow for the adoption of a 
strategic inventory, almost no inventories are observed (the median of observed values 
is zero and the mean is just slightly greater than one). Furthermore, just as predicted by 
the game theoretic model, a substantial deviation between the median first and second 
period wholesale prices is observed in LC, but no difference between the two wholesale 
prices in HC. Overall, it seems that the strategic interaction that is incorporated in the 
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game theoretic analysis of the strategic inventory game is an almost perfect predictor of 
observed behavior. 
The only noteworthy deviation of the observed behavior from the game theoretic 
predictions is connected to a first-period wholesale price in LC that is significantly 
lower than the equilibrium price. Below, a more detailed analysis of the data is 
provided. The results are presented in four parts: the supplier’s decision on the first-
period wholesale price, the buyer’s decision on the strategic inventory size, the 
supplier’s decision on the second period wholesale price, and finally the resulting 
individual and overall supply chain profits. The statistical analyses are based on the 
independent observations (i.e. every observation is the median of 45 games). 
4.4.1 Supplier’s Period 1 Wholesale Price 
Figure 13 displays the development of the median first-period wholesale prices over the 
15 decision rounds for both treatments. In both treatments, the median first-period 
wholesale price starts about 8 or 9 points below the theoretical benchmark. While the 
median in HC quickly moves up to and then maintains at the equilibrium prediction by 
round 4, the observed first-period wholesale prices in LC tend to drop over time. 
Moreover, it is moving significantly further away from equilibrium towards the end of 
the experiment.29 Hence, a clear difference between the behavior of the suppliers in HC 
and LC concerning the first-period wholesale prices is observed. 
  
Figure 13: Development of Period 1 Wholesale Prices 
 
                                                 
29 Comparing the observed values in the first five to those of the last five rounds using a sign test, the 
error probability is p = 0.063, two-tailed. Also, a significant negative correlation between the first-
period wholesale prices and the decision round using Spearman’s rank correlation measure (r = - 0.188, 
p < 0.001) is found. 
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Since the lower than predicted first-period wholesale price in LC (i.e. lower than the 
dynamic equilibrium price and lower than the static outcome price, sign test, p < 0.001 
and p = 0.008, two-tailed, correspondingly) only holds for LC, but not for HC, 
hypothesis 1a that states that the risk of contract failure leads to below equilibrium 
prices in both treatments cannot be supported. Also, no support for hypothesis 1b 
predicting lower first-period wholesale prices in HC than in LC can be found. Hence, 
the results show no clear evidence that suppliers’ behavior is strongly affected by the 
risk of contract failure. 
The other hypothesis that was derived from previous behavioral literature on supply 
chain interaction relates to fairness concerns. At first sight, it seems that the observed 
first-period wholesale prices in LC which are well below the equilibrium support 
hypothesis 2a. In fact, the data proves that payoff is shifted from the suppliers to the 
buyers via these low first-period prices in LC. This observation, however, is not 
sufficient to establish that the suppliers’ behavior is driven by fairness concerns. If this 
were the case, lower than equilibrium first-period wholesale prices in HC (see 
hypothesis 2a) should also be observed. But, as depict in Figure 13 (right panel), this is 
not the case. Hence, there is also no clear evidence that suppliers’ behavior is mainly 
affected by fairness concerns. The behavioral effects in supply chains with strategic 
inventories seem to go beyond fairness concerns and contract failure risk and, thus, 
beyond the concepts that are so far reported in the literature. 
4.4.2 Buyer’s Strategic Inventory Decision 
On neither of the treatments a significant difference between the observed strategic 
inventory sizes and the corresponding equilibrium predictions is observed. Note, 
however, that while the equilibrium inventory size happens to be an empirical best 
response to the observed median first-period wholesale prices in HC, it is not an 
empirical best response to the much lower observed first-period wholesale prices in LC. 
Table 5 displays the equilibrium, the empirical best response, and observed strategic 
inventory sizes for both treatments. The buyers’ empirical best response to the 
suppliers’ first-period wholesale prices in HC are very close to the equilibrium 
prediction. The best response to the median first-period wholesale price in HC is to 
adopt no strategic inventory (as in equilibrium), and the best response to the average 
first-period wholesale price in HC is to adopt a strategic inventory of size 1. For the 
buyers’ inventory decision a median inventory size of zero and a mean inventory size of 
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1.37 is observed. For these values, no statistical differences between observed inventory 
sizes and the equilibrium predictions or the empirical best responses (sign test, p = 1, 
two-tailed) can be found. It seems that buyers in HC make strategic inventory decisions 
that are almost perfectly in line with the non-cooperative, payoff maximizing 
equilibrium of the game. Note, however, that buyers in HC have no leeway to reduce 
payoff inequality by reducing the level of strategic inventories, because inventory 
choices below zero are not feasible and inventory choices above zero increase 
inequality. Thus, observed behavior in HC neither contradicts hypothesis 1d nor 2b. 
Table 5: Inventory Choices and Best Responses 
Treatment Equilibrium 
Empirical Best Response Observed Data 
to Median to Mean Median Mean 
LC 10 13.67 13.33 10 8.98 
HC 0 0 1 0 1.37 
In the LC treatment, the observed inventory size is significantly larger than zero (sign 
test, p = 0.016, two-tailed). Hence, as predicted by theory, inventory is only utilized if 
the holding cost is sufficiently low. However, in contrast to the observation of best 
response inventory choices in HC, the observed inventory choices in LC cannot be 
considered as best responses to the observed first-period wholesale prices. Figure 14 
displays the median best responses and the median observed inventory sizes in LC (left 
panel) and HC (right panel). It is evident that inventory choices are almost perfectly in 
line with best response in HC, but well below the best responses in LC.30 On average, 
the chosen inventory size in LC is about 27 percent smaller than the best response. This 
difference is significant (sign test, p = 0.008, two-tailed). This lower than best response 
inventory choices contradicts hypothesis 1d, but strongly supports hypothesis 2b. 
                                                 
30 Note that the observed median inventory size is always either an integer or exactly halfway between 
two integers. This makes the median slightly more volatile than the mean and explains the sudden, 
substantial drop we observe in the inventory size in round 6 of LC. 
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Figure 14: Development of Inventory Quantities 
Figure 14 displays the median of the inventory size choices in LC that would minimize 
the payoff difference between buyers and suppliers (“fair response”). The derivation of 
the buyer’s fair response inventory quantity is given in Appendix B. It seems that 
instead of choosing profit maximizing inventory sizes, buyers are choosing inventory 
sizes that equalize the profits of both supply chain partners as much as possible. As 
mentioned above, inventory choices in LC are significantly smaller than the best 
responses, but not significantly different from the “fair response“ (sign test, p = 1, two-
tailed). 
4.4.3 Supplier’s Period 2 Wholesale Price 
In the last decision stage of the game, the supplier sets the second period wholesale 
price. Table 6 shows the equilibrium values for the second period wholesale prices, the 
empirical best responses and the observed data. 
Table 6: Period 2 Wholesale Prices and Best Responses 
Treatment Equilibrium 
Empirical Best Response Observed Data 
to Median to Mean Median Mean 
LC 56 56 58.04 56 58.58 
HC 76 76 73.26 76 71.34 
Neither a significant difference between the empirical best responses and the observed 
wholesale prices in the LC treatment (sign test, p = 1.000, two-tailed) nor in the HC 
treatment (sign test, p = 0.500, two-tailed) is observed. Hence, giving a best response to 
the inventory choice of the buyer seems to be the stable behavior of suppliers in the 
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second period. The fact that the buyers’ inventory choices are strategically affecting the 
wholesale prices of suppliers, as predicted in the analysis by Anand et al. (2008), is 
further supported by a correlation analysis. Calculating Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficients separately for both treatments, shows that the second period wholesale 
prices are significantly and negatively correlated to the inventory sizes both in LC        
(r = - 0.748, p < 0.001) and in HC (r = - 0.496, p < 0.001). Hence, in both treatments the 
suppliers take the inventory size of their buyer into account, choosing lower second 
period wholesale prices, the more inventory the buyer has acquired. 
The observation of second period wholesale prices that are best responses to the buyers’ 
inventory choice strongly support hypothesis 1c (i.e., in the absence of contract failure 
risk suppliers make profit maximizing contract offers). Yet, for testing the fairness 
hypothesis 2a, the second period wholesale prices in combination with the first-period 
wholesale prices need to be evaluated. Since in both treatments second period wholesale 
prices are observed which are fully in line with the theoretical predictions and since the 
first-period wholesale prices deviate from the theoretical predictions only in LC, it is 
not surprising that the observed average wholesale prices in HC are indistinguishable 
from the theoretical benchmarks (sign test, p = 0.25, two-tailed), while in LC the 
observed average wholesale prices are significantly smaller than the theoretical 
benchmarks (sign test, p = 0.008, two-tailed). However, as mentioned in section 4.3, if 
supplier’s fairness concerns drive behavior, lower average wholesale prices would be 
expected in both treatments. Thus, hypothesis 2a needs to be rejected. 
4.4.4 Supply Chain Performance and the Distribution of Payoffs 
Table 7 shows an overview of the equilibrium and observed payoffs in both treatments. 
In HC, no difference between equilibrium and observed profits is found. In LC, 
however, there is clear evidence that suppliers have lower payoffs and that buyers have 
significantly higher payoffs than in equilibrium (sign test, p = 0.008, two-tailed). On the 
one hand, this implies less inequality in payoffs than in equilibrium. On the other hand, 
since the observed positive payoff difference for buyers is greater than the observed 
negative payoff difference for suppliers, the overall supply chain performance is 
significantly higher than in equilibrium (sign test, p = 0.008, two-tailed). Hence, 
summarized the behavioral effect of strategic inventories on supply chain performance 
is both efficiency and fairness enhancing. 
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Table 7: Comparison of the Profits of both Treatments 
4.5 Discussion and Implications 
Based on the standard model by Anand et al. (2008) that consists of a serial supply 
chain with two periods and price-sensitive demand, the first experimental test of the 
effect of strategic inventories on supply chain performance was conducted. In theory, if 
wholesale price contracts are used and holding costs are sufficiently low, building up a 
strategic inventory allows the buyer not only to increase her profit share, but also to 
enhance the overall supply chain performance by inducing a differentiated pricing 
behavior of the supplier. Verifying the predicted effects of strategic inventories in the 
field is extremely difficult, because supply chain interaction is generally embedded in a 
complex relationship that is simultaneously affected by numerous stochastic and 
strategic variables. The multiple confounds (i.e. parallel causal relationships) make the 
separation and identification of the effects of strategic inventories on prices and 
performance almost impossible in field data. 
Using carefully devised controls and variations in the experiment to filter out all other 
causes and effects, the pure effect of strategic inventories can be observed. The 
laboratory results show a positive effect of strategic inventories on supply chain 
performance that qualitatively is perfectly in line with the theoretical results and that 
quantitatively goes even beyond the equilibrium prediction. As predicted theoretically 
no strategic inventories in the case of prohibitively high holding cost (HC treatment) is 
observed. Supply chain performance in this setting is neither enhanced nor impaired by 
the possibility of building up inventories. The case, in which the holding cost is 
sufficiently low (LC treatment), shows an extensive adoption of strategic inventories, 
 
Equilibrium LC HC 
LC HC Median Mean  Median Mean  
Profit 
Supplier 
3,024 
(66.55%) 
2,888 
(66.67%) 
2,888 
2,870.4 
(61.41%) 
2,887.75 
2,848.13 
(64.01%) 
Profit Buyer 
1,520 
(33.45%) 
1,444 
(33.33%) 
1,759.25 
1,803.6 
(38.59%) 
1,444 
1,533 
(34.99%) 
Profit Supply 
Chain 
4,544 4,332 4,731.5 4,674 4,332 4,381.13 
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leading to a strong enhancement of supply chain performance. In fact, the observed 
supply chain performance is even superior to the game theoretically expected 
enhancement, when the cost of holding inventory is low. It is shown that this 
enhancement of supply chain performance cannot be uniquely attributed to fairness 
preferences or perception of contract failure risk, because lower than predicted average 
wholesale prices are only seen in LC but not in HC. Two characteristics that explain 
why average wholesale prices are even lower than predicted in LC are identified. 
The first striking difference in behavior across treatments is due to buyer empowerment 
(i.e. due to the fact that low cost buyers have a range of feasible inequality-reducing 
inventory choice alternatives that high cost buyers do not have). It turns out that low 
cost buyers frequently choose inventory sizes that are not payoff maximizing, but 
reduce the payoff inequality within the supply chain. It is possible that this buyer 
empowerment also influences the suppliers’ perception of contract failure risk leading 
to lower than predicted average wholesale prices. 
The second key difference between treatments is the additional distributional flexibility 
that results from the adoption of strategic inventories. It is shown that the seller’s 
willingness to reduce the wholesale price in period 1 has clear limits. While many 
suppliers are willing to contribute the part of their payoffs exceeding the payoff that 
they would have achieved in the static solution (i.e. without a strategic inventory), 
hardly any suppliers are observed, who are willing to share their payoffs beyond this 
point. Hence, it seems that payoff in the static solution is a decisive benchmark, a focal 
point, for the suppliers’ fairness concerns. A simple explanation why the static solution 
may be a natural focal point of the game is that it is the best outcome that can be 
enforced by suppliers (i.e. it is the maximin outcome). In fact, the existence of this focal 
point also explains why almost no sharing by the suppliers is seen in the high cost 
treatment. The highest achievable payoff for suppliers in that treatment is equal to the 
payoff in the static solution (i.e. at the level of the focal point). Securing payoffs at the 
focal point level, obviously, leaves no financial leeway for other-regarding behavior in 
the high cost treatment. 
In sum, the theoretically predicted strategic interaction mostly dominates behavior in 
the conducted multi-period game. However, when the supply chain partners manage to 
cooperate and to generate a surplus, they tend to divide the surplus in a way that 
equalizes payoffs as also previously observed in the literature. The interesting new 
behavioral aspect, that is observed here, is that fairness only matters when both parties 
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can actively contribute to generating a surplus. In the setting of the conducted 
experiment, the buyers can only contribute to the surplus, when their holding cost are 
low, allowing them to create and vary the size of their strategic inventories. Without the 
distributional flexibility that provides buyers with the strategic option to contribute to 
the joint surplus (i.e. without buyer empowerment) it is observed that suppliers see no 
reason to equalize payoffs in our setting. 
The findings of the presented laboratory study have several implications for supply 
chain management. First, the findings suggest that when holding costs are reasonably 
low, inventories may (at least partially) be adopted for strategic reasons, both enhancing 
the supply chain performance and empowering the buyer. In other words, the results 
give strong empirical support to the theoretical findings of Anand et al (2008). Second, 
the results suggest that there may be behavioral effects that top off the purely strategic 
effect. Seeking a more equitable payoff distribution in the supply chain, the empowered 
buyers may harm the supply chain performance by choosing suboptimal small 
inventories. But this negative effect of buyer empowerment on supply chain 
performance is generally offset by the positive effect of the low first-period prices. 
Third, the results highlight that the positive effects on supply chain performance can 
only be achieved with some flexibility concerning the distribution of profits. There is 
evidence that the extent of profit sharing may strongly depend on focal points that 
emerge from the interaction situation and induce upper bounds for the willingness to 
share. Obviously, such focal points may be based on historical, legal, or cultural details 
of the interaction environment. The conducted study shows that they may also be based 
on strategic features of the interaction (e.g. a maximin outside option). 
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5 Strategic Inventory in Supply Chains with Horizontal Competition 
In the standard model, the supply chain consists of only one supplier who sells goods to 
a single buyer. Hence, both supply chain members possess a high degree of monopoly 
power as they are only confronted with vertical competition. In real life scenarios, 
however, the supply chain structure often is more complex as described in the standard 
model, as supply chain members also compete horizontally against other suppliers or 
buyers. Horizontal competition within supply chains and the respective contract design 
for the single-period model have been examined extensively in literature. Some of the 
recent publications include Ingene and Parry (1995) who examine horizontal 
competition between multiple buyers that are not necessarily identical regarding their 
demand and cost function. They prove that a simple two-part tariff is unable to 
coordinate the supply chain if the supplier is forced to treat buyers identically (i.e. the 
supplier is not allowed to discriminate the buyers by offering differing, individual 
contracts). Only by using a menu of two-part tariffs the first-best solution can be 
achieved. However, the supplier does not always prefer such a menu over a non-
coordinating contract. Hence, the first-best solution is not always achievable. 
Bernstein and Federgruen (2003) extend the literature by considering the replenishment 
strategies of buyers within a supply chain with one supplier and multiple competing 
retailers. Their analysis features both price (Bertrand) and quantity (Cournot) 
competition between the buyers under linear and nonlinear pricing schemes. Moreover, 
they prove that the channel can be coordinated with nonlinear pricing schemes. Jain et 
al. (2001) consider a supply chain with a single supplier and multiple buyers under 
stochastic demand. In their setup, the buyers observe signals about the size of the 
demand. As these signals are private information the supplier implements advanced 
pricing mechanisms that nearly achieve channel coordination. 
However, the described research does not take the effects of strategic inventory into 
account that may arise in multi-period interaction under vertical competition. Literature 
that combines both horizontal and vertical competition under multiple-period interaction 
is still rare. Expanding the standard model of Anand et al. (2008), the study of Desai et 
al. (2010) includes an analysis of a one supplier, two buyers supply chain. For the 
relevant case of competition between buyers their linear demand function with a 
parameter for competition intensity (based on the quadratic utility function of Shubik 
and Levitian (1980)) implements a Bertrand (i.e. price) competition. 
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In contrast to Desai et al. (2010) the underlying study of this chapter investigates selling 
quantity (Cournot) competition like it is also done by Viswanathan and Jang (2009) as 
well as by Viswanathan and Jang (2011).31 Furthermore, this study generalizes prior 
research by considering an arbitrary number of buyers (Figure 15). The latter feature 
allows to analyze, to which extend strategic inventory plays a role if the supplier faces 
competing buyers and how the impact of strategic inventory is affected by reducing 
market power of the buyers via increasing their number. 
 
 
Figure 15: Horizontal Competition in Supply Chains 
5.1 Model Description and Analysis 
The model with horizontal competition ( e HCM  ) is based on the original two-period 
model of Anand et al. (2008). But, instead of selling to only one buyer, the supplier now 
has multiple identical buyers ( , 1,..,j k N ) that can purchase items from him. These 
buyers then sell these goods on the same market (Figure 15). The supplier cannot 
discriminate between the different buyers and sets a universal wholesale price in each 
period ( HCMtw ). Each buyer ( j ), in turn, has to decide about his purchase ( ,
HCM
j tQ ) and 
selling quantity ( ,
HCM
j tq ). The price on the external market is described by a linear, 
deterministic demand function and depends on the sum of the overall sold units               
(

   ,
1
N
HCM HCM
t j t
j
p a b q ). By purchasing more items than selling, each buyer has the option 
to build up an inventory (  , 1 , 1
HCM HCM HCM
j j jI Q q ) that she can use in the second period              
(  , 2 , 2
HCM HCM HCM
j j jq I Q ). Holding inventory causes identical cost of 
HCMh  per unit for each 
                                                 
31 The studies of Viswanathan and Jang (2009/ 2011) are a special case of this study with only two 
buyers. However, both of their (diverse) results cannot be confirmed by the presented study as inserting 
(N=2) into Table 8 and Table 10 shows. 
Supplier Buyer 2 Customer
Buyer 1
Buyer 3
:
:
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buyer. At the end of the second period, unsold units have a salvage value of zero. 
Hence, the buyers will sell all of their goods at the end of period two. Also, just as in the 
standard model the production cost of the supplier as well as the handling costs of 
supplier and buyer are normalized to zero. Moreover, both supplier and buyers possess 
perfect information. Like in the standard model, still none of the classical reasons (see 
chapter 2) to build up inventory exist. 
Therefore, the supplier’s profit function is: 
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 (5.1) 
while the profit function of a single buyer ( k ) is described by: 
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 (5.2) 
Hence, the supply chain profit is: 
 
 

 
 
 
   
    
  

 
 
 
   
 
 

 



, 1 , 1
, 1 , 2 ,
1
1
1 1
, 2 ,
11
2
, ,
N
HCM HCM HCM HCM HCM HCM
SC k k S B j
k
N N
HCM HCM HCM H
k
N
j k k
j
N
CM
k k
N
HCM HCM
k
k
j
j
q I q
a b q q I
a b q q
h   (5.3) 
The solution under individual optimization is conducted by backwards induction, the 
optimization starts with the selling quantity decision , 2
HCM
kq  of any buyer k  in the second 
period: 
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As every buyer is identical (i.e. , 2 , 2
HCM HCM
j Bq q j   with , 2
HCM
Bq  as single-buyer selling 
quantity) it holds that  

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1
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Hence, the total sold quantity in the second period is: 
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The supplier integrates the buyers’ reaction function for the overall selling quantity 
(5.6) into his profit function (5.1): 
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Then, he determines the optimal wholesale price of the second period: 
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Hence, the buyers can influence the wholesale price setting of the supplier under 
horizontal competition. The impact of the inventory increases with an increase in buyers 
as 
1
lim 1
N
N
N

 . However, to obtain the absolute effect of an increase of horizontal 
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competition also changes of the inventory size due to the increased competition have to 
be considered. 
Next, considering their selling quantities from (5.5) the buyers anticipate the supplier’s 
price setting (5.9) in their individual profit function: 
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Each buyer k  determines her optimal selling quantity as well as the optimal inventory 
size: 
selling quantity: 
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inventory size: 
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As the buyers are identical, (5.12) and (5.14) can be generalized to: 
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with: 
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Like in the standard model, the supplier decides with his first-period wholesale price 
choice whether the buyer will build up inventory or not. According to (5.17) a buyer 
will only build up inventory if 
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Case 1: dynamic solution (inventory is built up in equilibrium) 
 
The supplier integrates his second period price decision from (5.9) and the buyers’ first 
(5.16), (5.18) and second (5.6) period reaction functions into his profit function (5.1): 
 
     
   
   
   
     
   
     
 
      

 
      

 
 
2
2 2 4 3 2
1
2
4 3 2 3 2
1 1
2
2
4 3 2 3
2
1
2 1 4 2 8 7
4 2 1
4 2 8 7 1 8
4 2 1
4 2 4
4 2 1
HCM
H
HCM
CM HCM HCM
HCM H
H M
M
S
C
C
N N a N N N w
N N N b
N N N N a w N N h w
N N N b
N N N h N N
w
a h
N N N b
 (5.20) 
He then determines the optimal first-period wholesale price: 
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For the dynamic solution (5.19) must be fulfilled in order to be feasible. Inserting the 
optimal first-period wholesale price (5.22) into the buyers’ inventory respond function 
(5.17) shows that inventory will be built up as long as: 
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A summary of the solution with strategic inventory (dynamic solution) can be found in 
Table 8 where the values of all variables are described as functions of the number of 
buyers.32 
In the case of only one buyer ( 1N  ), the maximum holdings cost under which strategic 
inventory got utilized was quite high ( 
4
SM ah  or 
 
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max
max
1 1
4 50%
2
SM SM
SM SM SM
a
h h
aw w h
). As 
(5.23) shows, the upper boundary for the holding cost shrinks, if the number of buyers 
in the supply chain increases. Figure 16 shows the development of the maximum 
holding cost rate for a build-up of strategic inventory: 
 
Figure 16: Maximum Holding Cost Rate for Utilization of Strategic Inventory 
Starting at a relatively high level the upper bound for the holding costs decreases by 
two-thirds of the previous value as soon as a second buyer is added to the supply chain. 
Already with only 4 buyers in the supply chain the holding cost rate has to be below 
5%, in order to lead to a build-up of strategic inventory. At the same time, even if 
holding costs are constant, the total amount of strategic inventory also decreases with an 
increase of buyers (see Table 8). Hence, both the occurrence of strategic inventory and 
its impact on supply chain performance decrease with an increase of horizontal 
competition. Generally, with an increase of the number of buyers, they continue to lose 
their monopoly power within the supply chain. Hence, the buyers surcharge on the 
supplier’s wholesale price and their inventory size will decrease under an increasing 
                                                 
32 As the standard model by Anand et al (2009) is the special case of 1N   within the horizontal 
competition  model, the  results  of  Table 1  can  be  reproduced  from  Table 8  and  Table 9  by  
setting 1N  . 
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number of buyers. As a result, the solution converges towards the first-best solution 
with the supplier earning the entire supply chain profit. 
Table 8: Dynamic Solution under Horizontal Competition (Decision Variables) 
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Table 9: Dynamic Solution under Horizontal Competition (Profits) 
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
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Case 2: static solution (no inventory is built up in equilibrium) 
If holding costs are prohibitively high, the buyer will not build up inventory in 
equilibrium. Hence, the two periods are decoupled and decisions will be identical in 
both periods (i.e. it is sufficient to analyze the solution for the one period model and 
apply the decisions to both periods). As the reaction functions of the second period have 
already been derived, the static solution can be simply obtained by inserting 0HCjI   into 
the suppliers’ second period reaction function (5.9). Then, the obtained second period 
wholesale price can be inserted into the buyers’ second period reaction function (5.5). 
As the decisions are identical in both periods, the first-period decisions can be obtained 
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by copying the second period decisions. The complete static solution is summarized in 
Table 10: 
Table 10: Static Solution under Horizontal Competition 
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5.2 Impact of Strategic Inventory under Horizontal Competition 
Whether the supply chain members as well as the entire supply chain benefit from the 
possibility to use strategic inventory depends on the one hand on the level of the holding 
cost ( HCMh ) and on the other hand on the degree of horizontal competition ( N ). Anand 
et al (2008) have shown that with only one buyer in the supply chain, the supplier is 
always better off under the dynamic solution (i.e. the supplier will prefer the dynamic 
solution as long as holding costs are not prohibitively high). From the perspective of the 
buyer and the entire supply chain, profits are mostly higher under the dynamic solution. 
However, for very high holding costs there exists a small area in which profits are 
higher under the static solution (see Figure 9, Figure 10 and Figure 11). 
This difference regarding the preference for one solution or the other (i.e. dynamic 
versus static) disappears as soon as horizontal competition exists in the supply chain. 
Still, the supplier is always better off under the dynamic solution, but as soon as a 
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second buyer exists within the supply chain, a buyer also always prefers the dynamic 
solution.33 Hence, under horizontal competition and wholesale price setting, all supply 
chain members and therefore the entire supply chain benefit from strategic inventory. 
In Figure 17 the static solution gets compared to the best case scenario (zero holding 
cost) of the dynamic solution. Hence, Figure 17 shows the maximum advantage due to 
the utilization of strategic inventory. 
 
Figure 17: Profit Comparison Static vs. Dynamic under Horizontal Competition 
It is straightforward to see that the benefit due to strategic inventory decreases, if 
horizontal competition increases. Already for the case of only four buyers the 
differences between static and dynamic solution are almost marginal. Hence, strategic 
inventory plays a significant role, if horizontal competition is weak (i.e. if the buyers 
have strong monopoly power). However, in order to evaluate this result it has to be kept 
in mind that the scope for improvements decreases, if more buyers enter the supply 
chain. In case of only one buyer, the supply chain profit of the static solution 
corresponds to 75% of the first-best solution. Hence, by moving from the static to the 
fist best solution the supply chain profit can be increased by one third. For the example 
of four suppliers, the static solution already reaches 96% of the first-best supply chain 
outcome and is, therefore, even higher than the dynamic solution in the case of only one 
buyer (79.76%). Hence, the improvement of the dynamic over the static solution should 
                                                 
33 Comparisons between the static and dynamic solution for the buyer’s and supplier’s profits can be 
found in Appendix C. 
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also be measured considering the respective potential for improvement of the static 
solution (i.e. in comparison to the dead weight loss): 
  
   
 
 
 



/ /
/
HCM Dynamic HCM Static
SC SC
FB HCM Static
SC SC
N N
Relative Improvement N
N
 (5.24) 
The relative improvements in the best case scenario (  0HCMh ) are given in Table 11. In 
the situation without horizontal competition the absolute difference between the 
efficiency level of the static and the dynamic solution is about 4.76%. This corresponds 
to a deadweight loss reduction of about 19%. For 6 buyers within the supply chain, the 
absolute difference is only about 0.21%. However, this still means a deadweight loss 
reduction of about 10.32%. This approach shows that the diminishing effect of strategic 
inventory is partly caused by the reduction of the double marginalization effect due to 
the increased horizontal competition. If only the reduction of dead weight lost is 
considered, the impact of strategic inventory still reduces, but at a much smaller rate. 
Table 11: Deadweight Loss Reduction due to Strategic Inventory 
Number of Buyers 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Deadweight Loss of 
the Static Solution 
25.00% 11.11% 6.25% 4.00% 2.78% 2.04% 
Absolute Improvement of 
the Dynamic Solution 
4.76% 1.86% 0.91% 0.51% 0.32% 0.21% 
Relative Improvement 19.03% 16.75% 14.62% 12.87% 11.47% 10.32% 
In summary, these results show that strategic inventory only plays a major role if the 
supply chain profit is strongly impaired by double marginalization, because of high 
monopoly power of the buyers. As soon as more buyers enter the supply chain, the 
double marginalization effect gets reduced. Therefore, on the one hand, the impact of 
strategic inventory gets lower and, on the other hand, the maximum value of holding 
costs, for which strategic inventory gets applied, reduces. 
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6 Strategic Inventory under Interest Rate Approaches 
In the standard model of Anand et al. (2008) inventory holding costs are modeled as 
cost per unit and period. However, in practice a major fraction of the inventory holding 
cost depends on the value of the stored goods (e.g. opportunity cost due to locked 
capital, cost for insurance).34 As long as the purchasing costs of the buyer (i.e. the 
wholesale price) are constant it does not make a difference whether holding costs are 
modeled as per unit or as value costs (i.e. they can be transferred into each other without 
impacting the solution). 
However, in the dynamic case of the standard model, the supplier increases the first-
period wholesale price (
1
SM
w ) in comparison to the static case. Hence, the buyer’s first-
period purchasing price per unit is not constant and, moreover, it directly depends on 
the holding cost parameter ( SMh ) as  1 9 2 17SM SMw a h  . In practice, however, 
higher purchasing cost would likely cause higher holding costs, which is not considered 
in the standard model with its fixed holding cost parameter. 
To consider price dependent inventory costs, two different approaches may be 
considered. In the inventory interest (IIR) model ( e IIR ), the buyer’s inventory costs 
are determined as a percentage of her purchasing costs by an interest rate parameter 
 IIRi . Hence, in contrast to the standard model ( SMh ) the per unit holding costs of the 
buyer are no longer constant, but instead depend on the supplier’s first-period wholesale 
price choice: 1
IIR IIR IIRh i w  . 
While the IIR model only considers the opportunity cost of the capital that is locked due 
to inventory, the discounted cash flow approach extends the consideration of 
opportunity costs to all cash flows. The time value of money is considered by 
discounting future revenues. More specifically, in the discounted cash flow (DCF) 
model ( e DCF ), all future payments are discounted by multiplying them with the 
factor 

 
 
 
1
1
1
t
DCFi
 where DCFi  stands for a general interest rate parameter. Hence, both 
supplier and buyer have a higher valuation for profits that are made in the first-period. 
As the interest rate of the DCF model only covers the part of holdings costs that are 
caused by the date of the realization of the cash flows, an additional per unit holding 
                                                 
34 Nahmias (2009) pp. 204-205 
Strategic Inventory under Interest Rate Approaches 76 
costs rate ( DCFh ) is used in the DCF model. This per unit holding costs rate covers the 
residual, out of pocket costs of holding inventory and consist of buyer’s expenses for 
holding inventory that are not transfer payments towards the supplier (e.g. costs for 
insurances, warehouse operating costs). In the standard model, the increased first-period 
wholesale price caused the buyer to sell fewer goods in the first-period than in a single-
period model. Thus, the buyer’s profit of the first-period does not only get reduced by 
the investment in inventory, but additionally by the lower realization of profits due to 
selling activities. In the second period, however, the profit of the buyer is much higher 
than in the single-period model. This is caused by the fact that the selling quantity is 
higher due to a lower second period wholesale price. Moreover, the buyer can use her 
inventory, which has zero purchasing costs in the second period, to partly cover the 
customers demand. The supplier, in turn, also suffers from the lower first-period selling 
quantity. However, his first-period profit is higher than in a single-period model as the 
buyer invests into building up an inventory. In turn, his second period profit is lower 
than in the single-period model. 
It is important to note that a mathematically equivalent35 discounted cash flow approach 
was already conducted by Desai et al. (2010). In this study, the results of the DCF 
model get compared to the IIR model and the impact of the discount rate on the 
supplier’s decisions gets examined in more detail. 
6.1 Strategic Inventory under the Inventory Interest Rate Approach 
In this model, the inventory holding costs are no longer independent of the purchasing 
cost. An increase of the first-period wholesale price now also leads to an increase of the 
holding costs. In comparison to the standard model, the supplier, therefore, also 
influences the buyer’s holding cost with his first-period wholesale price decision. 
Like in the standard model three possible solutions (first-best, static, dynamic) have to 
be considered: 
The first-best solution serves as a benchmark. As holding inventory still causes a 
deadweight loss, no inventory is built up in the first-best solution. Hence, the change 
regarding the modelling of the holding cost parameter does not influence the first-best 
                                                 
35 Their   parameter corresponds to 
1
1
DCF
i
 that is used in the following. Hence, the presented 
deduction of this section is mathematically identical to the prior analysis of Desai et al. (2010). 
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solution. Therefore, the first-best solution of the IIR model is identical to the solution of 
the standard model. 
The static solution can be enforced by the supplier by using a commitment contract and 
automatically occurs if holding costs are prohibitively high. It is also identical to the 
solution of the standard model as per definition no inventory is built up. Hence, only the 
change of the dynamic solution and the maximum level of the interest rate that leads to 
the dynamic solution have to be investigated. 
As the supplier does not carry any holding costs, his profit function remains the same as 
in the standard model (3.29): 
      1 2 1 1 2 2,IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR IIRS w w w q I w q I       (6.1) 
The buyers profit function changes regarding the inventory holding costs: 
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 (6.2) 
Also, the supply chain profit changes due to the change to price-dependent holding 
costs: 
                 1 2 1 1 1 2 2, , .IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR IIRSC q I q a b Iq q i w a b q q   (6.3) 
6.1.1 Analysis of the Inventory Interest Rate Model 
Again, the solution can be derived by backwards induction. First, the buyer’s reaction 
function in period two has to be identified: 
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1
2
2
2
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IIR IIR IIR IIR
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q I q
a bq w
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 (6.4) 
  

 22 2
2
IIR
IIR IIR a wq w
b
  (6.5) 
The supplier integrates the buyer’s second period reaction function (6.5) into his profit 
function 
    1 2 1 1 2 2,
2
IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR I
II
IR IIR I R
S
R
Ia ww
b
w w q I w I

 
 
     
 
 (6.6) 
and derives his optimal reaction function to the buyer’s inventory size: 
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  (6.7) 
    2
2
IIR IIR IIRaw I bI  (6.8) 
Note, that both the supplier’s and buyer’s second period reaction functions are identical 
to the standard model. Hence, only if the buyer holds a strategic inventory size that 
differs from the size of the standard model a deviation from the solution of the standard 
model will occur.36 
In the first-period, the buyer optimizes her profit function and, thereby, incorporates the 
supplier’s second period wholesale price reaction function (6.8): 
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 (6.9) 
First, she optimizes her selling quantity. 
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Again, this reaction function is identical to the function of the standard model. As long 
as the supplier sets the same price as in the standard model, the buyer will sell exactly 
the same quantity to the external market. 
Second, the buyer derives the response function for the inventory size: 
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36 The second period results also show mathematically that the results of the static solution in the standard 
and the inventory interest rate model are identical, as the inventory size is per definition zero in the 
static solution. 
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Here, a first difference towards the reaction function of the standard model (3.40) 
occurs. There, the inventory holding costs are a constant factor that lowers the inventory 
size to the same degree but regardless of the actual level of the first-period wholesale 
price. In the IIR model, the interest rate determines how sensitive the buyer reacts to a 
change of the first-period wholesale price. In comparison to the standard model, an 
increase of the first-period wholesale price leads to a stronger reduction of the inventory 
size if 0IIRi  . Further, setting   1 0IIR IIRI w  in (6.13) shows that inventory is only built 
up if: 
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. (6.14) 
Hence, for larger first-period wholesale prices that do not fulfill (6.14), the static 
solution will apply. A check regarding this upper bound will be conducted after the 
first-period wholesale price is found. 
The supplier’s profit function that includes the previous response functions is: 
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 (6.15) 
In the last step, the supplier derives the optimal first-period wholesale price: 
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By inserting the first-period wholesale price into the reaction functions, the dynamic 
solution can be derived. As mentioned above, the dynamic solution is only feasible, if 
Strategic Inventory under Interest Rate Approaches 80 
condition (6.14) is fulfilled. Inserting (6.17) into (6.14) shows that the dynamic solution 
is feasible if 0 0.5IIRi  . 
Additionally, the supplier can always enforce the static solution by using a commitment 
contract. Hence, he will only implement the dynamic solution, if his profits are higher in 
comparison to the static solution. Comparing the results of the dynamic and static 
solution (Table 12) within the respective feasible range of the interest rate shows that 
the supplier always prefers the dynamic solution. Hence, as long as the interest holding 
cost rate is lower than 50% the supplier will implement the dynamic solution and 
strategic inventory is built up. Only for a higher holding cost rate the static solution 
applies. Moreover, a comparison of the respective profits shows that also the buyer and, 
therefore, the whole supply chain are always better off under the dynamic solution.37 A 
summary of the IIR model is given by Table 12 and Table 13: 
Table 12: Solution of the Inventory Interest Rate Model (Decision Variables) 
 First-Best 
e FB  
Static 
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0.5IIRi   
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37 See Appendix D for a mathematical comparisons of profits. 
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Table 13: Solution of the Inventory Interest Rate Model (Profits) 
 First-Best 
e FB  
Static 
e IIR  
0.5IIRi   
Dynamic 
e IIR  
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6.1.2 Impact of the Holding Cost on the Strategic Inventory in the Inventory 
Interest Rate Model and Conclusions 
To test how the actual size of the inventory interest rate affects the first-period 
wholesale price, the first order derivative has to be considered: 
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 (6.18) 
Hence, an increase of the interest rate leads to a reduction of the first-period wholesale 
price. 
Moreover, the results of the SM and the IIR model can be directly compared to each 
other at the respective upper and lower bound of the dynamic solution. At the lower 
bound, no inventory holding costs exist ( 0IIRi   and  0SMh ) for both models. Hence, it 
is straightforward that in the absence of any holding cost, both models lead to an exactly 
identical solution. Formally, this can be shown by setting the holding cost parameters to 
zero in both models. For the first-period, for example, the wholesale price (standard 
model (3.43), IIR model (6.17)) results in an identical price of 9
17
a . 
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For the upper bound comparing the two models is also straightforward because if the 
holding cost reach the bound (i.e.:  0.5IIRi  or 
4
SM ah ), the static solution will apply. 
Hence, as the static solution is identical in both models, there is also no difference 
between the models, if the respective holding costs parameters are above or exactly at 
the upper bound. However, it remains unclear, how the upper bound can be compared in 
terms of actual costs of holding inventory because of their difference in scale. To allow 
a comparison at the upper bound the inventory interest rate of the IIR model must be 
transferred into the per unit cost rate of the standard model (et vice versa). The 
respective per unit holding cost rate of the IIR model is 
       0.5 0.5
4
IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR ah w i i w , while the respective inventory interest rate of the 
standard model is 
   
  4 0.5
4
SM
SM
SM SM SM
a
h
i
aw h w
. Therefore, the solutions of both 
models correspond to each other regarding the boundaries of the holding costs. 
Now, the area within the boundaries is analyzed more specifically. As displayed by 
(6.13) the inventory interest rate influences how strongly the buyer reacts to price 
changes of the supplier. In the standard model (3.40), in contrast, the holding costs 
reduce the inventory size independently of the wholesale price. As a result, the supplier 
has to lower the first-period price stronger than in the standard model in which the 
holding costs are independent of the first-period wholesale price. Figure 18 shows the 
development of the first-period wholesale price under an increasing inventory interest 
rate under the parameters 100a  , 1b   (These parameters will be used for all figures 
of the supply chain members decision variables and without causing a loss of 
generality38). Note, however that there is no possible way to exactly convert the 
inventory holding cost rate to a per unit cost rate that works in both directions and for 
all values (i.e. if the parameter is converted back the result would differ from the 
starting value).39 However, this only creates a small disruption that is not visible by eye 
(see Appendix F for a comparison). Therefore, in the following the interest rate will be 
used as the baseline and the corresponding per unit holding cost rate of the standard 
                                                 
38 See Appendix E. 
39 Multiplying the inventory interest rate by the corresponding first-period price of the IIR model delivers 
a per unit cost rate. However, if this per unit cost is used in the standard model to calculate the first-
period wholesale price and then an interest rate is calculated with these values, it will differ from the 
starting interest rate. 
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model will be calculated by multiplying the inventory interest rate of the IIR model with 
the first-period wholesale price of the IIR model: 
  
 
1 2
9
:
17 4 4
   
 
SM IIR IIR IIR IIR
IIR IIR
a
h i w i i
i i
  (6.19) 
Consequently, the first-period wholesale price of the standard model is obtained by 
    1 1 1:SM SM SM IIR IIR IIRw h w i w i  . 
 
Figure 18: Development of First-period Wholesale Price in the IIR Model 
The development of the first-period wholesale price shows that both models have the 
same starting and ending point. However, in the standard model the wholesale price 
decreases nearly linearly40, while the curve between the two points is convex in the IIR 
model. As a result, the wholesale price in the IIR model is always smaller than in the 
standard model. This is caused by the more sensitive influence of a first-period 
wholesale price increase of the supplier on the inventory decision of the buyer (6.13). 
This means, if the inventory interest rate increases, the supplier starts with a higher 
decrease of the first-period wholesale price in the IIR model than in the standard model, 
because the level of the wholesale price also determines the level of the inventory cost. 
                                                 
40 In contrast to the original SM model, the curve is no longer perfectly linear, because 
1
SM
w  gets 
affected by the convex trend of 
1
IIR
w  due to  SM IIR IIR IIRh i w i  . 
49.5
50
50.5
51
51.5
52
52.5
53
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Wholesale Price
Period 1
Inventory Interest Rate 
Wholesale Price Period 1 (IIR Model) Wholesale Price Period 1 (Standard Model)
Strategic Inventory under Interest Rate Approaches 84 
By setting lower wholesale prices the supplier countervails the per unit holding cost 
increase due to the higher inventory interest rate (  IIR IIR IIRh w i ).41 
In summary, the buyer faces lower (or at least equal) first-period wholesale prices in the 
IIR model than in the standard model. As the reaction function of the first-period selling 
quantity is identical in both models ((3.38) and (6.11)), the lower first-period wholesale 
price results in a higher (or at least equal) selling quantity as described by Figure 19: 
 
Figure 19: Development of the First-period Selling Quantity in the IIR Model 
Hence, regarding the first-period, the double marginalization effect is weaker in the IIR 
model. However, it is still stronger than in the static solution, because the supplier raises 
the first-period wholesale price anticipating the buyer’s increased first-period 
purchasing quantity due to her strategic inventory build-up. 
In contrast to the selling quantity decision, the impact of the lower first-period 
wholesale price on the inventory size is more complicated. On one hand, a comparison 
of the reaction functions of the standard model (3.40) and the IIR model (6.13) shows 
that a lower wholesale price leads to an increase of the inventory size. Moreover, the 
inventory reducing compound of the standard model that depends on the per unit 
inventory holding cost rate ( SMh ) does no longer exist in the IIR model, which also 
leads to higher inventory levels. On the other hand, the inventory interest rate in the IIR 
model enlarges the negative impact of the first-period wholesale price on the inventory 
                                                 
41 Note that this can also be interpreted from another perspective: The higher the inventory holding cost 
rate is, the lower is the supplier’s scope for an increase of the first-period wholesale price. 
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size. Hence, so far it can only be stated that the solutions of both SM and IIR model 
have the same minimum and maximum inventory size, as at these points (upper and 
lower bound of the dynamic solution) both solutions are identical. 
A more detailed analysis of the effect of the holding costs parameter on the inventory 
size shows that in the standard model (see Table 2) an increase of the holding cost 
parameter ( SMh ) causes a nearly linear decrease of the inventory size.42 In the IIR model 
(Table 12), an increase of the holding cost parameter ( IIRi ) leads to a progressively 
decreasing inventory size. Hence, under the previously described method to compare 
both solutions the inventory size is always larger in the IIR model (see Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20: Development of the Inventory Size in the IIR Model 
Hence, the impact of the inventory cost modification leads to a reduction of the first-
period wholesale price, which in turn increases the inventory size. By combining the 
inventory size with the inventory costs parameter, the total holding costs of both models 
can be calculated. 
                                                 
42 Note, because 
SMh gets replaced by   1:
SM IIR IIRh i w , an increase of IIRi  leads to a nearly linear 
decrease of the inventory size (
SMI ). 
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Figure 21: Development of Holding Cost in the IIR Model 
As Figure 21 shows, the total holding costs in the IIR model ( i.e.:  1IIR IIR IIR IIRi w I i   
are larger than in the standard model ( i.e.:  SM SM SMh I h  with 1:SM IIR IIRh i w   due to 
the increased inventory size. Consequently, as the reaction functions of the second 
period are identical in both models, the larger inventory size in IIR will lead to a smaller 
second period wholesale price (Figure 22) and a larger selling quantity (Figure 23). 
Thus, in both periods, the double marginalization effect is weaker, if the per unit 
holding costs depends on the purchasing price (i.e. in the IIR model). 
 
Figure 22: Development of the Second Period Wholesale Price in the IIR Model 
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Figure 23: Development of the Second Period Selling Quantity in the IIR Model 
Hence, regarding the profits there exist two contrary effects: the downside of increased 
total holding costs and the upside of the reduction of double marginalization. As already 
stated, both supplier and buyer always prefer the dynamic solution in the IIR model.  In 
the standard model, in contrast, the buyer prefers the static solution, if holding costs are 
sufficiently high. This already shows that at least for high holding costs the buyer must 
be better off in the IIR model than in the standard model. The following more detailed 
analysis of the profits will show if this observation can be generalized to the entire 
range of inventory interest rates and to all supply chain members. 
In comparison to the IIR model, the supplier has to set lower wholesale prices in both 
periods. In the first-period, the supplier is enforced to set a lower price than in the 
standard model, because the buyer reacts more sensitive to his price setting. In the 
second period, the supplier also sets a lower wholesale price, because the lower 
wholesale price incentivized the buyer to build up a larger strategic inventory. However 
due to the lower prices, the selling quantity goes up. As shown in Figure 24, both effects 
nearly neutralize each other regarding the profit of the supplier.43 
                                                 
43 In fact, the supplier’s profit is slightly lower in the IIR model in comparison to the standard model. See 
Appendix G for a mathematical comparison. 
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Figure 24: Comparison of the Supplier Profit in IIR and Standard Model44 
Hence, from the supplier’s perspective, the way inventory holding costs are modeled 
(i.e. as constant per unit holding costs or as an inventory interest rate) does not 
substantially impact the his profit. He prefers the dynamic over the static solution in 
both models and under similar inventory costs, almost no profit difference exists. 
However, the realization of the profit differs. Compared to the standard model, the 
comparable profit level is achieved with lower prices and a higher selling quantity. 
In terms of the buyer’s profit, however, several differences occur. Here, the profits are 
only identical at the boundaries of the dynamic solution. For the inventory cost values 
within the interval of the dynamic solution, the buyer’s profit is always larger in the IIR 
model compared to the respective profit of the standard model (Figure 25 and Appendix 
G for a mathematical proof). Hence, the increase in total holding costs is outweighed by 
the positive effects of the lower wholesale prices, which leads to a weaker decrease of 
the buyer’s profit under rising holding costs. Moreover, in contrast to the standard 
model, the buyer always prefers the dynamic over the static solution in the IIR model. 
                                                 
44 While not visible for the naked eye, there is a small difference between both curves. However, the 
maximal difference is only about 0.0002% and depends on the direction of the translation of the 
inventory cost parameters. If the IIR model is used as the baseline (like in the figure above), the profit 
in the standard model is maximally 0.0002% larger (et vice versa). 
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Figure 25: Comparison of the Buyer Profit in IIR and Standard Model 
As the supplier’s profit is approximately identical in both models and the buyer’s profit 
of the dynamic solution is higher in the IIR model, the supply chain profit of the 
dynamic solution must also be higher in the case of purchasing price-dependent holding 
costs (see Figure 26 and Appendix G for a mathematical proof). Also, in the IIR model, 
the supply chain profit of the dynamic solution is always higher than the static solution 
(i.e. there is no interval in which the supply chain profit of the dynamic solution is 
smaller than the profit of the static solution like in the standard model). 
 
Figure 26: Comparison of the Supply Chain Profit in IIR and Standard Model 
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While the supply chain profit is larger in the IIR model, it is worthwhile to note that this 
difference is only caused by a higher profit of the buyer. Hence, a situation with 
purchase price-dependent inventory holding costs improves the buyer’s situation 
regarding the distribution of the total profit. 
In summary, the IIR model further highlights the impact of strategic inventory, as it also 
plays a pivotal role, if holding costs are interpreted as dependent from the purchasing 
costs (IIR model). Using an interest rate based holding cost leads to a higher inventory 
build-up than under the respective solution with per unit holding costs. Moreover, the 
interval with high holding cost, in which the profit levels were lower in the dynamic 
solution compared to the static solution, does no longer exist in the IIR model. 
6.2 Strategic Inventory under the Discounted Cash Flow Approach 
In the discounted cash flow (DCF) model ( e DCF ), future cash flows are measured at 
their present value. Hence, supplier’s and buyer’s second period cash flows are 
discounted with an interest rate DCFi . Hence, both supply chain members have a higher 
preference to realize profits in the first-period. Thus, the supplier might set a lower first-
period wholesale price than in the standard model in order to encourage the buyer to 
choose a higher purchasing quantity and, thereby, to shift a larger fraction of his profits 
towards the first-period. However, the buyer will be less willing to build up inventory as 
an inventory build-up shifts costs from the second towards the first-period. These 
preferences of supplier and buyer get more pronounced if the interest rate increases. 
Hence, in the dynamic solution the role of strategic inventory might be of less 
importance in the DCF model than in the standard model, in which the buyer accepted 
to have a low profit margin in the first and a higher profit margin in the second period in 
comparison to the static solution. 
Next to price dependent holding costs, the buyer might still have to carry additional out-
of-pocket per unit holding cost ( DCFh ) for her inventory. The extensions of the DCF 
model lead to the following profit functions, where 

1
1 DCFi
 represents the discount 
factor: 
    
 2 2
1 2 1 1,
1
DCF DCF DCF
DCF DCF DCF DCF DCF DCF
DCFS
w q I
w w w q I
i
 
   

  (6.20) 
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  (6.22) 
6.2.1 Solution of an Integrated Supply Chain (First-Best Solution) 
In the first-best solution, only the aggregated supply chain profit (6.22) has to be 
considered. As in the standard model, no inventory is built up in the first-best solution 
because  1 2, , 0DCF DCF DCFDCF
DCF
SC q I q
I




 for 0DCFh   . The selling quantity of each period can 
be obtained easily as there is no longer an interaction between both periods: 
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Hence, the selling quantities are identical to the first-best selling quantity of the 
standard model. However, in contrast to the IIR model, the resulting first-best profits of 
the DCF model differ from the standard model as the fraction of profits that are realized 
in the second period are discounted. Inserting the selling quantities (6.25) into the profit 
function (6.22) results in: 
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  (6.26) 
Hence, only for 0DCFi   the supply chain profit is identical to the first-best supply chain 
profit of the standard model. With an increase in the interest rate (
DCFi ) the supply chain 
profit decreases, because the second period profits is discounted. To analyze the effects 
of strategic inventory under individual optimization the following results have to be 
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compared to the first-best solution of the DCF model (i.e. (6.26) serving as the new 
benchmark). 
6.2.2 Individual Optimization of the Supply Chain Members 
Again, the solution can be obtained by backward induction. First, the buyer’s second 
period reaction function for the selling quantity is determined: 
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The supplier integrates this reaction function into his profit function 
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and determines his optimal reaction function for the second period wholesale price: 
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    2
2
DCF DCF DCFaw I bI  (6.31) 
A comparison of the second period reaction functions of the DCF model (6.28), (6.31) 
with the reaction function of the inventory interest rate model (6.4), (6.8) shows that the 
introduction of the discount factor in the DCF model does not lead to a change in the 
second period reaction functions. Thus, only a difference coming from a change in the 
inventory size decision would cause different decisions in period two. 
Integrating the second period reaction functions into the buyer’s profit function gives: 
     1 1 1 1 1,
3 1
4 2 4 2 2 4 2
1
DCF DCF DCF DCF DCF DCF DCF DCF DCF DCF
B
DCF DCF
DCF DCF
DCF
q I a b q q w q h
a a I a a I
bI bI
b b
i
I I         
      
            
      


 (6.32) 
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At this stage, the buyer has to determine both the reaction functions for his first-period 
selling quantity as well as the reaction function for the inventory size: 
selling quantity: 
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  (6.33) 
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inventory size: 
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The comparison of the buyer’s first-period reaction functions ((6.34), (6.36)) with the 
respective functions of the IIR model ((6.11), (6.13)) shows that the reaction functions 
for the selling quantity are identical. Moreover, the only difference in the inventory 
reaction function consists of the influence of the per unit holding cost rate ( DCFh ) that 
was additionally integrated in the DCF model. If this term is left out in the comparison 
both functions would be identical (i.e. if DCFh  is set to zero, the functions become 
identical). Hence, up to this stage there exists no structural difference between the DCF 
and the IIR model. 
According to (6.36) the buyer will only build up inventory, if 
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 (6.37) 
Hence, if condition (6.37) is not fulfilled, no strategic inventory is built up. In this case, 
the inventory (6.36) will be zero and periods are decoupled. Hence, wholesale price and 
selling quantity decisions will be identical in both periods. As before, such a solution 
without strategic inventory will be called static solution. The decisions can be 
determined by inserting  0DCFI  into the second period reaction functions ((6.31), (6.28)
) and into the profit functions ((6.20), (6.21)). While the decisions of the static solution 
are identical to those of the standard model, the profits again differ because of the 
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discounting of the second period. Under which conditions (6.37) is fulfilled will be 
determined after the first-period wholesale price is determined. 
By integrating the buyer’s reaction functions into the suppliers profit function, the 
relevant first-period profit function of the supplier can be calculated: 
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The supplier then determines the optimal first-period wholesale price: 
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Using this first-period wholesale price with the reaction functions and the profit 
functions delivers the results of the dynamic solution that are summarized alongside 
with the first-best and static solution in Table 14 and Table 15. However, like already 
mentioned this dynamic solution is only feasible if condition (6.37) is fulfilled. Inserting 
the first-period wholesale price (6.40) into that condition shows that the dynamic 
solution will only be feasible for the following combination of interest rate and per unit 
holding cost rate: 
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 (6.41) 
Only, if (6.41) is fulfilled, the supplier is able to implement the dynamic solution. Else, 
the static solution applies because the combined cost of holding inventory (costs due to 
discounting and per unit holding cost) prohibit the buyer from building up inventory. 
An isolated analysis of the interest rate ( DCFi ) and the per unit holding cost rate ( DCFh ) in 
which the other parameter is set to zero shows that inventory is not built up if 
4
DCF ah   
or 1.25 125%DCFi  . The upper bound for the unit holding cost rate is unsurprisingly 
identical to the standard model, as for 0DCFi   the entire DCF model becomes identical 
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to the standard model. The maximum interest rate however is surprisingly high in 
comparison to the IIR rate model where it was 0.5. Hence, regarding the feasibility of 
the dynamic solution, strategic inventory is possible for an even wider range of the 
interest rate than in the DCF model. It will be shown later on that this is caused by the 
suppliers increasing preference to shift profits into the first-period by lowering the first-
period wholesale price as the interest rate increases. 
However, in order to be the equilibrium solution the dynamic solution must not only be 
feasible but also be preferred over the static solution by the supplier. Else, the supplier 
would implement the static solution by committing on the second period price in the 
first-period. To test whether the supplier implements the dynamic solution and whether 
buyer and supply chain are better off under the dynamic solution, the profits of the 
dynamic solution have to be compared to the respective static profits. 
First, the dynamic profit of the supplier gets compared to the static profit. The supplier 
will only implement the dynamic solution, if the corresponding profit is larger than the 
profit of the static solution: 
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Solving this for 
DCFh  shows that 
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As 2. of (6.45) violates the inventory condition (6.41) (i.e. inventory would be smaller 
than zero in the case of 2.), only 1. of (6.45) is relevant. Hence, the supplier favors and 
implements the dynamic solution if 
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 (6.46) 
In contrast to the IIR model, there exists a combination of DCFh  and DCFi  under which the 
supplier could implement the dynamic solution but prefers implementing the static 
solution due to a higher profit (i.e. DCF DCFS Dh h ). 
In order to obtain a better comparison to the IIR model, the per unit holding costs ( DCFh ) 
will be excluded in the following analysis (i.e.: 0DCFh  ) as the IIR model does not 
include constant per unit holding costs. Solving (6.46) for 0DCFh   delivers: 
 
3 73
0 0.7215
16
DCFi

    (6.47) 
Hence, as long as the interest rate is lower than 72.15%, the supplier’s profit is larger in 
the dynamic solution than in the static. For higher values, the static solution will be 
larger and, therefore, the supplier will implement this solution. To implement the static 
solution, the supplier is no longer bound to using a commitment contract as setting the 
static first-period wholesale price will prevent the buyer from building up inventory as 
soon as 0DCFi  . A summary of the first-best, the static and the dynamic solution of the 
DCF model is given in Table 14 and Table 15. 
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Table 14: Summary of Decision Variables in the DCF Model45 
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45 These results were first derived by Desai et al. (2010) and summarized in Table 1 of their study. Note 
that Desai et al. (2010) use a discount factor  . Inserting  1 1   DCFi  into their results 
delivers the results as they are presented in Table 14 and Table 15. 
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Table 15: Summary of Profits in the DCF Model46 
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Using the same method as before, it can also be determined for which combination of 
holding cost parameters the buyer prefers the dynamic solution. 
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46 See footnote 45. 
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 (6.50) 
It is straightforward that for 0DCFh   condition (6.50) is always fulfilled and, therefore, 
that the supplier will prefer the dynamic over the static solution. For 0DCFh   the 
analysis, however, is more complicated: 
The left hand side of (6.50) can only be negative, if the term within the brackets in the 
second row is negative. Hence, it is straightforward that only for small values of DCFi , 
the buyer might prefer the static over the dynamic solution. Solving (6.50) for DCFh  
delivers:47 
                                                 
47 See Appendix I. 
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For 0.01678DCFi   the value within the square root gets negative. Hence, only for a 
lower inventory interest rate a holding cost rate exists, under which the buyer does not 
prefer the dynamic solution.48 In contrast to the supplier, both boundaries described in 
(6.51) are relevant. However, the area in which the static solution is better (i.e. one of 
the boundaries of (6.51) is not fulfilled) for the buyer is relatively small. 
Comparing the supply chain profits shows that an area exists under which the supply 
chain profit of the static solution is larger than in the dynamic solution.49 This was also 
observed for the SM but not for the IIR model (Figure 26). 
6.2.3 The Impact of the Interest Rate on the Solution of the DCF Model 
In the following, the per unit inventory costs are left out of the analysis (i.e.: 0DCFh  ) to 
provide a better understanding of the influence of the interest rate ( DCFi ) on the 
parameters of the DCF model and to deliver a comparison to the IIR model that does 
not include the per unit holding cost rate. Again, the parameters 100a   and 1b   will 
                                                 
48 Note, that the border for which the buyer prefers the static solution presented in the study of Desai et al. 
(2010) is incorrect because of a wrong interpretation by the authors. The border described by rlh  does 
not describe whether the buyer is better-off under the dynamic contract, but instead weather the 
dynamic contract is feasible. Hence, Desai et al. (2010) do not consider that there exists an area for the 
holding costs within the feasible range under which the buyer is worse-off under the dynamic contract. 
An example for the existence of such an area is already described by Anand et al. (2008) in their 
standard model for 0i   and is generalized for 0h  and 0i   by (6.51) of this thesis. 
49 A mathematical proof and description is given in Appendix J. 
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be used for all figures in this section and the per unit holding cost parameter of the 
standard model will be derived from the IIR model in the same way as demonstrated in 
section 6.1 ( i.e.  1:SM IIR IIR IIRh i w i  . Fixing parameters a  and b  is done without loss 
of generality for 0DCFh  .50 
In the first-period, the supplier determines the first-period wholesale price. In 
comparison to both the standard and the IIR model the wholesale price drops 
considerably stronger, if the interest rate increases (Figure 27). Already at 12.5%DCFi   
the first-period wholesale price of the DCF model equals the static wholesale price of 
the standard solution. Under a further increase of the interest rate, the first-period 
wholesale price even drops below the static first-period wholesale price of the standard 
model. Hence, in comparison to both the standard and the IIR model, a first-period 
wholesale price that is lower than the static price of the standard solution is possible. 
This is caused by the discounting of the second period: In order to pull the realization of 
profits into the first-period, the supplier lowers the first-period wholesale price. This 
action increases the buyer’s benefit from an inventory build-up and, thus, partly 
compensates the decreased buyer’s incentive caused by the higher holding costs ( DCFi ). 
 
Figure 27: First-period Wholesale Price in the DCF Model 
  
                                                 
50 See Appendix H. 
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As profits that are generated in the first-period do not get discounted, the level of the 
interest rate does not directly affect the first-period selling quantity, which only depends 
on the first-period wholesale price (6.34). However, as an increase of the interest rate 
decreases the first-period wholesale price, there exists an indirect link. Thus, the lower 
first-period wholesale price in the DCF model (Figure 27) causes a higher first-period 
selling quantity (Figure 28). 
 
Figure 28: Development of First-period Selling Quantity in the DCF Model 
In the DCF model, an increase of the interest rate ( DCFi ) causes a stronger increase of the 
selling quantity than in the SM and IIR model. Both in the standard and in the IIR 
model, the first-period selling quantity cannot exceed the selling quantity of the static 
solution. Thus, the double marginalization effect is larger in period one, if strategic 
inventories are used (i.e. in the dynamic solution). Only due to a lower double 
marginalization effect in period two that is caused by the strategic inventory, an overall 
improvement regarding the profits gets possible (i.e. the profit improvement in the 
second period due to a lower double marginalization effect must outweigh both the loss 
due to the increased double marginalization effect of period one and the inventory 
holding cost). This property does no longer hold for the DCF model. Here, the static 
first-period selling quantity is already reached under the interest rate of 12.5%DCFi    
and quickly exceeded up to a maximum of 1 30.24
DCFq   for 72.15%DCFi  . Thus, for an 
interest rate over 12.5%DCFi  , the double marginalization effect in period one is smaller 
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compared to the standard and IIR model. However, the first-period selling quantity 
cannot reach the quantity of the first-best solution and, therefore, a loss due to the 
double marginalization effect persists in the first-period of DCF model. 
While the effect of an interest rate increase was simple regarding the first-period selling 
quantity, the impact on the size of the strategic inventory is more complex. On the one 
hand, an increase of the interest rate increases the holding cost and, thus, reduces the 
incentive to build up strategic inventory. On the other hand, an increase of the interest 
rate also leads to a lower first-period wholesale price in comparison to the IIR model, 
because the supplier wants to increase the buyer’s incentive to build up strategic 
inventory (i.e. pull his realization of the profits into the first-period). 
The comparison of the inventory reaction function of the IIR (6.13) model and of the 
DCF model (6.36) showed that the functions are identical. Hence, under an identical 
interest rate (DCF model) and inventory interest rate (IIR model) an identical first-
period wholesale price would lead to an identical size of the strategic inventory. 
However, as Figure 27 has shown, the first-period wholesale price is smaller in the DCF 
model compared to the IIR model, because the supplier aims to shift the realization of 
profits into the first-period. Consequently, in comparison to the IIR the buyer builds up 
a larger strategic inventory in the DCF model (Figure 29). 
 
Figure 29: Development of the Inventory Size in the DCF Model 
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In both the IIR and the DCF model, the supplier lowers the first-period wholesale price, 
if the holding costs increase. However, in comparison to the standard and the IIR model 
increasing holding costs lead to a much higher first-period wholesale price reduction, 
because of the supplier’s increased incentive to pull profits into the first-period in the 
DCF model. Consequently, the benefit from lower purchasing costs partly compensates 
the disadvantage of increased holding costs, which leads to a weaker decrease of the of 
strategic inventory size (Figure 29). Thus, the supplier successfully encourages the 
buyer to maintain a larger strategic inventory size in case of higher holding cost. 
However, while the supplier benefits from the earlier profit realization, a higher 
strategic inventory will also force him to set a lower second period wholesale price. 
Additionally, the differences regarding the total holding cost have to be considered. In 
comparison to the IIR model, the purchasing cost ( 1
ew ) are lower in the DCF model for 
an identical interest rate ( DCFi ) and inventory interest rate ( IIRi ). Meanwhile, the size of 
the strategic inventory ( DCFI , IIRI ) is higher in the DCF model. Together, these two 
effects could either lead to lower or higher total holding costs (  1 1
e e ei w q ). 
 
Figure 30: Total Holding Costs in the DCF Model 
Despite the lower purchasing cost the increased amount of strategic inventory leads to 
higher total holding costs in comparison to both the standard and the IIR model. As 
Figure 30 shows, the difference is stronger for interest rates over 0.25ei   , because the 
holding cost reaches its maximum in the standard and IIR model at this point and slowly 
decreases from this point on, while further increasing in the DCF model. 
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As already mentioned, a higher strategic inventory size of the buyer in the second 
period, forces the supplier to set a lower second period wholesale price as he only sets 
the price for the buyer’s residual demand (Figure 31). 
 
Figure 31: Second Period Wholesale Price in the DCF Model 
A lower wholesale price generally drives the selling quantity up. Figure 32 shows that 
under increasing interest rate, the impact of strategic inventory is decreasing much 
slower in the DCF model. Hence, the double marginalization effect is again reduced to a 
larger extent in the DCF model than in the SM and the IIR model. Moreover, within the 
dynamic solution the second period wholesale price is no longer always smaller than the 
first-period wholesale price: Comparing the first and second period wholesale price 
(given in Table 14) shows that for 0DCFh   and 0.5DCFi   the supplier will set a lower 
first-period wholesale price in the first-period: 
 
?
1 2
DCF DCF
w w   (6.52) 
 
      
2
? 6 1 2 5 7 29 - 2 1
17 8 17 8
DCF DCF DCF DCF
DCF DCF
DCF DCF
i a i i ha i h
i i
      

 
  (6.53) 
For 0DCFh  :51 
  
?
9 6 1 DCFa i a    (6.54) 
                                                 
51 A general analysis with  0DCFh ,  0DCFi  can be found on p. 93 of Desai et al (2010). 
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  0.5DCFi   (6.55) 
Hence, for 0.5DCFi   the effect that lowers the first-period wholesale price because the 
supplier wants to increase the buyer’s incentive to build up inventory is stronger than 
the effect of the remaining strategic inventory that lowers the second period wholesale 
price. 
 
Figure 32: Second Period Selling Quantity in the DCF Model 
The analysis of the supply chain member’s decision variables has shown strong 
structural differences between the DCF model on the one hand and the SM and the IIR 
model on the other hand. These differences will likely also cause differences regarding 
the supply chain profit and its distribution among the supply chain members. 
In the DCF model, the double marginalization effect was reduced in both periods. In the 
SM and IIR model, the double marginalization effect was only decreased in the second 
period, while it was even increased in the first-period. Moreover in the second period, 
the reduction of the double marginalization effect is more salient in the DCF model than 
in the standard and IIR model. This stronger reduction positively affects the supply 
chain profit of the DCF model. However, this enhancement must be set against the 
increased holding costs in the DCF model that are carried by the buyer (Figure 30). 
Figure 34 shows that if the respective per unit holding costs (i.e. SMh , DCFh ) and the 
(inventory) interest rates (i.e. IIRi , DCFi ) are set to zero, all three models lead to an 
identical solution. In contrast to the standard and the IIR model, increasing interest rates 
lead to increasing supply chain efficiency (ratio of first-best profit). Hence, the profit 
enhancement due to the reduction of double marginalization outweighs the increase of 
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the holding costs. The advantage regarding the supply chain profit increases, if the 
holding cost rate increases. Hence, in contrast to the standard model and as in the IIR 
model, there exists no area of interest rates, in which the supply chain profits are 
lowered due to the effects of strategic inventory. 
Moreover, strategic inventory is used up unto an interest rate of 72.15%DCFi  , while it is 
only used up unto an interest rate of 50%IIRi   in the IIR model.52 Hence, the positive 
effects of strategic inventory persist for a larger area of holding cost. 
 
Figure 33: Comparison Supplier Profit in the DCF Model53 
 
 
                                                 
52 In the standard model, strategic inventory is also only used up to a holding cost rate that corresponds to 
an interest rate of 50%. 
53 Profits are weighted with the corresponding first-best profit of the respective model (see footnote 54). 
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Figure 34: Comparison Buyer Profit in the DCF Model54 
 
Figure 35: Comparison Supply Chain Profit in the DCF Model55 
While the supply chain profit in the DCF model dominates the corresponding profits of 
the standard and the IIR model, it is unclear if both buyer and supplier benefit from the 
increase. The supplier tries to lessen the profit reduction caused by an increased interest 
rate by offering lower first-period wholesale prices to shift profits into the first-period. 
                                                 
54 The discounting of the second period profits in the DCF model lowers the overall profits, if the interest 
rate increases. To achieve a proper comparison with the standard and the IIR model that do not contain 
this property, the profits are set in comparison to the corresponding first-best solution (i.e. the solution 
of the DCF model is weighted with the first-best solution of the DCF model given in Table 15). 
 
55 Profits are weighted with the corresponding first-best profit of the respective model (see footnote 54). 
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These lower prices also reduce the double marginalization effect. However, only the 
buyer benefits from the additional profits of the lowered double marginalization effect, 
while the supplier gives up a part of his profit. Last, the profit of the buyer gets 
decreased by the increased total holding cost. 
The comparison of the solution of the DCF model with the standard and the IIR model 
(Figure 34) shows that the reduction of the double marginalization has the largest 
impact on the solution. Thus, the largest improvement towards the standard and IIR 
model can be seen on side of the buyer. The supplier’s profit, in turn, decreases under a 
rising interest rate. Thus, he can only partly compensate the reduction of his profit that 
is caused by an increased interest rate. As a result, the supplier prefers the static solution 
without strategic inventory, if the interest rate is high ( 72.15%DCFi  ). In this case, he 
will implement the static solution by setting the first-period wholesale price to the static 
value. By doing so, he can successfully prohibit the buyer from building up a strategic 
inventory, because of the high inventory holding cost due to the high interest rate. 
6.3 Conclusion and Insights under Price-dependent Holding Costs 
In summary, strategic inventory also plays a pivotal role in the DCF model. However, 
both in its utilization and its impact several differences towards the standard and the IIR 
model exist. In those models strategic inventory had two functions. The buyer builds up 
strategic inventory in the first-period, to lower the monopoly power of the supplier in 
the second period. The supplier, in turn, can implement an internal two-price block 
scheme for the second period by letting the buyer build up strategic inventory in the 
first-period. Hence, a part of the buyer’s demand is fulfilled by the units that have been 
purchased for the high first-period wholesale price and the supplier can price for the 
buyer’s residual demand with a low second period wholesale price. Because of these 
effects the supplier always benefits from the utilization of strategic inventory both in the 
standard and in the IIR model. The buyer also benefits from the usage of strategic 
inventory in both the standard (except for high holding cost) as well as in the IIR model, 
because the lower average wholesale price outweighs the increased holding costs. 
In the DCF model, however, an additional utilization of strategic inventory arises. Here, 
the interest rate now affects both supply chain members as it determines how strongly 
they prefer generating profits in the first-period over generating profits in the second 
period. In case of the supplier, the interest rate determines the costs of selling units in 
the second period instead of already realizing those sales in the first-period (i.e. the 
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higher the interest rate is the higher is the supplier’s incentive to sell units in the first-
period). As a result, the supplier has an incentive to lower the first-period wholesale 
price in order to encourage the buyer to build up a higher strategic inventory as this 
partly pulls the supplier’s realization of profits into the first-period. This new utilization 
of strategic inventory in the DCF model massively impacts the model’s solution. 
The supplier has to balance the usage of strategic inventory between the function to 
implement a well-fitting two-price block scheme and the function to reduce the impact 
of the discounting of the second period profit. For low interest rates, the latter is less 
important and the supplier can focus on setting diverse prices between the first and the 
second period in order to implement a well-fitting two-pricing block scheme. For 
increasing interest rates, however, the supplier has to focus on reducing the effects of 
the discounting by lowering the first-period wholesale price. This usage is getting so 
dominating over the two-price block effect that for 50%DCFi   the first-period wholesale 
price is even lower than the second period wholesale price.56 
The additional pressure on the supplier due to the discounting has the following overall 
effects in comparison to the SM and the IIR model: The supplier has a stronger 
incentive to lower the first-period wholesale price to partly circumvent the discounting. 
The lower first-period wholesale price causes a higher first-period selling quantity and, 
therefore, decreases the double marginalization effect. Also, it increases the size of the 
strategic inventory. Despite the lower purchasing cost, the total inventory holding costs 
are higher due to the increased amount of strategic inventory. Additionally, the higher 
size of strategic inventory leads to a lower second period wholesale price setting of the 
supplier and, hence, an increased second period selling quantity. Consequently, the 
double marginalization effect is also decreased in the second period. 
Overall, the profit enhancing effect (lower double marginalization) within the DCF 
model outweighs the negative effect (higher total holding costs) leading to a higher 
supply chain profit. Moreover, strategic inventory is utilized up to a much higher 
holding cost rate (i.e. 72.15%DCFi   in the DCF model versus 50%IIRi   in the IIR 
model). However, the buyer gains a higher fraction of the additional supply chain profit. 
The supplier, in turn, is only better off for low to medium interest rates (Figure 34). For 
high interest rates ( 72.15%DCFi  ) the supplier prefers the static solution and will 
implement it by setting the static first-period wholesale price.  
                                                 
56 This, of course, still is a two-price block scheme, from which, however, only the buyer profits, while it 
reduces the profit of the supplier. 
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7 Strategic Inventories and the Role of Forwards 
Both the theoretical as well as the behavioral analyses have shown that strategic 
inventory affects the solution of multi-period supply chain interactions. In case of a 
simple wholesale price contract, strategic inventory reduces the double marginalization 
effect. But, at the same time the inventory causes holding costs. In the standard model, 
the profit improvement due to double marginalization reduction in the dynamic solution 
outweighs the occurring holding costs for small to medium holding values 
 55 0.191288
SM ah a  .57 For  21 0.138152
SM ah a  both supplier’s and buyer’s profits 
exceed the respective profit of a solution without an utilization of strategic inventory 
(i.e. of the static solution).58 Under IIR conditions, the utilization of strategic inventory 
always increases the profits of all supply chain members in comparison to the respective 
static solution. Thus, under a wholesale price contract the possibility to use strategic 
inventory is beneficial for both supply chain members in the majority of cases. 
However, Anand et al. (2008) have shown that the supplier is no longer able to 
implement a dynamic vertical contract that simultaneously coordinates the supply chain 
and allows a free distribution of the supply chain profit between supplier and buyer if 
the buyer can utilize strategic inventory. 
Hereby, achieving the first-best solution is prohibited by two reasons: First, the buyer is 
able to influence the price setting of the supplier by using strategic inventory. As a 
result, the supplier cannot determine wholesale prices that enable him to generate the 
maximum (i.e. first-best) supply chain profit and at the same time to extract the entire 
supply chain profit. Thus, he will determine wholesale prices that maximize his 
individual profit at the cost of overall supply chain profit. Second, as soon as the buyer 
builds up inventory, holding costs will occur. And, as the first-best solution does not 
contain any holding costs, a solution that includes such costs will always be inferior to 
the first-best solution. 
These drawbacks of strategic inventory can only be removed by more sophisticated 
contracts. Anand et al. (2008) already proved in their fundamental paper that in the 
space of general commitment contracts, the supplier is able to achieve first-best profits 
(i.e. able to implement the first-best solution and to extract away all residual profits of 
                                                 
57 See page 38 in section 3. 
58 See page 41 of section 3. 
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the buyer).59 However, their commitment contract is a variant of a supplier who sells his 
firm to the buyer for the price of the sum of all coming first-best period profits. A less 
restricted contract variant to achieve first-best profits was shown by Arya and 
Mittendorf (2013). They also investigate a nonlinear pricing scheme (i.e. a quantity-
contingent pricing scheme) that is supplemented by complex supplier-to-customer 
rebates. By implementing such a contract, the supplier can eliminate strategic inventory 
and achieve channel coordination. 
Both the coordinating contracts of Anand et al. (2008) and of Arya and Mittendorf 
(2013) are problematic in terms of practical realization. In the commitment contract of 
Anand et al. (2008) the buyer must pay the sum of all future profits to the supplier. In 
Arya and Mittendorf (2013) a nonlinear pricing scheme is mixed with complex 
supplier-to-customer rebates. In this chapter, an easier way to circumvent the negative 
effects that are introduced by the buyer’s option to use strategic inventory gets 
investigated. The presented model with forwards contracts ( i FW ) aims on abolishing 
the physical form of strategic inventory. This target is identical to the commitment 
contract which was introduced by Anand et al. (2008). The striking difference is that in 
the model with forwards contracts, the buyer is still allowed to influence the supplier’s 
prices via using non-physical stocks. 
In contrast to the standard model of Anand et al. (2008), the forward contract model 
(FW) includes an additional option regarding the interaction within the supply chain: 
The supplier allows the buyer to place forwards (i.e. preorders) at a specific forward 
price that is determined by the supplier.60 Hence, in each period, the supplier will set 
both the regular wholesale price of the actual period as well as the forward prices for 
preorders. And, the buyer has to decide both about her buying quantity as well as about 
her forward quantity. 
In the forward contract model the time horizon remains at two periods (i.e. identical to 
the standard model). Accordingly, in the first-period, the supplier determines both the 
first-period wholesale price ( 1
FWw ) as well as the forward price ( FWv ). The buyer, who 
faces a deterministic, price sensitive demand in each period ( FW FWt tp a b q   ), then 
determines her buying ( 1
FWQ ) and her selling ( 1
FWq ) quantity. Still, unsold units from 
                                                 
59 See Theorem 6 (p. 1802) of Anand et al (2008). 
60 While committing on supplying the buyer with goods to the condition of the forward price, the pricing 
scheme can only be interpreted as a commitment contract if the variable second period price is not 
smaller than the forward price. Table 16 shows that this is never the case. 
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period one will be carried over to the second period as inventory ( 1 1
FW FW FWI Q q  ) and 
cause holding costs of FWh . In contrast to the standard model, the buyer has the 
additional option to place preorders ( FWO ) in the first-period. These preordered goods 
will be delivered in the second period at the cost of a unit price of FWv . As the supplier 
produces preordered goods just in time, forwards will neither cause holding costs at the 
buyer’s nor at the supplier’s side. Further, no discrimination regarding the source of the 
goods that the buyer possesses at the start of the second period ( FWI , FWO ) is made. 
Hence, both preordered and stored goods (i.e. inventory) can be used absolutely 
identically in period two. 
 
 
Figure 36: Decisions in the Strategic Inventory Model with Forward Buying 
In the second period, the supplier only decides about his second period wholesale price. 
Determining a forwards price is unnecessary, because no further period is following and 
unused units have a salvage value of zero. The buyer also only has one decision left in 
the second period. Following the general structure of the derivation of the standard 
model, her selling quantity decision will be treated as the decision variable, while the 
other variables are calculated based on this decision (i.e.:    2 2FW FW FW FWQ q I O  and 
2 2
FW FWp a b q   ). Moreover, both supplier and buyer possess perfect information. In 
summary, regarding the decisions the only difference between standard and the FW 
model are the forward price and forward quantity decisions in the first-period. 
As outlined, the effect of inventory and forwards is identical in the second period as no 
discrimination between them is made. Likely, the buyer will be using the source that is 
less expensive for her. Hence, only if 
 1
FW FW FWv w h   (7.1) 
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is fulfilled, the buyer will be willing to use preorders instead of inventory. However, 
whether or not condition (7.1) is fulfilled, is fully in control of the supplier.61 The 
following analysis will show that the supplier has an incentive to let the buyer use 
forwards instead of inventory and how this affects the profit of the supply chain and its 
distribution among buyer and supplier. 
7.1 First-Best and Static Solution of the Strategic Inventory Model with Forward 
Contracts 
Before the dynamic solution (i.e. a solution that includes the utilization of strategic 
inventory and/ or preorders) of the FW model is derived, the corresponding benchmarks 
(first-best and static) will be determined. Again, the first-best and the static solution (i.e. 
solution with neither strategic inventory nor forwards) serve as benchmarks for the 
dynamic solution. 
In the first-best solution, the supplier sets a wholesale price that corresponds to his 
marginal costs (i.e. 
1 2
0
FW FW
w w  ). Hence, the supplier has no incentive to offer the 
buyer the option to buy forwards and no deviation from the standard model occur. In the 
static solution, strategic inventories as well as preorders are excluded by definition. 
Hence, the static solution is also unaffected by the extension to use preorders that was 
introduced in the FW model. As both the first-best and the static solution are not 
affected by the introduction of the option to use forwards, they remain identical to the 
respective solutions of the standard model. Hence, the standard and the FW model can 
be perfectly compared to each other. The benchmarks of the first-best and static solution 
are displayed in comparison to the dynamic solution of the FW model in Table 16 at the 
end of section 7.2. 
In the following, the dynamic solution of the FW model will be investigated. This 
analysis also tests whether the supplier will implement the dynamic solution with 
strategic inventory and/ or forwards or if he will implement the static solution by using 
a commitment contract. 
7.2 Dynamic Solution of the Forward Contract Model 
As the supplier offers the option to preorder units at the forward price, both the 
supplier’s as well as the buyer’s profit function need to be modified. The supplier will 
                                                 
61 The supplier can simply prohibit forwards by setting 
FWv  prohibitively high. Hence, the solution (and 
profits) of the standard model always serves as an outside option for the supplier. 
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also get the revenues that arise from the buyer’s preorders ( FW FWv O ). Additionally, in 
the second period preordered goods will reduce the purchasing quantity of the buyer in 
the same manner as inventory does. The supplier’s profit function in the FW model, 
therefore, is: 
             1 1 2 2FW FW FW FW FW FW FW FW FW FWS w q I v O w q I O   (7.2) 
The buyer, in turn, has to pay for the preordered goods, if she decides to utilize 
forwards. Also, forwards reduce the purchasing quantity in the second period that is 
needed to satisfy the selling quantity: 
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  (7.3) 
Combining both the suppliers and buyers profit function gives the supply chain profit: 
              1 1 2 2FW FW FW FW FW FW FWSC a b q q h I a b q q   (7.4) 
Hence, the supply chain profit function remains unaffected by the introduction of 
forwards as they are just a further transfer payment between supplier and buyer without 
causing any deadweight loss. 
As the solution of the FW model is also obtained by backwards induction, the 
optimization starts with the last decision (i.e. the second period selling quantity decision 
of the buyer) within the model: 
 
 
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
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  (7.5) 
  
 
  
 
2
2 2 max ,
2
FW
FW FW FW FW a wq w I O
b
  (7.6) 
Hence, the buyer will only purchase additional items in the second period, if 
     2 2FW FW FWw a b I O .  (7.7) 
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However, optimizing his second-period profit for given values of FWI  and FWO  the 
supplier has no incentive to set a prohibitively high second period wholesale price. It is 
assumed that condition (7.7) is fulfilled and (7.6) can be simplified to 
 

 22 2
2
FW
FW FW a wq w
b
. 
Inserting the buyer’s second period response function (7.6) into the supplier’s profit 
function (7.2) yields: 
   21 1 2
2
FW
FW FW FW FW FW FW FW FW FW
S
a w
w q I v O w I O
b

 
         
 
  (7.8) 
The supplier’s second period response function, therefore, is: 
 
   
 




1 2
2
22
,
0
2
FW FW FW FW
W
F
F
S FW Wa w I O
b
w w
w
, (7.9) 
which results in the following response function: 
       2 2, max 0,
FW FW FWFW FW aI O b I Ow . (7.10) 
Inserting the right hand side of the supplier’s second period reaction function (7.10) into 
the buyer’s condition to buy additional units in the second period (7.7) shows that (7.7) 
is fulfilled if 
  
2
FW FW a
b
I O ,  (7.11) 
which is also the supplier’s condition to set positive second period wholesale prices (see 
(7.10)). As 2
a
b  is the buyer’s first-best selling quantity (i.e. the quantity the buyer would 
purchase from the supplier and sell to her customers at a wholesale price of zero), it is 
straightforward that the supplier’s second period wholesale price becomes irrelevant, if 
the buyer already owns 2
a
b  units through strategic inventory and/ or forwards. 
Moreover, it shows that, if the buyer has less items than 2
a
b  available, the supplier will 
always set the second period wholesale prize larger than zero and the buyer will always 
buy additional items in the second period. 
Further, the supplier’s second period reaction function (7.10) shows that both strategic 
inventory and forwards affect the supplier’s second period wholesale price setting in the 
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same way. Hence, forwards can be used in the exactly same strategic manner as 
strategic inventory. 
Integrating the buyer’s (7.6) and supplier’s (7.10) second period reaction function into 
the buyer’s profit function (7.3) gives the relevant profit function for the buyer’s 
decisions about the first-period selling quantity ( 1
FWq ), the strategic inventory ( FWI ) and 
the forwards ( FWO ): 
     
      
            
 
          

2
2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2
2 2
12 16 16 16
16
16 12 24
16
FW FW FW FW FW FW FW
FW
B
FW FW FW FW FW FW FW FW
a b a I O b a q b q b w q I
b
b v O h I b I O b I O
b
  (7.12) 
Starting with the selling quantity optimization leads to: 
 

   

1 1
1
2 0
FW
FW FWB
FW
a bq w
q
  (7.13) 
  
  
  
  
1
1 1 max 0,
2
FW
FW FW a wq w
b
  (7.14) 
Therefore, the buyer’s first-period selling quantity reaction function is identical to the 
standard model. Still, the selling quantity is only dependent on the first-period 
wholesale price and, given 1
FWw , the decision is made independently from the decisions 
about the size of strategic inventory and forwards. 
Next, the strategic inventory size gets determined: 
  

     

 1
3 3
0
4 2
FW
FW FW FW FWB
FW
a w h b I O
I
  (7.15) 
        
 
1 1
2
( , ) max 0,
2 3
FW FW FW FW FW FWaI w O w h O
b b
  (7.16) 
The buyer’s strategic inventory reaction function can be divided into two-parts. The first 
part      
 
1
2
2 3
FW FWa w h
b b
 is identical to the reaction function of the standard model. 
Still, a higher first-period wholesale price or higher holding cost reduces the size of the 
strategic inventory. New in the FW model, however, is the second part (  FWO ). Now, 
the size of the strategic inventory gets reduced by the amount of preordered items. 
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Hence, the first part of (7.16) defines a target level of strategic items (this target level of 
strategic items can be either fulfilled by inventory or by forwards) and only the amount 
that is not fulfilled by forwards will be met by strategic inventory. 
Last, the optimal quantity of forwards gets optimized: 
  

   


3 3
4 2
FW
FW FW FWB
FW
a v b I O
O
  (7.17) 
       
 
2
, max 0,
2 3
FW FW FW FW FWaO v I v I
b b
  (7.18) 
This reaction function (7.18) is quite similar to the strategic inventory (7.16) reaction 
function. Comparing it piece by piece shows that the first part is almost identical to the 
inventory reaction function. Again, this can be interpreted as the target size of strategic 
items. Comparing this two target sizes shows that the target size of the strategic 
inventory is higher if  1
FW FW FWw h v  (et vice versa). Moreover, the amount of forwards 
gets reduced by the size of the chosen strategic inventory as described by the second 
part of (7.18) (i.e.  FWI ). This leads to the following intuitive solution: The buyer will 
build up her strategic item pool from the source with the higher target level and, 
therefore, only use the source with the cheaper overall purchasing costs ( 1
FW FWw h  
versus FWv ). The other source, in contrast, will be neglected:62 
 
  

 
  

1
1
1
0
( ) 2
2 3
FW FW FW
FW FW
FW FW
if w h v
I w a
w h else
b b
  (7.19) 
and: 
  

 


1
1
0
( ) 2
2 3
FW FW FW
FW FW
FW
if w h v
O w a
v else
b b
  (7.20) 
As the supplier decides about both 1
FWw  and FWv , he can also control which source the 
buyer will use. Hence, in the following, the two cases described by (7.19) and (7.20) 
will be analyzed individually: 
 
                                                 
62 In case of indifference (i.e.  1
FW FW FWw h v ), it is assumed that the buyer will only use forwards 
instead of strategic inventory as the holding costs of physical inventory would cause a deadweight lost 
from the perspective of the overall supply chain. 
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Case 1: Buyer only uses strategic inventory (  1
FW FW FWw h v ): 
In this simple case     1 1
2
( )
2 3
FW FW FW FWaI w w h
b b
 and 0FWO  . Hence, this solution is 
identical to the solution of the standard model (Table 2). 
 
Case 2: Buyer only uses forwards (  1
FW FW FWw h v ): 
In this case, forwards will replace strategic inventory (i.e.  1
2
( )
2 3
FW FW FWaO w v
b b
 and 
0
FW
I  ). 
The supplier has the following optimization problem: 
 
   
 
     
       
 
 
 
1 1
1 1
1
2
4 3 2 4 33,
2 6 3 2 6
s.t. :
FWFW FW FW FW FW
FW FW FW FW
S
FW FW FW
a vw a w v v a v a
w v v
b b b b
w h v
 (7.21) 
with the corresponding Lagrange function: 
 
   
 
1 1
1 1
1
2
4 3 2 4 33, ,
2 6 3 2 6
FWFW FW FW FW FW
FW FW FW FW
S
FW FW FW
a vw a w v v a v a
w v u v
b b b b
u w h v
 
     
       
 
 
   
 (7.22) 
The partial first-order derivatives are: 
 
 1
1 2
FW FW
S
FW
wa
u
b bw

  

 (7.23) 
 
8
2 9
FW
FWS
FW
a
v u
b bv

   

 (7.24) 
 1
FW
FW FW FWS w h v
u

  

 (7.25) 
Setting the derivatives (7.23) and (7.24) equal to zero yields: 
 1
1
2
FWw a ub   (7.26) 
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9 9
16 8
FWv a u b    (7.27) 
To solve this problem the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker approach is applied: 
 
Case 2.1: 0u , 1 0
FW FW FWw h v    
In the first case, the restriction within the optimization problem (7.21) is binding. 
Hence, the supplier has to balance the first-period wholesale and the forward price, so 
that the forward price only exceeds the first-period wholesale price by the holding costs. 
The parameter u  shows the extent of the supplier’s profit increase if the restriction of 
(7.21) would be relaxed by one unit (i.e. if the buyer’s holding cost would be one unit 
higher). 
Inserting (7.26) and (7.27) into  1
FW FW FWw h v  gives: 
1
1 9 9
2 16 8
FW FW FW
FW
w h v
a u b h a b u
 
      
 
 
8
34 17
FWau h
b b
    (7.28) 
By inserting (7.28) into (7.26) and (7.27) the first-period wholesale and the forward 
price can be calculated: 
 1
9 8
17 17
FW FWw a h     (7.29) 
 
9 9
17 17
FW FWv a h     (7.30) 
Examining the two first-period prices shows that the first-period wholesale price in 
(7.29) decreases and that the forward price in (7.30) increases if the holding cost ( FWh ) 
increase, because the supplier has to balance the first-period wholesale and the forward 
price in order to ensure that the buyer uses forwards instead of strategic inventory (i.e. 
to fulfill 1 0
FW FW FWw h v   ). Hence, he cannot set the first-period wholesale and the 
forward price independently from each other. 
By inserting the two prices into the reaction functions the decision variables and the 
corresponding profits can be calculated. A summary of the results is given in Table 16. 
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Case 2.2: 0u , 1
FW FW FWw h v   
In this case, the restriction of (7.21) is not binding. Hence, the supplier can set both the 
first-period wholesale and the forward price independently from each other and, 
therefore, to their respective optimal levels. 
Inserting 0u  into (7.26) and (7.27) directly gives the first-period wholesale and the 
forward price: 
 1
1
2
FWw a  (7.31) 
 
9
16
FWv a  (7.32) 
The two prices in period one from (7.31) and (7.32) already deliver some interesting 
insights. In contrast to the standard model the first-period wholesale price is no longer 
dependent on the holding cost parameter. Instead, the supplier always uses the static 
price. Hence, the buyer’s option to use strategic inventory does no longer influence the 
wholesale price setting in period one and the supplier can use the first-period wholesale 
price purely to optimize his income gained by revenue from items that the buyer will 
directly sell to her customers. Hence, he no longer has to use the first-period wholesale 
price as a part of the two pricing block implementation. This decoupling leads to a 
generally lower first-period wholesale price in Case 2.2 of the FW model. 
Consequently, the double marginalization effect of this solution would be lower than in 
the standard model, which would improve the overall supply chain profit. 
Moreover, the forward price is always higher than the first-period wholesale price. 
Using the constraint  1
FW FW FWw h v  the minimum level of the holding cost parameter 
can be determined by calculating the difference between the two prices:63 
1
1
FW FW FW
FW FW FW
w h v
h v w
 
 
 
 
9 1
16 2
FW
h a a    (7.33) 
 
16
FW ah  (7.34) 
                                                 
63 The minimum level of the holding cost can also be found by inserting 0u  into (7.28). 
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Hence, as soon as condition (7.34) is fulfilled, the supplier is able to implement Case 
2.2. Otherwise, he can only implement Case 2.1. Table 16 summarizes the solution of 
Case 2.2. 
Table 16: Solution of the Forward Contract Model 
 
First-Best Standard Model Forward Contract Model 
  
Static Dynamic LFW UFW 
  
h   a / 4SM  h   a / 4
SM
 h   a / 16
FW
 h   a / 16
FW
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7.3 Comparisons of the Different Cases within the Forward Contract Model 
Reconsidering that the supplier controls whether the buyer uses strategic inventory or 
forwards, a comparison regarding the profits within the different cases has to be made. 
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Case 1 can be achieved by setting  1
FW FW FWw h v . In this case, the buyer would only 
use strategic inventory (for 
4
FW ah ) and the solution would be identical to the solution 
of the standard model. In Case 2, the buyer will use forwards instead of strategic 
inventory as 1
FW FW FWw h v  . However, Case 2 is divided into two sub-cases depending 
on the level of the holding costs. Case 2.1 is relevant, if the holding costs are low (i.e.

16
FW ah ). In this case, the supplier has to balance the first-period wholesale and the 
forward price in order to assure that the buyer uses forwards instead of strategic 
inventory. This case will be denoted as limited forward solution (LFW). In Case 2.2, the 
supplier is no longer limited by 1
FW FW FWw h v  , as the holding cost are high enough 
(i.e. 
16
a
h ) that he is able to set both the first-period wholesale price as well as the 
forward price to his desired levels. Case 2.2 will, therefore, be denoted as unlimited 
forward solution (UFW). 
While it is straightforward that the supplier will always prefer the unlimited over the 
limited case, it remains unclear whether he prefers the solution of the FW model over 
the solution of the standard model at all. Figure 37 displays which profit comparisons 
have to applied: 
 
Figure 37: Comparisons of Standard and Forward Contract Model 
 
For low holding cost (
16
a
h ), the solution of the limited forward contract model 
competes against the dynamic solution within the standard model. For the medium 
holding cost interval (
16 4
a a
h  ), the unlimited solution within the forward contract 
model gets available and competes against the dynamic solution of the standard model. 
Last, for high holding cost (
4
a
h ), the dynamic solution is no longer applicable. Hence, 
the unlimited solution of the FW model now competes against the static solution of the 
standard model. 
LFW 
h 
Forward 
Contact Model: 
h = a/16 
h = a/4 
Dynamic Static 
UFW 
Standard Model: 
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Alongside with the comparison of the supplier profits that are necessary to distinguish 
which solution he will implement, the profits of the buyer and the supply chain will also 
be compared. This way it can be determined, how these profits are altered by the 
supplier’s chosen alternative. Additionally, prior to the necessary comparisons, the two 
cases (LFW, UFW) within the FW model will also be compared in order to test, if the 
buyer and the supply chain also perform better in the UFW case. 
7.3.1 Comparison within the Forward Contract Model 
Within the forward contract model LWF and UFW need to be compared: 
Supplier: 
 

 



?
2 2 2?
2
?
Pr Pr
9 8 17
34 64
16
1 8
0
08
ofit Supplier LFW ofit Supplier UFW
a ah h a
b b
a h
b
 
   
?
2
0 16a h  (7.35) 
As already outlined above, (7.35) mathematically shows that the supplier always prefers 
the unlimited solution of the forward contract model. Therefore, he will implement the 
unlimited solution as soon as the holding costs are sufficiently high (
16
a
h ). 
Buyer: 


     

     
 

?
22 ?
2 2?
?
2 2
2
Pr Pr
35
256
195 2432 11008
73984
0 195 243
155 38
2 110
172
1156
0
08
ofit Buyer LFW ofit Buyer UFW
a
b
a a h h
b
a a h
ah h
b
h
a
 
        
?
0 195 a+688 h a-16 h  (7.36) 
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The buyer prefers the unlimited solution of the forward contract model over the limited 
solution if 
16
a
h . However, the unlimited solution cannot be implemented for 
16
a
h .64 
For 
16
a
h  , the buyer then prefers the limited solution of the forward contract model. 
Hence, the buyers preference is contrary to that of the supplier and she will always be 
confronted with the less favorable case of the FW model. Whether the buyer is, 
nevertheless, better off in comparison to the standard model, will be examined in the 
following comparisons. 
 
Supply Chain: 



     

     
   

 
?
2?
2 2?
2
2
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2
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256
263 4608 6400
0
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0 263 4608 6
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a a h h
b
a
h
h
a h
b
a h
a
 
        
?
0 263 a-400 h a-16 h  (7.37) 
Condition (7.37) shows that for 
16
a
h  the supply chain profit would be higher, if UFW 
would apply. However, only LFW can be implemented under these holding costs. For 
263
<h< a
16 400
a
 the profit would be larger under the limited solution. However, LFW is 
not chosen by the supplier. Lastly, for 
263
h> a
400
 the UFW solution outperforms the 
solution of LWF again. 
  
                                                 
64 Note, that the unlimited solution cannot be implemented, because of the buyer’s behavior: If the 
supplier would offer the prices of the unlimited solution, the buyer would build up inventory instead of 
ordering items at the forward price. To prohibit the utilization of inventory the supplier has to use the 
modified prices of the limited solution. As both supply chain members would prefer the unlimited 
solution, they could agree on implementing it using more sophisticated contracts. 
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7.3.2 Comparisons between Standard and Forward Contract Model 
 
Low Holding Costs: LFW versus dynamic 
The relevant interval of the holding costs is: 0 h <
16
a
 . For higher holding cost, the 
LWF solution gets replaced by the UFW solution. 
 
Supplier: 

    

     


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2 2 ?
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2 29 4 8
3
Pr Pr
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34
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34
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h
 
    
?
5 16 0h a h  (7.38) 
The supplier prefers the LWF solution over the dynamic solution if 
5
16
h a . Hence, 
within the relevant interval, he always prefers the solution with forwards instead of 
strategic inventory. 
 
Buyer: 
       

 

 
 
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1156 1
r Pr
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h h
 
    
?
13 11 0h a h  (7.39) 
The buyer prefers the LWF solution over the dynamic solution of the standard model if 
13
11
h a . Thus, in the relevant interval the buyer is better off, if forwards are offered by 
the supplier. 
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Supply Chain: 
      

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    
?
163 338 0h a h  (7.40) 
It has already been shown that both supplier and buyer prefer the LWF solution over the 
dynamic solution. Consequently, the supply chain performance is also better under the 
LFW solution of the forward contract model in comparison to the dynamic solution of 
the standard model. 
In summary, switching from the standard model towards the forward contract model is 
profit enhancing for the individual supply chain members and for the entire supply 
chain if holding costs are low (h <
16
a
). 
 
Medium Holding Costs: UFW versus dynamic SM 
Next, the solutions of the forward contract model and the standard model for the 
holding cost interval 
16 4
a a
h   are conducted. For lower holding cost, the UFW 
solution would not be possible in the FW model and for higher holding cost the static 
solution would replace the dynamic solution in the standard model. 
 
Supplier: 
?
2 ?
2 2
2 2
?
Pr Pr
17
64
9 4 8
128 256
1088
34
0
ofit Supplier UFW ofit Supplier Dynamic SM
a
b
a a h h
b
a a h h
b
    


    


 
      
?
2 2128 256 0a a h h  (7.41) 
The supplier prefers the unlimited advanced orders over the dynamic solution, if 

 
4 17
0.508
16
h a a . As the dynamic solution cannot be implemented, if h >
4
a
 , the 
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supplier always prefers the UFW solution of the FW model over the dynamic solution 
of the standard model. 
 
Buyer: 
?
2 2
2 22 ?
?
155  118 304
115
Pr Pr
35
256
195 7552 19456
0
73984
6 
a
ofit Buyer UFW ofit Buyer Dynamic SM
a
b
a a h h
a h h
b
b
     


     

 
       
?
2 2195 7552 19456 0a a h h  (7.42) 
The buyer is also better off under UFW, as she would only prefer the dynamic solution 
if 
59 17 61
0.412
304 608
h a a
 
     
 
, which is outside of the relevant interval (the dynamic 
solution would have already been replaced by the static solution under such high 
holding costs). 
 
Supply Chain: 
?
2 2 ?
2 22 ? 4
Pr Pr
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256
263
61 254 576
1
16256
15
36864
0
7
6
3984
ofit Supply Chain UFW ofit Supply Chain Dynamic SM
a
b
a a h h
h
b
b
a a h



  
     
  


 
       
?
64 263 576 0a h a h  (7.43) 
Again, both supplier and buyer prefer the solution of the forward contract model over 
the solution of the standard model. Consequently, the supply chain must also perform 
better in the FW model compared to the standard model. This can also be seen 
mathematically (7.43) as the dynamic solution would only be better if 
263
576
h a . 
However, for such high holding costs it would already been replaced by the static 
solution. 
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In summary, the FW model always outperforms the standard model for all supply chain 
members and, therefore, also improves the supply chain performance for medium 
holding costs (
16 4
a a
h  ). 
 
High Holding Costs: UFW versus static SM 
In the last interval (
4
a
h ), the dynamic solution is no longer feasible as holding costs 
are too high. Therefore, the UFW solution of the FW model needs to be compared 
against the static solution of the standard model. 
 
Supplier: 
?
2 ? 2
4
Pr Pr
17
64
ofit Supplier UFW ofit Supplier Static SM
a
b
a
b



 
 
2 ?
64
0
a
b
 (7.44) 
Buyer: 
?
22 ?
Pr Pr
35
256 8
ofit Buyer UFW ofit Buyer Static SM
a
b
a
b


 
 
2 ?3
0
256
a
b
 (7.45) 
Supply Chain: 
?
2 ? 23
8
Pr Pr
103
256
ofit Supply Chain UFW ofit Supply Chain Static SM
a
b
a
b


 
 
2 ?7
0
256
a
b
 (7.46) 
The three comparisons ((7.44), (7.45) and (7.46)) prove that the unlimited solution of 
the forward contract model is always superior to the static solution. 
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Therefore, the solutions of the FW model (LFW and UFW) always perform better than 
their relevant counterparts of the standard model (dynamic and static). For low holding 
costs ( 
16
a
h ), the supplier can only implement the limited solution as he is forced to 
ensure that the buyer uses forwards instead of strategic inventory. Although the buyer 
would also prefer the unlimited solution, it only becomes available if holding costs are 
sufficiently high ( 
16
a
h ). 
7.4 Detailed Analysis of Decisions and Profits within the Forward Contract Model 
As shown in Table 16, strategic inventory gets successfully removed by forwards in the 
FW model. Further, the profit comparisons have shown that both buyer and supplier are 
always better off in the FW model. However, it remains unclear to which extend the 
elimination of holding cost is the driving factor for the improvement of the individual 
profits in the FW model. To analyze this, the profits of the standard model are modified 
with the holding costs. For the supplier, a fictional profit is calculated that shows his 
profit, if he would gain the entire improvement due to a holding cost removal 
( SM SM SM
S
h I   ). Figure 38 shows that the suppliers profit enhancement in the FW 
model exceeds the savings caused by the removal of the holding cost (all figures are 
normalized with 100a  and 1b  ). Hence, additional factors must exist that further 
improve his profit (i.e. either via an additional increase of supply chain profit or via 
extracting a part of the buyer’s profit). 
 
Figure 38: Profit Supplier in the Forward Contract Model 
For the buyer, a similar approach is used. Here, the fictional profit is considered that 
would occur, if she no longer had to pay the holding costs ( SM SM SM
B
h I   ). As shown 
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in Figure 39, with the exception of a low holding cost parameter the improvement of the 
FW model also exceeds the improvement that can be expected due to the removal of 
holding costs. 
 
Figure 39: Profit Buyer in the Forward Contract Model 
Hence, both the supplier and the buyer can improve their profit to a larger extent than 
given by the additional profit due to the holding cost removal. As the savings must also 
be distributed among supplier and buyer (i.e. they can only get a faction of the entire 
savings), the effect for the whole supply chain gets even more distinctive (Figure 40). 
Regarding the entire supply chain, the virtual benchmark is obtained by: 
  SM SM SM
SC
h I . 
 
Figure 40: Profit Supply Chain in the Forward Contract Model 
Even, if holding costs would be saved, the supply chain performance in the FW model 
is always above the supply chain performance of the standard model without holding 
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costs. The FW model even always outperforms the best case scenario ( 0SMh  ) of the 
standard model. A step by step comparison of the decision variables between standard 
and forward contract model will show, where this additional improvement arises. 
In the following, the development of the decision variables under increasing holding 
cost will be examined in more detail. Again, the parameters 100a   and 1b   will be 
used for the graphical illustrations. The utilization of these parameters is without loss of 
generality. 
In the first-period, two prices have to be compared (Figure 41). While the first-period 
wholesale price of the forward contract model can be directly compared to its 
counterpart of the standard model, there is no direct counterpart for the forward price. 
However, from the buyer’s perspective the forward price determines the price to possess 
an item at the start of the second period. Hence, the SM counterpart can simply be 
obtained by adding the per unit holding cost to the first-period wholesale price 
(
1
SM SM
w h ). 
 
Figure 41: First-Period Prices Forward Contract Model 
In the standard model, the first-period wholesale price had two functions. First, it 
determines to which price the buyer can purchase goods that are meant to be directly 
resold in the first-period. Second, it also determines to which costs she can build up 
inventory in the second period. Hence, the supplier had to balance his first-period 
wholesale price to fulfill both functions as best as possible. To control the buyer’s 
strategic inventory build-up, he had to set a higher first-period wholesale price in the 
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first-period. This, however, increases the double marginalization effect at the cost of 
supply chain performance. 
In the unlimited solution of the FW model, the supplier can perfectly separate both 
functions of the first-period wholesale price. Thus, he can set the first-period wholesale 
price to his desired level maintaining the level of double marginalization identical to the 
static solution. Moreover, he is willing to let the buyer build up goods for the second 
period (here: forwards) as he gets a higher price for those items (
1
SM
w  versus FWv ). As a 
result, he will set the forward price to his profit maximizing level in the unlimited 
solution of the forward contract model. 
In the limited case of the FW model, the supplier is forced to move away from his 
desired values that he can achieve in the unlimited solution in order to ensure that the 
buyer uses forwards instead of inventory. However, as he still is able to additionally 
charge the per unit holding costs for second period goods (forwards), he can partly 
separate the two functions of the first-period wholesale price. This again leads to a 
lower first-period wholesale price and, thus, to a lower level of double marginalization. 
Also, as he can charge the per unit holding costs within the limits defined by his 
forward price, he is more willing to let the buyer build up second period goods and 
charges a lower price for those goods. This price is even lower than in the standard 
model as the level of the per unit holding costs hinders him from reaching his desired 
level. 
In summary, the first-period wholesale price is always lower in the forward contract 
model than in the standard model. Consequently, the buyer will sell more items to her 
customers (Figure 42). As a result, the double marginalization effect in the first-period 
is lower in the forward contract model leading to an additional profit enhancement in 
comparison to the standard model. Further, the supplier always extracts some of the 
profit enhancement due to the removal of holding costs by setting a forward price that is 
higher than the first-period wholesale price of the standard model (Figure 41). 
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Figure 42: First-period Selling Quantity Forward Contract Model 
Comparing the prices to build up items for the second period has already shown that 
these are also lower in the forward contract model. As shown by (7.19) differences 
between the amount of strategic inventory and forwards solely depend on differences 
between the prices to build up second period items. Consequently, the lower build-up 
price (
1
FW SM SM
v w h  ) in the forward contract model causes a higher size of forwards 
in the FW model in comparison to the strategic inventory size in the standard model 
(Figure 43). 
 
Figure 43: Forward Size in the Forward Contract Model 
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In the forward contract model the build-up of second period items is higher and 
maintains at a constant high level even if the holding costs increase. Thus, the impact of 
strategic items is always relevant in the forward contract model and does no longer get 
negligible, if the per unit holding cost rate are high. This is also reflected in the second 
period wholesale price of the supplier (Figure 44). 
 
Figure 44: Second Period Wholesale Price in the Forward Contract Model 
Due to the higher amount of items that the buyer possesses at the start of period two, the 
supplier will set a lower second period wholesale price as he only considers the buyer’s 
residual demand of the second period. Due to the lower second period wholesale price, 
the buyer will again sell more items in comparison to the standard model (Figure 45). 
Hence, the double marginalization effect is even stronger reduced by the utilization of 
forwards than it was reduced by strategic inventory in the standard model leading to a 
further improvement of supply chain performance. The described reduction of double 
marginalization becomes even more pronounced because the forwards were purchased 
at a lower price than in the standard model. 
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Figure 45: Second Period Selling Quantity in the Forward Contract Model 
7.5 Conclusions on the Forward Contract Model 
The analysis of the forward contract model has shown that strategic inventory can be 
completely removed from supply chains by allowing the buyer to order forwards from 
the supplier. These forwards replace strategic inventory and inherit its strategic function 
(i.e. enforcing the supplier to set a lower second period wholesale price). As forwards 
are not physically present at the end of period one, the holding costs that occurred 
through strategic inventory no longer occur. 
Moreover, the detailed analysis has shown that the first-period wholesale price had to 
fulfill two functions in the standard model. On the one hand, it determines the price that 
the buyer has to pay for goods that he has to pay for items that she wants to directly 
resell to her customers. On the other hand, it determines to which costs the buyer can 
build up inventory. In the forward contract model, the supplier can better separate these 
functions, as he can set prices for both functions separately. 
For low holding costs, the supplier must ensure that the buyer will use forwards instead 
of strategic inventory by keeping the difference between first-period wholesale price 
and forward price at the level of the holding costs. Offering the two different prices in 
the first-period also allows him to partly extract the savings due to the removal of the 
holding cost for the strategic inventory. However, as soon as the holding costs are high 
enough the supplier does no longer need to prohibit the buyer from using a strategic 
inventory instead of forwards. The supplier then can implement his desired prices as the 
buyer will prefer using forwards instead of building up strategic inventory. 
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Due to the improved separation regarding the two functions of the first-period 
wholesale price, the supplier is able to set a lower first-period wholesale price which 
will decrease the double marginalization effect in the first-period. And, also in the 
second period, the double marginalization effect gets reduced: As the supplier can partly 
extract the saved holding costs utilizing the forward price, he is more willing to let the 
buyer build up forwards than he was willing to let the buyer build up strategic 
inventory. This leads to a higher forward quantity in comparison to the strategic 
inventory size. As a result of the high size of forwards, the supplier will also charge a 
lower second period wholesale price. Consequently, the reduced double marginalization 
effect in both periods provide an additional boost of supply chain performance, so that 
the total profit enhancement of the forward contract model goes even beyond the 
improvement that was expected due to the saved holding costs. Both supplier and buyer 
are able to achieve a higher profit level in comparison to the standard model and, 
therefore, the supply chain performance is also closer to the first-best solution. The first-
best solution, however, cannot be achieved as double marginalization is not fully 
removed via the forward contract. 
Last, the impact of forwards is no longer limited by the level of the per unit holding 
costs. In the standard model, the impact of strategic inventory reduces, if holding costs 
increase, and even disappears, if the per unit holding costs are prohibitively high. In the 
forward contract model, instead, higher per unit holding costs even increase the impact 
on the supply chain decisions. As forwards impact the solution of the supply chain 
regardless of the actual level of the per unit holding costs and both supplier and buyer 
prefer the utilization of forwards over the utilization of strategic inventory, the impacts 
of forwards should be considered in multi-period supply chain interactions alongside 
with the impacts of strategic inventory. 
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8 Conclusions and Outlook 
The research objective of this thesis is to contribute to the relative new research stream 
of strategic inventory in multi-period interaction in vertical supply chains. In Chapter 3 
the profit loss that is caused by the double marginalization effect and the effectiveness 
of a coordinating contract was reviewed. Moreover, the standard model of Anand et al 
(2008) that features multi-period interaction within a vertical supply chain was 
presented. In the standard model that serves as a baseline for the theoretical extensions 
of this thesis, buyers build up strategic inventory to offset the monopoly power of the 
supplier in the second period. Hence, the utilization of strategic inventory clearly differs 
from the classical reasons to hold inventory that were briefly summarized in first section 
of chapter 2. By building up a strategic inventory the buyer is able to force the supplier 
to set a lower second period wholesale price. The supplier, in turn, anticipates the 
inventory build-up of the buyer and increases the first-period wholesale price. This way 
he can implement an internal two block scheme in the second period. 
While the strategic interaction through inventory may improve supply chain 
performance in the case of a simple wholesale price contract for both supply chain 
members, it prevents the coordinating effect of more complex contracts at the same 
time. Hence, despite its profit enhancing effects strategic inventory is also a threat for 
the supply chain performance. 
In chapter 4, a laboratory study was presented that is the first empirical validation on the 
effects of strategic inventories in supply chain management. The results deliver clear 
evidence for the behavioral relevance of strategic inventories and the efficiency 
enhancing effect that qualitatively is perfectly in line with the theoretical results and that 
quantitatively goes even beyond the equilibrium prediction. It is shown that this 
enhancement of supply chain performance cannot be uniquely attributed to fairness 
preferences of the suppliers or to the perception of contract failure risk. Instead, an 
empowerment of the buyers is identified as she is able to reduce the suppliers profit 
with her inventory size decision. This empowerment may also influence the suppliers’ 
perception of contract failure risk leading to lower than predicted average wholesale 
prices. Moreover, it can be observed that the supplier is willing to forgo the additional 
profit that can be achieved by the adoption of strategic inventory. Hence, he is willing to 
reduce his first-period wholesale price as long as he remains at the profit level that he 
would have achieved if no strategic inventory would be utilized. Hardly any suppliers 
are observed, who are willing to share their payoffs beyond this point. Hence, this 
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payoff seems to be a decisive benchmark, a focal point, for the suppliers’ fairness 
concerns. 
The findings of the presented laboratory study have several implications for supply 
chain management. First, the findings suggest that when holding costs are reasonably 
low, inventories may (at least partially) be adopted for strategic reasons, both enhancing 
the supply chain performance and empowering the buyer. In other words, the results 
give strong empirical support to the theoretical findings of Anand et al (2008). Second, 
the results suggest that there may be behavioral effects that top off the purely strategic 
effect. Seeking a more equitable payoff distribution in the supply chain, the empowered 
buyers may harm the supply chain performance by choosing suboptimally small 
inventories. But, this negative effect of buyer empowerment on supply chain 
performance is generally offset by the positive effect of the low first-period prices. 
Third, the results highlight that the positive effects on supply chain performance can 
only be achieved with some flexibility concerning the distribution of profits. There is 
evidence that the extent of profit sharing may strongly depend on focal points that 
emerge from the interaction situation and induce upper bounds for the willingness to 
share. Obviously, such focal points may be based on historical, legal, or cultural details 
of the interaction environment. 
In chapter 5, horizontal competition was integrated into the model by allowing an 
arbitrary number of competing buyers. Hence, the impact of horizontal competition on 
the vertical competition between supplier and buyer(s) was analyzed. It is shown that 
the impact of strategic inventory reduces quickly if additional buyers exist within the 
supply chain. This is caused by the reduction of the monopoly power of the buyer, if the 
amount of buyers is increased. As a result, the double marginalization effect reduces 
strongly and, consequently, the room for improvement due to strategic inventory also 
decreases. Although, measuring the impact of strategic inventory by its ability to reduce 
the remaining inefficiency through the double marginalization effect gives a slightly 
better impression of the impact of strategic inventory, it can be summarized that 
strategic inventory only has a major impact on the supply chain solution, if the buyer’s 
side possesses a high degree of monopoly power. 
In the first section of chapter 6, the constant per unit holding cost rate of the standard 
model was replaced by a more appropriate approach with holding costs that depend on 
the purchasing price of the buyer: Instead of using a constant per unit holding cost rate, 
the holding costs are determined by an inventory interest rate that gets multiplied with 
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the purchasing price. The results of this inventory interest rate model indicate no strong 
structural differences towards the standard model with constant per unit holding costs 
rates. However, as the supplier also determines the buyer’s holding cost by setting the 
first-period wholesale price, he will set this price lower in comparison to the standard 
model. As a result, the buyer will build up slightly larger strategic inventory sizes and 
the double marginalization effect is reduced stronger than in the standard model. As the 
buyer participates stronger from the arising additional profit enhancement, she also is 
always better off under the dynamic solution. In summary, the inventory interest model 
further highlights the impact of strategic inventory in multi-period vertical competition, 
as it also plays a pivotal role, if holding costs are accounted as dependent from the 
purchasing costs. As long as the inventory interest rate is not prohibitively high both 
supply chain members always prefer the dynamic solution and the impact of strategic 
inventory is slightly larger in the inventory interest rate model than in the standard 
model. 
In the second section of chapter 6, the discounted cash flow approach of Desai et al. 
(2010) with both a discount factor for the second period and a constant per unit holding 
cost rate was examined and compared to the IIR model. In contrast to the previous 
variants of holding costs, the supplier gets also affected by this modification of the 
discounted cash flow model as his fraction of profits that is realized in the second period 
gets discounted as well. Hence, for the supplier the interest rate determines the costs of 
selling units in the second period instead of realizing those sales in the first-period (i.e. 
the higher the interest rate the higher is the supplier’s incentive to sell units in the first-
period). As a result, the supplier has an incentive to lower the first-period wholesale 
price in order to encourage the buyer to build up a higher strategic inventory that partly 
pulls the supplier’s realization of profits into the first-period. This new utilization of 
strategic inventory in the discounted cash flow model massively impacts the model’s 
solution leading to structural differences in comparison to the standard and the 
inventory interest rate model. 
In the discounted cash flow model, the supplier has to balance the usage of strategic 
inventory between the function to implement a well-fitting two-price block scheme and 
the function to reduce the impact of the discounting of the second period profit. For low 
interest rates, the latter is less important and the supplier can focus on setting diverse 
prices between the first and the second period in order to implement a well-fitting two-
pricing block scheme across periods. For increasing interest rates, however, the supplier 
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has to focus on reducing the effects of the discounting by lowering the first-period 
wholesale price. This usage is getting so dominating over the two-price block effect that 
for high interest rates the first-period wholesale price is even lower than the second 
period wholesale price. This low first-period wholesale price results in a higher strategic 
inventory build-up and, consequently, also in a lower second period wholesale price in 
comparison to the standard model. As mainly the buyer profits from the profit 
enhancing effect of a reduced double marginalization effect, the supplier does no longer 
always prefer the dynamic over the static solution. However, the interest rate at which 
he will implement the static solution is significantly higher than the maximum inventory 
interest rate of the inventory interest rate model under which the dynamic solution is 
feasible. 
In chapter 7, a situation is modeled where the supplier possesses the opportunity to offer 
his buyer an option to preorder items in the first-period at a specific preorder price. 
These items than get delivered to the customer at the beginning of the second period. 
This described contract modification of the forward contract model aims on removing 
the holding cost of strategic inventory by offering a non-physical version of strategic 
items that does not cause holding costs while fulfilling the same function as inventory. 
The analysis of the forward contract model shows that indeed both supplier and buyer 
are always better off in the forward contract model and, therefore, strategic inventory 
gets successfully replaced by preorders. The relative performance of the forward 
contract model depends on the level of the per unit holding costs. However, in contrast 
to previous models an increase of the holding costs is beneficial for the supply chain 
performance: 
For low holding costs, the supplier has to ensure that the buyer will use forwards instead 
of strategic inventory by keeping the difference between first-period wholesale price 
and preorder price at the level of the holding costs. Offering the two different prices in 
the first-period also allows him to partly extract the savings due to the removal of the 
holding cost for the strategic inventory. However, as soon as the holding costs are high 
enough the supplier does no longer need to prohibit the buyer from using a strategic 
inventory instead of preorders. The supplier then can implement his desired prizes as 
the buyer will prefer using forwards instead of building up strategic inventory. Hence, 
the forward contract model is also able to (partly) remove the negative effects regarding 
double marginalization that was caused by the increased first-period wholesale price in 
the standard model. 
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Finally, the results of this thesis also have some implications for future research, 
emphasizing that the role of strategic inventories should be considered both in non-
cooperative supply chain modeling and in behavioral research. 
Anand et al. (2008) have shown that strategic inventory is relevant for any convex and, 
moreover, under certain conditions also for concave demand functions. However, they 
have only considered demand functions in which the demand of the second period is 
independent of the first-period selling quantity. In practice, however, recent selling 
quantities might impact the future demand. Hereby, both a negative as well as a positive 
correlation between future demand and recent selling quantities might occur: 
Considering the life cycle of a product, a negative correlation might, for example, exist 
if the market gets saturated by recent selling quantities. In turn, a positive correlation, 
for example, is possible if recent selling quantities help to establish the product on the 
market. Both correlations might interfere with the buyer’s willingness to build up 
strategic inventory and should, therefore, be examined carefully. 
Moreover, in the current literature on strategic inventory, operative reasons to build up 
inventory (e.g. safety stock, cycle inventory, anticipation stock) are ruled out by design 
in order to investigate the pure effect of strategic inventory. However, in order to get 
valid evidence on the practical relevance of strategic inventory, the operational reasons 
to build up inventory need to be considered. For example, buyers might have an 
incentive to build up inventories both to hedge against uncertainties (safety stock) as 
well as through strategic considerations. In such a scenario, the buyers might be able to 
use their entire unsold goods as a strategic tool, while the supplier would anticipate this. 
Hence, the findings of Anand et al. (2008) cannot directly be transferred to such a (more 
realistic) scenario. Also, the existence of cycle inventory and anticipation stock (both on 
the side of the supplier and/ or the buyer) might interfere with the utilization of strategic 
inventory. 
Another important open issue is the design of simple, dynamic contracts that can be 
used to implement the optimal supply chain performance in the presence of strategic 
inventories. So far, only relatively complex contracts have been developed (e.g. 
supplier-to-customer rebates). Moreover, these contracts have to be tested under 
scenarios with both strategic as well as operational reasons to build up inventory. It 
would be interesting to examine, under which conditions advanced contracts are 
strategically feasible and behaviorally robust. 
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Another direction for further research is to study the role of information asymmetries, 
especially regarding the inventory size in a setting with strategic inventories. It is not 
yet clear how the supplier can set optimal wholesale prices without the exact knowledge 
of the inventory size. More complex contracts, such as screening contracts, may be 
necessary to successfully deal with these information asymmetries. But, if the contracts 
become too complex, it may be more effective to rely on less sophisticated contractual 
agreements that take truth-telling and trust into account (see e.g. Charness and 
Dufwenberg (2011), Inderfurth et al. (2013)). 
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Appendix: 
Appendix A: Sample Instructions of the Experimental Study including the 
Corresponding Profit Tables 
Instructions  
Please read the instructions carefully and raise your hand, if you have a question. 
In the experiment, in which you participate now, you can earn lab dollars (LD) that will 
be converted into money and paid to you at the end of the experiment. The amount of 
LD that you will earn in each of the decision rounds depends both on your decisions and 
the decisions of your co-player. Every decision you make in the experiment is 
anonymous. 
Background: 
You are in a vertical supply chain consisting of one supplier and one buyer. At the 
beginning of the game you will be assigned either the role of the supplier or of the 
buyer. This allocation will be maintained in all 15 rounds of the experiment. At the 
beginning of each round you will be randomly assigned to one player with the other 
role. Each round is divided into five stages (see figure): 
  
 
1. stage: supplier determines 
 the wholesale price of period 1  
2. stage: buyer determines 
his inventory size 
4. stage: supplier determines  
the wholesale price of period 2 
2. stage: buyer terminates 
 the game 
3. stage: automated selling: 
buyer sells the optimal  
quantity to his customers 
5. stage: automated selling: 
buyer sells the optimal  
quantity to his customers 
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Stage 1: Decision of the Supplier in Period 1 
In the first decision stage of the experiment, the supplier sets the wholesale price at 
which the buyer may purchase goods in the first-period. For the wholesale price each 
value in the interval from 0 to 152 with a maximum precision of three digits after the 
decimal point is allowed. In the attached payout table the wholesale price of the first-
period is displayed on the left side of each table. However, the table does not include all 
feasible prices but only the 0 and the numbers in the interval between 52 and 84 in steps 
of four. Thus, the payout table serves only as guidance. For the prices not listed, use the 
profit calculator provided. 
      
wholesale 
price 
period 1 
0      
52      
56      
…      
84      
Stage 2: Decision of the Buyer in Period 1 
At the beginning of the second stage in period one the buyer is informed about the 
current wholesale price. Then, the buyer can decide whether to continue or to terminate 
the game. If the buyer terminates the game, the round ends immediately. If the buyer 
instead continues the game, he decides about his inventory size. Here, each value in the 
interval between 0 and 38 with a maximum precision of three digits after the decimal 
point is allowed. 
For each unit purchased to build up inventory the wholesale price of the first-period 
needs to be paid to the supplier. Additionally, holding costs of 4 LD per item are 
caused. In the attached payout table the inventory size is displayed in the upper left 
corner. Again, not all possible inventory sizes but only those in the interval between 0 
and 20 in steps of five are given. For other values the provided calculator can be used to 
obtain the corresponding profits. 
Appendix: 152 
      
wholesale 
price 
period 1 
0      
52      
56      
…      
84      
Stage 3: Automated Vending of the Buyer in Period 1 
If the game was not terminated, an automated vending for the first-period is operated 
after the buyer has decided about his inventory size. In this stage, the program calculates 
the optimal selling quantity of the buyer and sells them on the market. The optimal 
selling quantity only depends on the wholesale price of the first-period, but not on the 
inventory size of the buyer. 
Stage 4: Decision Supplier in Period 2 
If the game was not terminated, the buyer’s inventory size will be communicated to the 
supplier and the supplier is prompted to set the wholesale price of the second period. 
For the wholesale price, each value in the interval from 0 to 152 with a maximum 
precision of three digits after the decimal point is allowed. In the payout table the price 
of the second period is displayed in the columns (top edge). Again, only the 0 and the 
values in the interval between 52 and 84 are given in steps of four. For further 
calculations the provided calculator can be used. 
inventory wholesale price period 2 
 0 52 56 … 84 
wholesale 
price 
period 1 
0      
52      
56      
…      
84      
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Stage 5: Automated Vending of the Buyer in Period 2 
If the game was not terminated, again an automated vending for the second period will 
be conducted after the supplier has set the wholesale price of the second period. Again, 
the exact quantity that maximizes the profit of the buyer will be sold. If the buyer built 
up inventory in the first-period, he can use these goods for the vending process and 
needs to buy fewer units from the buyer in the second period. Thus, the optimal selling 
quantity of the second period depends on both the wholesale price of the second period 
and the inventory size of the buyer. It should be noted that the buyer will not purchase 
further goods from the supplier in the second period, if the wholesale price of the 
second period is too high. In this case, the buyer would only sell his inventory to the 
external market. 
Calculation of the Profits of each Round: 
After all decisions have been made, the profits of the current round for both the supplier 
and the buyer will be displayed. If the trade was rejected, the profit would be zero LD 
for both players. In all other cases, the respective profits for the specified values of the 
wholesale prices and the inventory size correspond to the profits given by the payout 
table or the calculator. 
Control Question: 
The wholesale price of the first-period is 72 LD, the inventory size is 15 and the 
wholesale price of the second period is 60 LD. What are the profits of the supplier and 
the buyer for this round? Please use the payout table and write down your answers on 
the prepared paper. Please wait until we have checked your responses. A correct 
answering of this control question is required to participate in the experiment. 
How will the payment be carried out? 
Your payment (in Euros) matches the sum of your LD divided by 3000. This means that 
30 LD correspond to exactly 1 euro cent. You will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
Please wait until we call your name. 
 
Good luck.  
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Profit Table Supplier (LC and HC): 
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 0 1.300 1.344 1.380 1.408 1.428 1.440 1.444 1.440 1.428
52 1.300 2.600 2.644 2.680 2.708 2.728 2.740 2.744 2.740 2.728
56 1.344 2.644 2.688 2.724 2.752 2.772 2.784 2.788 2.784 2.772
60 1.380 2.680 2.724 2.760 2.788 2.808 2.820 2.824 2.820 2.808
64 1.408 2.708 2.752 2.788 2.816 2.836 2.848 2.852 2.848 2.836
68 1.428 2.728 2.772 2.808 2.836 2.856 2.868 2.872 2.868 2.856
72 1.440 2.740 2.784 2.820 2.848 2.868 2.880 2.884 2.880 2.868
76 1.444 2.744 2.788 2.824 2.852 2.872 2.884 2.888 2.884 2.872
80 1.440 2.740 2.784 2.820 2.848 2.868 2.880 2.884 2.880 2.868
84 1.428 2.728 2.772 2.808 2.836 2.856 2.868 2.872 2.868 2.856
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 0 1.040 1.064 1.080 1.088 1.088 1.080 1.064 1.040 1.008
52 1.560 2.600 2.624 2.640 2.648 2.648 2.640 2.624 2.600 2.568
56 1.624 2.664 2.688 2.704 2.712 2.712 2.704 2.688 2.664 2.632
60 1.680 2.720 2.744 2.760 2.768 2.768 2.760 2.744 2.720 2.688
64 1.728 2.768 2.792 2.808 2.816 2.816 2.808 2.792 2.768 2.736
68 1.768 2.808 2.832 2.848 2.856 2.856 2.848 2.832 2.808 2.776
72 1.800 2.840 2.864 2.880 2.888 2.888 2.880 2.864 2.840 2.808
76 1.824 2.864 2.888 2.904 2.912 2.912 2.904 2.888 2.864 2.832
80 1.840 2.880 2.904 2.920 2.928 2.928 2.920 2.904 2.880 2.848
84 1.848 2.888 2.912 2.928 2.936 2.936 2.928 2.912 2.888 2.856
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 0 780 784 780 768 748 720 684 640 588
52 1.820 2.600 2.604 2.600 2.588 2.568 2.540 2.504 2.460 2.408
56 1.904 2.684 2.688 2.684 2.672 2.652 2.624 2.588 2.544 2.492
60 1.980 2.760 2.764 2.760 2.748 2.728 2.700 2.664 2.620 2.568
64 2.048 2.828 2.832 2.828 2.816 2.796 2.768 2.732 2.688 2.636
68 2.108 2.888 2.892 2.888 2.876 2.856 2.828 2.792 2.748 2.696
72 2.160 2.940 2.944 2.940 2.928 2.908 2.880 2.844 2.800 2.748
76 2.204 2.984 2.988 2.984 2.972 2.952 2.924 2.888 2.844 2.792
80 2.240 3.020 3.024 3.020 3.008 2.988 2.960 2.924 2.880 2.828
84 2.268 3.048 3.052 3.048 3.036 3.016 2.988 2.952 2.908 2.856
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 0 520 504 480 448 408 360 304 240 168
52 2.080 2.600 2.584 2.560 2.528 2.488 2.440 2.384 2.320 2.248
56 2.184 2.704 2.688 2.664 2.632 2.592 2.544 2.488 2.424 2.352
60 2.280 2.800 2.784 2.760 2.728 2.688 2.640 2.584 2.520 2.448
64 2.368 2.888 2.872 2.848 2.816 2.776 2.728 2.672 2.608 2.536
68 2.448 2.968 2.952 2.928 2.896 2.856 2.808 2.752 2.688 2.616
72 2.520 3.040 3.024 3.000 2.968 2.928 2.880 2.824 2.760 2.688
76 2.584 3.104 3.088 3.064 3.032 2.992 2.944 2.888 2.824 2.752
80 2.640 3.160 3.144 3.120 3.088 3.048 3.000 2.944 2.880 2.808
84 2.688 3.208 3.192 3.168 3.136 3.096 3.048 2.992 2.928 2.856
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 0 260 224 180 128 68 0 0 0 0
52 2.340 2.600 2.564 2.520 2.468 2.408 2.340 2.340 2.340 2.340
56 2.464 2.724 2.688 2.644 2.592 2.532 2.464 2.464 2.464 2.464
60 2.580 2.840 2.804 2.760 2.708 2.648 2.580 2.580 2.580 2.580
64 2.688 2.948 2.912 2.868 2.816 2.756 2.688 2.688 2.688 2.688
68 2.788 3.048 3.012 2.968 2.916 2.856 2.788 2.788 2.788 2.788
72 2.880 3.140 3.104 3.060 3.008 2.948 2.880 2.880 2.880 2.880
76 2.964 3.224 3.188 3.144 3.092 3.032 2.964 2.964 2.964 2.964
80 3.040 3.300 3.264 3.220 3.168 3.108 3.040 3.040 3.040 3.040
84 3.108 3.368 3.332 3.288 3.236 3.176 3.108 3.108 3.108 3.108
Wholesale 
Price 
Period 1
Inventory
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale 
Price 
Period 1
Wholesale 
Price 
Period 1
Inventory
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale 
Price 
Period 1
Inventory
Wholesale Price Period 2
10
15
20
Inventory
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale 
Price 
Period 1
Inventory
Wholesale Price Period 2
0
5
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Profit Table Buyer (LC): 
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 5.776 4.138 4.040 3.946 3.856 3.770 3.688 3.610 3.536 3.466
52 4.138 2.500 2.402 2.308 2.218 2.132 2.050 1.972 1.898 1.828
56 4.040 2.402 2.304 2.210 2.120 2.034 1.952 1.874 1.800 1.730
60 3.946 2.308 2.210 2.116 2.026 1.940 1.858 1.780 1.706 1.636
64 3.856 2.218 2.120 2.026 1.936 1.850 1.768 1.690 1.616 1.546
68 3.770 2.132 2.034 1.940 1.850 1.764 1.682 1.604 1.530 1.460
72 3.688 2.050 1.952 1.858 1.768 1.682 1.600 1.522 1.448 1.378
76 3.610 1.972 1.874 1.780 1.690 1.604 1.522 1.444 1.370 1.300
80 3.536 1.898 1.800 1.706 1.616 1.530 1.448 1.370 1.296 1.226
84 3.466 1.828 1.730 1.636 1.546 1.460 1.378 1.300 1.226 1.156
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 5.756 4.378 4.300 4.226 4.156 4.090 4.028 3.970 3.916 3.866
52 3.858 2.480 2.402 2.328 2.258 2.192 2.130 2.072 2.018 1.968
56 3.740 2.362 2.284 2.210 2.140 2.074 2.012 1.954 1.900 1.850
60 3.626 2.248 2.170 2.096 2.026 1.960 1.898 1.840 1.786 1.736
64 3.516 2.138 2.060 1.986 1.916 1.850 1.788 1.730 1.676 1.626
68 3.410 2.032 1.954 1.880 1.810 1.744 1.682 1.624 1.570 1.520
72 3.308 1.930 1.852 1.778 1.708 1.642 1.580 1.522 1.468 1.418
76 3.210 1.832 1.754 1.680 1.610 1.544 1.482 1.424 1.370 1.320
80 3.116 1.738 1.660 1.586 1.516 1.450 1.388 1.330 1.276 1.226
84 3.026 1.648 1.570 1.496 1.426 1.360 1.298 1.240 1.186 1.136
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 5.736 4.618 4.560 4.506 4.456 4.410 4.368 4.330 4.296 4.266
52 3.578 2.460 2.402 2.348 2.298 2.252 2.210 2.172 2.138 2.108
56 3.440 2.322 2.264 2.210 2.160 2.114 2.072 2.034 2.000 1.970
60 3.306 2.188 2.130 2.076 2.026 1.980 1.938 1.900 1.866 1.836
64 3.176 2.058 2.000 1.946 1.896 1.850 1.808 1.770 1.736 1.706
68 3.050 1.932 1.874 1.820 1.770 1.724 1.682 1.644 1.610 1.580
72 2.928 1.810 1.752 1.698 1.648 1.602 1.560 1.522 1.488 1.458
76 2.810 1.692 1.634 1.580 1.530 1.484 1.442 1.404 1.370 1.340
80 2.696 1.578 1.520 1.466 1.416 1.370 1.328 1.290 1.256 1.226
84 2.586 1.468 1.410 1.356 1.306 1.260 1.218 1.180 1.146 1.116
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 5.716 4.858 4.820 4.786 4.756 4.730 4.708 4.690 4.676 4.666
52 3.298 2.440 2.402 2.368 2.338 2.312 2.290 2.272 2.258 2.248
56 3.140 2.282 2.244 2.210 2.180 2.154 2.132 2.114 2.100 2.090
60 2.986 2.128 2.090 2.056 2.026 2.000 1.978 1.960 1.946 1.936
64 2.836 1.978 1.940 1.906 1.876 1.850 1.828 1.810 1.796 1.786
68 2.690 1.832 1.794 1.760 1.730 1.704 1.682 1.664 1.650 1.640
72 2.548 1.690 1.652 1.618 1.588 1.562 1.540 1.522 1.508 1.498
76 2.410 1.552 1.514 1.480 1.450 1.424 1.402 1.384 1.370 1.360
80 2.276 1.418 1.380 1.346 1.316 1.290 1.268 1.250 1.236 1.226
84 2.146 1.288 1.250 1.216 1.186 1.160 1.138 1.120 1.106 1.096
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 5.696 5.098 5.080 5.066 5.056 5.050 5.048 5.048 5.048 5.048
52 3.018 2.420 2.402 2.388 2.378 2.372 2.370 2.370 2.370 2.370
56 2.840 2.242 2.224 2.210 2.200 2.194 2.192 2.192 2.192 2.192
60 2.666 2.068 2.050 2.036 2.026 2.020 2.018 2.018 2.018 2.018
64 2.496 1.898 1.880 1.866 1.856 1.850 1.848 1.848 1.848 1.848
68 2.330 1.732 1.714 1.700 1.690 1.684 1.682 1.682 1.682 1.682
72 2.168 1.570 1.552 1.538 1.528 1.522 1.520 1.520 1.520 1.520
76 2.010 1.412 1.394 1.380 1.370 1.364 1.362 1.362 1.362 1.362
80 1.856 1.258 1.240 1.226 1.216 1.210 1.208 1.208 1.208 1.208
84 1.706 1.108 1.090 1.076 1.066 1.060 1.058 1.058 1.058 1.058
Wholesale 
Price 
Period 1
Inventory 20
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale 
Price 
Period 1
Inventory 15
Wholesale Price Period 2
Inventory 0
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale 
Price 
Period 1
Inventory 5
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale 
Price 
Period 1
Inventory 10
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale 
Price 
Period 1
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Profit Table Buyer (HC): 
 
  
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 0 1,300 1,344 1,380 1,408 1,428 1,440 1,444 1,440 1,428
52 1,300 2,600 2,644 2,680 2,708 2,728 2,740 2,744 2,740 2,728
56 1,344 2,644 2,688 2,724 2,752 2,772 2,784 2,788 2,784 2,772
60 1,380 2,680 2,724 2,760 2,788 2,808 2,820 2,824 2,820 2,808
64 1,408 2,708 2,752 2,788 2,816 2,836 2,848 2,852 2,848 2,836
68 1,428 2,728 2,772 2,808 2,836 2,856 2,868 2,872 2,868 2,856
72 1,440 2,740 2,784 2,820 2,848 2,868 2,880 2,884 2,880 2,868
76 1,444 2,744 2,788 2,824 2,852 2,872 2,884 2,888 2,884 2,872
80 1,440 2,740 2,784 2,820 2,848 2,868 2,880 2,884 2,880 2,868
84 1,428 2,728 2,772 2,808 2,836 2,856 2,868 2,872 2,868 2,856
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 0 1,040 1,064 1,080 1,088 1,088 1,080 1,064 1,040 1,008
52 1,560 2,600 2,624 2,640 2,648 2,648 2,640 2,624 2,600 2,568
56 1,624 2,664 2,688 2,704 2,712 2,712 2,704 2,688 2,664 2,632
60 1,680 2,720 2,744 2,760 2,768 2,768 2,760 2,744 2,720 2,688
64 1,728 2,768 2,792 2,808 2,816 2,816 2,808 2,792 2,768 2,736
68 1,768 2,808 2,832 2,848 2,856 2,856 2,848 2,832 2,808 2,776
72 1,800 2,840 2,864 2,880 2,888 2,888 2,880 2,864 2,840 2,808
76 1,824 2,864 2,888 2,904 2,912 2,912 2,904 2,888 2,864 2,832
80 1,840 2,880 2,904 2,920 2,928 2,928 2,920 2,904 2,880 2,848
84 1,848 2,888 2,912 2,928 2,936 2,936 2,928 2,912 2,888 2,856
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 0 780 784 780 768 748 720 684 640 588
52 1,820 2,600 2,604 2,600 2,588 2,568 2,540 2,504 2,460 2,408
56 1,904 2,684 2,688 2,684 2,672 2,652 2,624 2,588 2,544 2,492
60 1,980 2,760 2,764 2,760 2,748 2,728 2,700 2,664 2,620 2,568
64 2,048 2,828 2,832 2,828 2,816 2,796 2,768 2,732 2,688 2,636
68 2,108 2,888 2,892 2,888 2,876 2,856 2,828 2,792 2,748 2,696
72 2,160 2,940 2,944 2,940 2,928 2,908 2,880 2,844 2,800 2,748
76 2,204 2,984 2,988 2,984 2,972 2,952 2,924 2,888 2,844 2,792
80 2,240 3,020 3,024 3,020 3,008 2,988 2,960 2,924 2,880 2,828
84 2,268 3,048 3,052 3,048 3,036 3,016 2,988 2,952 2,908 2,856
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 0 520 504 480 448 408 360 304 240 168
52 2,080 2,600 2,584 2,560 2,528 2,488 2,440 2,384 2,320 2,248
56 2,184 2,704 2,688 2,664 2,632 2,592 2,544 2,488 2,424 2,352
60 2,280 2,800 2,784 2,760 2,728 2,688 2,640 2,584 2,520 2,448
64 2,368 2,888 2,872 2,848 2,816 2,776 2,728 2,672 2,608 2,536
68 2,448 2,968 2,952 2,928 2,896 2,856 2,808 2,752 2,688 2,616
72 2,520 3,040 3,024 3,000 2,968 2,928 2,880 2,824 2,760 2,688
76 2,584 3,104 3,088 3,064 3,032 2,992 2,944 2,888 2,824 2,752
80 2,640 3,160 3,144 3,120 3,088 3,048 3,000 2,944 2,880 2,808
84 2,688 3,208 3,192 3,168 3,136 3,096 3,048 2,992 2,928 2,856
0 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84
0 0 260 224 180 128 68 0 0 0 0
52 2,340 2,600 2,564 2,520 2,468 2,408 2,340 2,340 2,340 2,340
56 2,464 2,724 2,688 2,644 2,592 2,532 2,464 2,464 2,464 2,464
60 2,580 2,840 2,804 2,760 2,708 2,648 2,580 2,580 2,580 2,580
64 2,688 2,948 2,912 2,868 2,816 2,756 2,688 2,688 2,688 2,688
68 2,788 3,048 3,012 2,968 2,916 2,856 2,788 2,788 2,788 2,788
72 2,880 3,140 3,104 3,060 3,008 2,948 2,880 2,880 2,880 2,880
76 2,964 3,224 3,188 3,144 3,092 3,032 2,964 2,964 2,964 2,964
80 3,040 3,300 3,264 3,220 3,168 3,108 3,040 3,040 3,040 3,040
84 3,108 3,368 3,332 3,288 3,236 3,176 3,108 3,108 3,108 3,108
Wholesale 
Price 
Period 1
Inventory 20
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale 
Price 
Period 1
Wholesale 
Price 
Period 1
Inventory 10
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale 
Price 
Period 1
Inventory 15
Wholesale Price Period 2
Inventory 0
Wholesale Price Period 2
Wholesale 
Price 
Period 1
Inventory 5
Wholesale Price Period 2
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Appendix B: Fairness Inventory Size 
The buyer can use strategic inventory to reduce the absolute profit difference between 
herself and the supplier. The fairness inventory size that minimizes the profit difference 
is obtained by a comparison of the marginal profit of the supplier and the buyer with 
respect to the inventory size. 
The marginal profit of the buyer can be obtained by calculating the first derivative of 
the buyer’s profit function with respect to the inventory size. Under consideration of the 
automated determination of the selling quantities in both periods (see (3.38) and (3.33)) 
and under the assumption that the supplier will choose the optimal response wholesale 
price from (3.35) in the second period65, according to (3.30) the relevant profit function 
of the buyer is: 
 
 2 2 2 21 1 15 8 4 12 16 12
16
B
a a w w b a I b I w h b I
b
                 


  (9.1) 
Therefore, the derivation of the buyer’s profit function (9.1) is: 
 
 
 
1
1
3 3
4 2
114 3 .
B a w h b I
I
w h I

      

    
 (9.2) 
Hence, in the LC treatment (i.e., for 4h  ), the buyer should only build up inventory if 
1 110w  . Further, we see that the advantage of building up inventory is larger, the lower 
1w . Therefore, by setting a low wholesale price in the first-period, the supplier can 
influence the incentive of the buyer for building up inventory. This becomes visible 
from the optimality condition (setting the marginal profit in (9.2) equal to zero) so that 
the buyer’s profit maximizing inventory decision is derived as 1 1( ) (114 ) / 3BI w w h   . 
Further, the marginal profit of the inventory is diminishing. 
The influence of inventory on the supplier’s profit can be obtained similarly. Because of 
the automation of the buyer’s selling quantities, the optimal response quantities again 
need to be inserted into the profit function (3.29) of the supplier. Under the assumption 
that the supplier will choose the optimal response wholesale price in the second period, 
the relevant profit function of the supplier is: 
                                                 
65 The analysis of the observed wholesale price decision of the supplier shows that this assumption is 
fulfilled. 
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2 2 2 2
1 1 14 4 8 4 4
8
S
a a w w b w I b a I b I
b
               
 

 (9.3) 
Therefore, the derivation of the supplier’s profit function (9.3) is: 
 1
1
2
76 2 .
S aw b I
I
w I

   

   
 (9.4) 
If the buyer aims to minimize the profit difference by using strategic inventory, she 
should only lower her inventory size, if her marginal disadvantage of this action is 
lower than the corresponding marginal disadvantage of the supplier. The inventory size, 
for which the marginal profits from (9.2) and (9.4) are equal, therefore, is: 
 
1
1
2 1
5 5
5 8 4
10
38 .
a w h
I
b
w h
    


    
 (9.5) 
As a negative inventory is not possible, the fairness inventory size is given by: 
 
 
1
1
2 1
5 5
5 8 4
max 0,
10
max 0, 38 .
a w h
I
b
w h
     
  
 
    
 (9.6) 
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Appendix C: Profit Comparison between Static and Dynamic Solution in the 
Horizontal Competition Model 
 
Profit Comparison Supplier: 
 
       
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2 2 4 3
?
24 4 4 8 4 0HCM HCMh ha N N a N N N   (9.7) 
The left-hand side of (9.7) has a double zero spot at 
 
h
2 1
HCM a
N N

 
. Hence, the 
condition is either always violated or fulfilled. Inserting 0HCMh  , for example, shows 
that (9.7) is always fulfilled and that the supplier’s profit is always larger in the dynamic 
solution in comparison of the static solution regardless of the number of buyers within 
the supply chain. 
 
Profit Comparison (Single) Buyer: 
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   
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The left-hand side of (9.8) has zero spots at  
 
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I
N N

 
 and at
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 .I  does not need to be considered as the dynamic solution only applies for:  
    
 
h
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
 
. 
And  .II  only needs to be considered if it applies within the dynamic solution: 
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 4 3
?
5 2
(4 20 24 16 45 2 01)N N N N N       (9.9) 
For 1N   (i.e. in the standard model of Anand et al. (2009)) condition (9.9) is fulfilled 
and, therefore, there must exist both an interval of holding costs under which the buyer 
prefers the dynamic solution as well as an interval of holding costs under which the 
buyer prefers the static solution. Anand et al. (2009) have shown that the buyer prefers 
the dynamic solution if  
21
0.138
152
SMh a a . Increasing the number of buyers (e.g. 
2N  ) shows that condition (9.9) is no longer fulfilled. Hence, the buyers will always 
prefer either the dynamic or the static solution regardless of the level of the holding 
costs ( HCMh ). Inserting 2N   and 0HCMh   into (9.8) shows that the left-hand side is 
larger and, therefore, that the buyers will always prefer the dynamic over the static 
solution, if there is more than one buyer within the supply chain (i.e. if 2N  ). 
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Appendix D: Profit Comparison of the Static and Dynamic Solution in the 
Inventory Interest Rate Model 
 
Profit Comparison Supplier: 
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In order to test condition (9.10) it is important to consider whether its denominator is 
positive or negative: 
    
?2
17 4 4 0IIR IIRi i   (9.11) 
Condition (9.11) is fulfilled if 
1 3 2 1 3 2
2 2 2 2
IIR
i
 
    . As the dynamic solution is 
only feasible if 
1
0
2
IIR
i  , condition (9.11) is always fulfilled and, therefore, only the 
case of a positive denominator in (9.10) needs to be considered: 
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Condition (9.12) is fulfilled if 0.5IIRi  . Therefore, within the feasible range of the 
dynamic solution condition (9.12) is always fulfilled and the supplier always prefers the 
dynamic over the static solution. 
 
Profit Comparison Buyer: 
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84 96 40.5 8 0IIR IIR IIRi i i   (9.13) 
As condition (9.13) is fulfilled if 0.5IIRi  , the buyer is always better off under the 
dynamic solution in comparison to the static solution. 
Moreover, as both supplier and buyer are better off in the dynamic solution, the supply 
chain profit is also always larger in the dynamic solution. 
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Appendix E: Generality regarding the Parameter Choice in the Inventory Interest 
Rate Model 
Varying the b  parameter will influence the first-best, static and dynamic solutions of 
the standard model in the same way as in the corresponding solutions of the inventory 
interest model (see Table 2 and Table 12). If, for example, the parameter b  is doubled, 
the first-period wholesale price of the first-best, static and dynamic solution will divide 
in half both in the standard as well as in the inventory interest rate model. 
Varying the a  parameter will influence the first-best, static and dynamic solution of the 
inventory interest rate model in the same way (see Table 12). If, for example, the 
parameter a  is doubled, the first-period wholesale price of the first-best, static and 
dynamic solution will be doubled as well. 
In the dynamic case of the standard model, however, the ratio between a  and the 
holding cost parameter ( SMh ) is the decisive factor. Hence, if a  is doubled SMh  also 
needs to be doubled in order to get doubled result for the items displayed in Table 2. 
However, as SMh  gets replaced by     
2
1
: 9 17 4 4
SM IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR IIR
h i w i i a i i       
in the graphical illustrations of section 6, the modified results of the standard model 
show the same behaviour as in the inventory interest rate if a  is varied (e.g. if a  is 
doubled, both the results of the interest rate model as well as the modified results of the 
standard model will be doubled in the first-best, static and dynamic case). 
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Appendix F: Transformation of the Holding Cost Parameters between Standard 
and Inventory Interest Rate Model 
  
Figure 46: Error caused by the Direction of Transformation between Standard and 
Inventory Interest Rate Model 
On the right hand side, the holding cost parameter of the standard model (
SMh ) was 
transformed to an interest rate. The first-period wholesale prices ( 1
SMw / 1
IIRw ) were 
calculated by inserting 
SMh into  1SM SMw h  and by inserting the transformed interest rate 
1
SM
IIR
SM
h
i
w
 
 
 
 into 1 ( )
IIR IIRw i . On the left hand side, the transformation was made the other 
way around. Comparing both methods shows that no clear difference is visible as the 
created error is below 0.02%. 
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Appendix G: Profit Comparison between Inventory Interest Rate and Modified 
Standard Model (Dynamic Solutions) 
In the following comparison, the holding cost parameter of the standard model gets 
calculated from the inventory interest rate of the IIR model: 
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  (9.14) 
As the static solution of the IIR and the standard model are identical, only the area in 
which the dynamic solution applies (i.e. 0.5IIRi  ) has to be considered. Moreover, 
0
IIR
i   does not need to be considered, as the dynamic solutions of the IIR model and 
standard model are identical in this case. 
 
Profit Comparison Supplier: 
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Inserting (9.14) into (9.16): 
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For 0 0.5IIRi  , (9.18) can be simplified to: 
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As condition (9.19) is always fulfilled for 0 0.5IIRi  , the supplier’s profit is smaller 
in the IIR model in comparison to the benchmark obtained by the modified standard 
model. Note, however, that the difference (9.18) is relatively small. 
 
Profit Comparison Buyer: 
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For 0 0.5IIRi  , (9.24) can be simplified to: 
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As condition (9.25) is always fulfilled for 0 0.5IIRi  , the buyer’s profit is larger in 
the IIR model in comparison to the benchmark obtained by the modified standard 
model. 
 
Profit Comparison Supply Chain: 
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For 0 0.5IIRi  , (9.28) can be simplified to: 
    
3 2 ?
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As condition (9.29) always fulfilled for 0 0.5IIRi  , the overall supply chain profit is 
larger in the IIR model in comparison to the benchmark obtained by the modified 
standard model. 
  
Appendix: 168 
Appendix H: Generality regarding the Parameter Choice in the Discounted Cash 
Flow Model 
Varying the a  and b  parameter will influence the first-best, static and dynamic solution 
of the discounted cash flow as well as in the inventory interest model in the same way 
(see Table 12 and Table 14 + Table 15). If, for example, the parameter a  b  is 
doubled, the first-period wholesale price of the first-best, static and dynamic solution 
will divide in half (be doubled) both in the discounted cash flow as well as in the 
inventory interest rate model. 
The same holds for the relationship between the standard and the inventory interest rate 
model as shown in Appendix E. 
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Appendix I: Profit Comparison Discounted Cash Flow Model 
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Appendix J: Comparison of the Dynamic and Static Solution of the Discounted 
Cash Flow Model 
Combination of holding cost parameters ( DCFh , DCFi ) for which the dynamic supply chain 
profit is larger than the static profit: 
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